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Abstract 
 
This doctoral thesis explores specific intrapersonal processes which decision 
makers undergo when confronted with choices that tap into moral considerations. More 
precisely, it addresses the concept of sacred values, which generally refers to issues or 
entities which individuals deem as inviolable, absolute, and thus precluded from trade-
offs against other issues or values. It is argued that sacred values may powerfully shape 
decision making, and that specific intrapersonal processes operate when issues such as 
human rights or human dignity are treated as sacred. Moreover, sacred values may have 
two different effects on decision making, depending on the type of trade-off at hand. In 
taboo trade-offs (i.e., scenarios that pit a sacred value against a non-sacred issue), 
sacred values may facilitate decision making. In contrast, in tragic trade-offs (i.e., 
scenarios that pit two sacred values against each other), sacred values may hinder the 
choice process. 
The first of two papers examined the influence of sacred values and 
manipulation of trade-off type on perceived decision difficulty and negative emotions. 
The findings of two experiments show that taboo trade-offs were perceived as more 
negatively emotion-laden, but as easier to solve, compared to scenarios not involving 
sacred values (i.e., routine trade-offs). However, tragic trade-offs were experienced as 
particularly difficult and stressful. 
The second paper explored several indicators of conflict and self-regulation 
processes. Three experiments assessed measures of ambivalence, emotional stress, fear, 
and guilt, as a function of sacred value endorsement and trade-off type. The results 
demonstrate that individuals with higher sacred value endorsement showed more 
variation in intrapersonal measures depending on trade-off type than people with lower 
levels, and showed predominantly lower scores in taboo scenarios. 
Altogether, the results suggest that sacred values may, in fact, play the role of 
facilitators or barriers in decision making, and that they provoke specific (cognitive and 
affective) conflict and self-regulation processes. These results are mainly discussed on 
the background of dual process models and in terms of the functions of negative 
emotions in decision making when sacred values are called into question. 
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1. Introduction 
2   Introduction 
 
 
Human dignity is a fundamental and central principle in Western traditions of 
philosophy, law, and religion, and refers to the belief that each human being has an 
inherent, inviolable, and absolute significance that has to be protected unconditionally. 
According to Immanuel Kant’s (1797) seminal work on moral philosophy, there are 
beings and things which do not have a certain value or price, and thus cannot be simply 
compared or related to other values. However, they are “ends in themselves” and exist 
beyond all value. In other words, they possess their own dignity as an intrinsic worth.  
The concern of the principle of human dignity has been broadly expressed in 
international and national law, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(United Nations, 2002), or the Swiss Federal Constitution (Swiss Confederation, 1999). 
Moreover, human dignity has repeatedly been a central matter in a large variety of 
public controversies about political, societal, judicial, and economical issues. For 
instance, the discovery of severe maltreatments of terror suspects held in various U.S. 
army bases has prompted heated debates regarding whether torture should be allowed to 
force information from terror suspects about planned terror attacks. Other discussions 
have concerned the questions of whether research on stem cells using human embryos 
should be permitted, or whether death penalties should be reenacted in cases of severe 
violent crimes. In the public sphere, debates about such proposals often evoke harsh 
reactions of anger and outrage, and strong demands to affirm the rights and the dignity 
of human beings. 
To capture this phenomenon, psychologists have developed the concept of 
sacred values (or protected values), which generally refers to issues, entities, or beings 
which are seen as inviolable and infinitely significant (e.g., Baron & Spranca, 1997; 
Tanner, Ryf, & Hanselmann, 2009; Tetlock, 2003). Since individuals deem such values 
as absolute, they are often highly reluctant to make trade-offs of sacred values against 
other issues or values, particularly monetary benefits. Although previous research has 
widely contributed to a better comprehension of this phenomenon by examining 
people’s affective and behavioral reactions to observed violations of sacred values, still 
little is known about the processes which individuals undergo when they are themselves 
in the role of the decision maker, confronted with scenarios that put sacred values, for 
instance human dignity, at risk. Initial studies have suggested that individuals feel 
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emotionally disturbed and morally “contaminated” even when merely contemplating 
such choices and trade-offs (e.g., Tetlock, 2003). Hence, the aim of the present research 
is, in general terms, to address these decisions in more detail, and to explore the 
underlying intrapersonal processes. 
There are numerous domains in politics, economics, medicine, etc., in which 
individuals are faced with decisions that tap into sacred values, and are requested to 
make trade-offs and cost-benefit analyses. Politicians and government authorities, for 
example, have the duty to do the best possible for the protection and welfare of each 
citizen. However, due to restricted financial resources, they cannot escape cost-benefit 
analyses and are required to invest the money in a way which results in the best possible 
benefit. In other words, even though such a procedure obviously violates the principle 
that human lives, health, or dignity are absolute and protected from trade-offs, decision 
makers are obliged ex officio to put a monetary value on the life of each human being, 
in order to optimize the outcome for each individual. Such cost-benefit analyses are 
customary, for instance, when deciding how many policemen are required for the best 
possible security in a town, which safety measures should be taken to optimize traffic 
security, which environmental policies are implemented to minimize health risks, or 
which medicinal measures are justified to optimize the life quality of elderly people and 
prolong their lives. Another example of a decision scenario that potentially tapped into 
sacred values was the recent case of a convict on hunger strike in Switzerland, who tried 
to achieve a prison furlough. In this case, authority officials and doctors had to decide 
whether to apply force feeding. In doing so, they were confronted with the dilemma of 
whether to violate the convict’s integrity and right to self-determination by applying 
force feeding, or to neglect the authority’s duty to take care of people held in custody by 
letting him die of starvation. Another example of a particularly hard dilemma was 
provided by an article in the Air Security Act, which was enacted in Germany in 
response to the 9/11 attacks, but later declared as unconstitutional by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court. This article permitted the army to shoot down hijacked 
commercial airplanes once the hijackers’ intention to crash into civilian targets had 
become apparent. If such a case had become reality, it would have confronted a member 
of the government with the request to trade-off human lives against each other, and thus 
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to sacrifice lives in order to save other lives. Obviously, even though this scenario 
sounds very strange or even surreal, it may be predicted that most individuals, when 
faced with such fatal decisions, would struggle and contemplate desperately to come to 
a solution, suffering emotional stress which can hardly be surpassed.  
Hence, the goal of my research is to examine more thoroughly what decision 
makers go through when confronted with choices that tap into sacred values. According 
to Tetlock (2003), I assume that decisions on sacred values have a largely distinctive 
subjective significance, compared to ordinary “routine” choices. Sacred values may 
powerfully shape decision making, and I propose that specific intrapersonal processes 
operate when issues such as human rights, lives, or dignity are treated as sacred. 
Importantly, these processes may additionally be highly dependent on the extent of 
conflict which is experienced due to the type of trade-off. That is, a choice scenario in 
which a sacred value is pitted against another (not sacred) issue (i.e., taboo trade-off) 
should be experienced as much less conflicting and difficult to solve, because the sacred 
value at hand allows any trade-offs to be rejected from the outset. In sharp contrast, a 
tough dilemma involving two sacred values which compete against each other (i.e., 
tragic trade-off) should be experienced as particularly conflicting and difficult to solve 
because the decision maker is forced to choose the lesser of two evils. No matter what 
choice is made, he or she has to violate one of the two sacred values and to relinquish its 
absoluteness in order to come to a solution. Therefore, I assume that sacred values can 
have two different effects on decision making, dependent on trade-off types, thereby 
representing two sides of the same coin: Sacred values may help to ease decision 
making or hinder the choice process. In other words, they may play the role of 
facilitators or barriers in decision making, which I expect to be reflected in specific 
cognitive and affective processes. As I will outline below in more detail, I assume that 
negative emotions may play distinctive roles in choices which put sacred values at risk. 
Finally, it is important to note that my research does not focus on choices per se, but 
rather aims to shed light on processes and to provide a better comprehension of 
mechanisms behind the effects of sacred values in decision making. 
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1.1 Overview 
The outline of this doctoral thesis is as follows: In Section 1.2, I will first 
approach the concept of sacred values and trade-off reluctance, and then present some 
insights into specific characteristics with respect to sacred values that I deem as relevant 
for my research, such as emotional and motivational consequences, and associations 
with principled reasoning and self-identity. In Section 1.3, I will briefly present several 
methods to measure sacred value endorsements and some selected results with respect 
to the validation of the sacred values construct. In Section 1.4, I will give, as a 
preparation for my own work, a short general overview of findings from decision 
making research revealing possible determinants that render choices more or less 
difficult and emotion-laden. Subsequently, in Section 1.5, I will introduce my first 
research project which addressed the roles of sacred values as facilitators or barriers in 
decision making and explored the link with negative emotions. The results of this 
project have already been published (see Section 2; Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008). 
Following this, Section 1.6 outlines various theories and findings which provide 
potential (and, at least, partial) explanations for the processes underlying the facilitation 
and barrier effects of sacred values in decision making. Next, Section 1.7 introduces my 
second research project, which took a closer look at the mechanisms behind these 
effects and examined several cognitive and affective indicators for conflict and self-
regulation processes. The results of this research have been recently submitted for 
publication (see Section 3; Hanselmann, Tanner, & Duc, 2010). Sections 2 and 3 
contain the two manuscripts of the articles recently published or submitted, respectively. 
Finally, in Section 4, I will discuss the findings of the current research and present some 
ideas for future research.  
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1.2 Approaching the Concept of Sacred Values 
1.2.1 Sacred Values and Trade-Off Reluctance 
Normative theories of decision making, such as utility-based models, assume 
that each choice requires a trade-off between values or attributes if there is no clearly 
superior option. A trade-off means compensating for costs or disadvantages on one 
attribute with benefits or advantages on another attribute (e.g., Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; 
von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). For instance, a consumer looking for a new car 
may be concerned with the trade-off between the attributes purchase price, size, and 
motor performance. Assuming that this consumer gives more weight to the motor 
performance than to the other attributes, he will probably accept a higher price and a 
larger size in return for a better performance. According to the normative perspective, 
any types of values or attributes can be traded off, and individuals are always able to 
add up disadvantages and benefits in order to arrive at a choice which provides the best 
overall utility. Importantly, as a prerequisite for trade-offs and exchanges, economic 
models suggest that each value or entity has its own utility and exchange value, mostly 
in monetary form (e.g., Smith, 1776). In essence, this assumption holds for all types of 
values, including material and ideational values as well as abstract norms. In this vein, 
early theories of social exchange (e.g., Homans, 1961; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) 
characterize human relationships as a process of exchanging resources such as care, 
information, love, aversion, reputation, or financial rewards.  
In contrast to these theoretical assumptions, a growing number of empirical 
findings have demonstrated that individuals are often highly reluctant to make trade-
offs among certain values or entities and to sacrifice them in return for other values, 
particularly economic ones (e.g., Gregory & Lichtenstein, 1994; Ritov & Baron, 1999). 
Note that these findings also nicely reflect Kant’s (1797) theoretical notion of human 
dignity as an issue which cannot be compared with other values.  
To comprehend this phenomenon of trade-off reluctance, several authors assume 
that people treat certain values as absolute and protected from trade-offs with other 
values. Hence, such values have been conceptualized as sacred values (Fiske & Tetlock, 
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1997; McGraw & Tetlock, 2005; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Lerner, & Green, 2000), 
protected values (Baron & Spranca, 1997), taboo values (Lichtenstein, Gregory, & 
Irwin, 2007), or moral mandates (Skitka, 2002), and refer to any entity an individual or 
a community considers as infinitely significant and inviolable, and therefore as non-
tradable and non-substitutable (e.g., Tanner et al., 2009; Tetlock et al., 2000). Sacred 
values may encompass concrete or abstract entities (such as human lives, animals, 
plants, physical integrity, organs for transplant operations, or the unborn life), desirable 
states or conducts of behaviors (such as human rights, human dignity, honesty, security, 
or freedom), or interpersonal values (such as love, friendship, or trust) (e.g., Andre, 
1992; Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Foa, Converse, Törnblom, & Foa, 1993; Medin, 
Schwartz, Blok, & Birnbaum, 1999). In the remainder of this section, I will present 
some selected theories and findings which point out the unique features of sacred 
values, showing that they go far beyond those of merely strong preferences, attitudes or 
“normal” values.  
1.2.2 Emotions and Motivation of Behavior 
To highlight the subjective significance of sacred values and trade-off 
reluctance, several studies examined people’s emotional and behavioral responses 
toward trade-offs involving sacred values. For example, Tetlock et al. (2000) provided 
participants with examples of routine trade-offs (i.e., pitting two secular values against 
each other; e.g., cleaning service against money) and taboo trade-offs (i.e., pitting a 
sacred value against a secular value; e.g., adoption rights against money), and assessed 
and compared participants’ reactions to these scenarios. Unlike routine trade-offs, taboo 
trade-off proposals evoked harsh emotional responses of protest and moral outrage, 
strong desires to sanction violators of the sacred values at hand, and considerable 
willingness to volunteer in actions that might prevent violations. Importantly, as Tetlock 
(2003) argues, not only actual violations of sacred values and taboo trade-offs elicit 
feelings of outrage and intentions to punish the transgressors; even calling sacred values 
into question and merely contemplating taboo trade-offs may evoke feelings of distress 
and disturbance.  
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As an extreme and impressive example of how far-reaching reactions toward 
attempts to compromise sacred values can be, Ginges, Atran, Medin, and Shikaki 
(2007) explored the role and consequences of sacred values in the Middle East conflict 
between Israelis and Palestinians. In a series of field experiments, Ginges et al. provided 
samples of Palestinians and Israelis living in the West Bank and Gaza with hypothetical 
proposals (“peace deals”) involving compromises over issues that are integral to the 
conflict and potentially tap into taboo trade-offs, but will result in peace and a two-state 
solution (i.e., a Jewish state of Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and 
Gaza). For instance, Palestinians responded to the proposition that they should give up 
their right of return to their lands in Israel, whereas Israelis responded to the proposition 
to give up parts of their “Land of Israel”. Findings showed that individuals who endorse 
the right of return or the “Land of Israel“ as a sacred value, respectively, reacted with 
strong feelings of outrage, and showed support for violence such as suicide attacks 
toward others assaulting their sacred values. Interestingly, outrage and support for 
violence were particularly strong when peace deals involving taboo trade-offs were 
additionally combined with monetary incentives, but, conversely, were reduced when 
peace deals were combined with concessions on the opponent’s side regarding their 
own sacred values. These results demonstrate impressively the dynamics of sacred 
values and trade-off reluctance in real-world conflicts: On the one hand, an increase of 
incentives to compromise over sacred values may backfire and result in a rapid increase 
of outrage and offensive behavior, especially when the taboo character of the trade-off 
at hand is exacerbated through additional monetary incentives. On the other hand, 
approval of compromises over one’s own sacred values may be greater in a conflict 
situation if the adversary also shows concessions that imply a similar loss over their 
own sacred values.  
Another important line of research suggests that sacred values may have specific 
motivational effects on interpersonal and other forms of behaviors that go far beyond 
the effects of strong attitudes or preferences. In particular, Skitka and colleagues were 
able to show that moral mandates (a concept sharing properties with sacred values) may 
build up an emotionally charged “moral conviction” and work as motivational forces 
(e.g., Bauman & Skitka, 2009; Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka, 2002; Skitka & Bauman, 
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2008; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Specifically, participants with a strong moral 
conviction maintained a greater social distance (i.e., preferred rather distant than 
intimate relationships) as well as a greater physical distance (i.e., placed themselves on 
a more remote chair in discussion sessions) from people who did not share their own 
moral view. Moreover, when solving tasks in groups, individuals with a strong moral 
conviction showed less goodwill and cooperativeness toward other group members who 
showed dissimilar moral beliefs (Skitka et al., 2005). Finally, moral convictions 
associated with various controversial political issues (e.g., abortion, gay marriage) were 
shown to operate as strong motivators of voting intentions and behavior, irrespective of 
specific attitudes towards these issues and party preferences (Skitka & Bauman, 2008).  
As an interesting extension of this research, Wright, Cullum, and Schwab (2008) 
found that interpersonal reactions which are evoked by moral convictions can be 
explained not exclusively by strong moral emotions, but especially by specific cognitive 
beliefs about moral issues at hand (i.e., they are seen as non-negotiable and objectively 
grounded). Importantly, these findings suggest that unique properties of sacred values 
(i.e., issues seen as absolute and non-negotiable) may have distinctive motivational and 
interpersonal consequences, which might be additionally exacerbated by the strength of 
feelings of anger and outrage. Moreover, they demonstrate the social power of moral 
convictions and sacred values to polarize groups, and to tear apart or bond together 
individuals through more or fewer shared values. As I will outline in the next paragraph, 
the strong association between sacred values and emotion-laden convictions and 
motivations is also reflected in their link to a deontological perspective. 
1.2.3 Deontological Reasoning and Commitments to Act 
Another central feature of sacred values is their relation to deontological 
reasoning (e.g., Baron & Spranca, 1997; Tanner, 2009; Tanner & Medin, 2004; Tanner, 
Medin, Iliev, 2008). In contrast to a consequentialist (utilitarian) perspective, which 
focuses on the outcomes of actions and not on actions themselves, a deontological 
perspective focuses on the inherent rightness or wrongness of an action, irrespective of 
its consequences. The philosophical concept of deontology, which is derived from the 
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Greek word δεον (duty), emphasizes moral principles and rules in terms of prohibitions 
against actions and obligations to act, such as the duty to help other people or the duty 
not to lie (e.g., Birnbacher, 2003; Broad, 1930; Kant, 1797). 
In line with the perspective of deontological principled reasoning, several 
studies have shown that individuals endorsing sacred values focus on what is morally 
right or wrong, and on what they ought to do or what they should not do, rather than on 
the consequences of their acts. For instance, Baron and Spranca (1997) provided 
evidence that sacred values are related to insensitivities to the magnitude as well as the 
probability of certain outcomes. In a similar vein, recent studies examined people’s 
commitment to honesty as a sacred value in the context of business choices, and 
demonstrated that individuals who feel strongly committed to the principle of honesty 
as a sacred value were actually more likely to behave honestly, irrespective of financial 
incentives to show dishonest choices (Tanner, Gibson, Wagner, & Berkowitsch, 2010). 
These findings corroborate the role of sacred values in decision making as commitments 
to act in accordance with certain principles, regardless of potentially costly 
consequences. Furthermore, these results intriguingly emphasize the reluctance of 
trading off sacred values against concrete financial incentives. 
Following the observation that deontological reasoning is associated with a 
greater sensitivity to principles of obligations and prohibitions than to consequences of 
actions, people who endorse sacred values should also be more sensitive to the 
distinction between actions and omissions. That is, they should differentiate to a 
stronger extent whether an outcome results from an action or from inaction, compared 
to people who do not endorse sacred values. A recent study using environmental choice 
scenarios was able to confirm this assumption, and additionally demonstrated that 
individuals who endorse sacred values tended to prefer actions to omissions more 
strongly compared to people who did not endorse sacred values, even though both 
alternatives result in similar consequences (Tanner, 2009). These findings provided 
further evidence for the assumption that people who endorse sacred values often 
strongly favor actions over inactions (i.e., “action bias”; e.g., Patt & Zeckhauser, 2000; 
Tanner & Medin, 2004; Tanner et al., 2008). It should be noted that these findings with 
regard to the “action bias” obviously contradict the prevailing view that sacred values 
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are related to an “omission bias”, that is, a tendency to prefer omissions to actions (e.g., 
Ritov & Baron, 1990, 1999). While the exact preconditions for the emergence of either 
the action bias or the omission bias has largely remained unclear, it seems that people 
who endorse sacred values often feel particularly strongly obligated to principles such 
as “bringing about good” or “taking care of others” (cf. Nunner-Winkler, 1984), 
irrespective of whether their actions will result in successful outcomes. In this regard, it 
is plausible to assume that sacred values may be a powerful source for activism and 
engagement to safeguard human rights, animal lives, or the environment (e.g., Horwitz, 
1994). 
In conclusion, these findings – together with the results on behavioral 
consequences of moral conviction (e.g., Bauman & Skitka, 2009) – emphasize the 
commitment function of sacred values that motivates people to actively engage in 
protecting and reaffirming sacred values and moral standards. As I will argue in the 
following, the strong commitment component might be due not least to the importance 
of sacred values with regard to the self-concept. 
1.2.4 Sacred Values and the Self 
In their sacred value protection model, Tetlock et al. (2000) made two key 
assumptions regarding how people cope with threats to sacred values. First, as already 
mentioned, people react with strong moral outrage and intentions to punish 
transgressors when they are faced with threats to sacred values or violations of taboo 
trade-offs. This mechanism seems to serve as an important motivator to affirm sacred 
values on the interpersonal level. Second, when observing violations of taboo trade-offs 
– or even when requested to contemplate taboo trade-offs – individuals feel 
“contaminated” by such situations and seek to convince themselves of their own moral 
worthiness by acts of moral cleansing. They express, for instance, their willingness to 
volunteer in political action groups fighting against propositions that would allow 
transgressions of sacred values, or to donate to an organ-donation campaign which 
should help to prevent ideas to install a market for organs. Obviously, people not only 
may self-affirm their moral worthiness by such acts of moral cleansing, but additionally 
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reaffirm the sacred values at risk. Hence, moral outrage and moral cleansing are two 
crucial mechanisms serving the protection of sacred values. 
The findings and interpretations about moral cleansing suggest that sacred 
values, and probably moral values in general, might be central and important aspects of 
the self-identity. In this regard, sacred values were, in fact, found to be associated with a 
strong moral identity (Merz & Tanner, 2009). Moral identity has been defined as a self-
conception organized around a set of various moral traits (i.e., values or principles such 
as being honest, helpful, generous, etc.; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984). Moreover, 
they indicate the role of the moral identity as a kind of self-regulatory mechanism that 
motivates moral action. In a series of experiments, it was confirmed that the more likely 
a person views certain values as being central to his or her self-concept, the stronger the 
motivational driver between moral identity and behavior is, such as volunteering 
activities or charitable donations (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 
2007). In this vein, assuming that sacred values are in fact central parts of a person’s 
self-concept, they should prompt and facilitate acts and choices which help to uphold 
this self-concept.  
1.2.5 Conclusion 
A growing body of research has intriguingly demonstrated that individuals back 
up their sacred values by strictly rejecting trade-offs, by expressing harsh reactions of 
outrage, and by showing various behaviors that help to protect the status of the sacred 
values at risk. Furthermore, findings suggest that sacred values are associated with 
deontological reasoning and strong commitments to serve certain moral principles such 
as prohibitions and obligations to act. Finally, research suggests that sacred values are 
related to central parts of the self-concept, which additionally highlights the distinctive 
roles of emotions and motivations to act with respect to sacred values.  
Before focusing more closely on further areas of research in which my own 
work is embedded, I will outline some conceptual considerations which must be kept in 
mind when developing an instrument to capture what individuals deem sacred, and then 
present different approaches to assess sacred value endorsements. After that, I will show 
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some empirical data with respect to the validation of the construct, which broadly reflect 
the unique features of sacred values. 
1.3 Measurement and Validation of the Sacred Value Construct 
1.3.1 Conceptual Considerations on the Specifics of Sacred Values 
As already mentioned, all characteristic features of sacred values which have 
been outlined so far highlight essential differences between sacred values and other 
value concepts. In other words, sacred values are similar, but not identical, to “normal” 
values, commonly seen as stable beliefs about desirable states or conducts of behaviors 
(e.g., Rohan, 2000; Schwartz, 1992). While the concept of values does not necessarily 
exclude trade-offs, sacred values are inherently linked with absolute demands, rejections 
of trade-offs, and strong commitments to defend their status. Furthermore, sacred values 
are also similar to strong attitudes, but are additionally linked to moral convictions and 
deontological reasoning.  
However, it is important to note that, even though individuals strictly express 
their belief that they perceive some issues as absolute and thus protected from any cost-
benefit consideration, they are not always able to actually uphold such an absolute 
demand due to reality constraints. In concrete terms, there may be situations in which 
the costs of defending sacred values become simply unbearable (e.g., tragic trade-off 
scenarios; Bartels, 2008; Tetlock, 2003). Nevertheless, people holding sacred values 
affirm that they are serious in their view, and try to do their utmost to uphold sacred 
values (e.g., Bartels & Medin, 2007). Importantly, not least the facts that violations of 
sacred values provoke harsh reactions of outrage, and that even the mere contemplation 
of taboo trade-offs evoke feelings of distress demonstrate that commitments to sacred 
values are real even if the individuals are not always able to defend them successfully.  
Following these considerations, there may be ostensible discrepancies between 
what people actually do and what people deem they ought to do with respect to sacred 
values. One possibility to bridge this gap refers to recent literature suggesting a 
differentiation between a stronger and a weaker notion of sacred values and trade-off 
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reluctance (e.g., Tanner, 2009). While the stronger notion demands an absolute trade-off 
reluctance, the weaker notion demands substantially greater thresholds at which people 
holding sacred values would accept some trade-offs. In this regard, it is conceivable that 
people’s expressions of beliefs rather reflect the stronger notion of sacred values, 
whereas actual behaviors reflect the weaker notion.  
Most importantly, not least due to the fact of possible discrepancies between 
expressions of beliefs and actual behaviors, it is indispensable to use reliable and valid 
measures to capture the extent to which an individual deems something as inviolable 
and absolute. These measures should go beyond simple observations of whether people 
accept or reject certain choices or behaviors, because such observations ignore the 
aforementioned discrepancies and, furthermore, cannot conceptually distinguish sacred 
values from other “normal” values or strong attitudes. However, measures of sacred 
value endorsements should take into account a broad variety of essential characteristics 
of sacred values. In the following, I will critically present different approaches to 
measuring sacred value endorsements.  
1.3.2 Different Approaches to Measure Sacred Value Endorsements 
Until recently, research on sacred values has utilized various single or multiple 
item measures which have not been proven in terms of their reliability or construct 
validity. Generally, two different approaches to assess sacred values have emerged in 
previous research. The first approach, which was developed in initial studies on 
protected values, represents a direct way of assessing sacred value endorsements, and 
aims to capture whether individuals perceive the current situation as concerning issues 
or values which must not be sacrificed (e.g., Baron & Spranca, 1997; Ritov & Baron, 
1999). In other words, this direct approach addresses trade-off reluctance as a distinctive 
feature of sacred values. As an illustrative example, Ritov and Baron asked their 
participants whether they would accept opening a river dam once a year in order to save 
twenty fish species that are threatened with extinction due to the dam, when by opening 
the dam two other species would become extinct due to the changing water level. To 
assess whether respondents associate sacred values with this situation, a single item 
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with several categorial alternatives such as “This is acceptable if it leads to some sort of 
benefits that are great enough” or “This is not acceptable no matter how great the 
benefits” was provided, whereby the latter alternative formed the sacred value option. In 
other words, respondents who selected this option were categorized as people who 
associated a sacred value with the current situation.  
The second approach represents an indirect way to assess sacred value 
endorsements in that respondents are asked to judge choices and acts committed by 
others. Thus, respondents are requested to appraise the observed choices and acts on 
multiple items aiming to capture the extent of moral outrage, which is assumed to 
reflect the level of sacred value endorsement (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2000). For instance, 
respondents are presented with several acts that potentially violate sacred values (e.g., 
“buying and selling human body parts for medical transplant operations”) and were 
asked to rate these acts along a variety of response scales which constitute the index of 
moral outrage (e.g., bad – good; not at all upsetting – very upsetting; no anger – great 
deal of anger). As a result, high ratings of moral outrage are interpreted as an indirect 
indicator of strong sacred value endorsements.  
However, both the direct and the indirect approach may have, at least in their 
original versions, substantial disadvantages. On the one hand, the direct approach has to 
be judged critically because using a single item is problematic due to its rather doubtful 
reliability. On the other hand, the indirect approach, which is based on the reactions to 
an observed behavior, does not allow it to be precisely specified whether this behavior 
is seen as actually violating sacred values. Therefore, due to these and other reasons, 
Tanner, Ryf, and Hanselmann (2009) recently developed and validated a new 
instrument – the Sacred Value Measure (SVM) – which contains multiple items and 
encompasses the direct and the indirect approach in two separate subscales. 
First, the SVM-D subscale contains items that reflect essential features of sacred 
values in a direct manner, such as unwillingness to sacrifice a value, denial of trade-
offs, inviolability, or incommensurability. Thus respondents are presented with a 
description of an issue which is potentially associated with sacred values, are then 
provided with five statements reflecting features of sacred values, and are asked to 
indicate the extent of their agreement with these items on response scales when 
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considering the issue at hand (see Table 1 for question examples and the full description 
of the items). 
Table 1. Sacred Value Measure: Question Examples and Items of the Direct (SVM-D) and Indirect 
(SVM-I) Subscale 
SVM-Da 
Human rights are something… 
1. that we should not sacrifice, no matter what the benefits (money or something else). 
2. which one cannot quantify with money. 
3. for which I think it is right to make cost-benefit analyses. * 
4. for which I can be flexible if the situation demands it. * 
5. that involves issues or values which are inviolable. 
SVM-Ib 
What do you think about torturing imprisoned terror suspects to force information to be revealed about 
possible terrorist attacks? This is… 
1. not at all praiseworthy (1) – very praiseworthy (7) * 
2. not at all embarrassing (1) – very embarrassing (7) 
3. not at all acceptable (1) – very acceptable (7) * 
4. not at all outrageous (1) – very outrageous (7) 
5. not at all disgusting (1) – very disgusting (7) 
6. very immoral (1) – very moral (7) * 
Note. Items with an asterisk (*) have to be recoded. Adapted and translated from “Geschützte Werte 
Skala (GWS): Konstruktion und Validierung eines Messinstrumentes [Sacred Value Measure (SVM): 
Construction and validation of an instrument to assess sacred values],” by C. Tanner, B. Ryf, and M. 
Hanselmann, 2009, Diagnostica, 55, 174-183. Copyright 2009 by Hogrefe Verlag Göttingen. 
a7-point response scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). b7-point response 
scales.  
Second, the SVM-I subscale was adapted from the moral outrage items (Tetlock 
et al., 2000) and assesses sacred value endorsements indirectly through people’s 
reactions either to observed violations of sacred values or to hypothetical propositions 
potentially violating sacred values. Respondents are presented with a description of a 
certain behavior or proposition and are then asked to judge this behavior or proposition 
on six response scales (see Table 1). 
Introduction   17 
 
 
1.3.3 Validation of the Sacred Values Construct 
In several studies, the SVM was proven in terms of reliability and discriminant 
or convergent validity (Tanner et al., 2009; Merz & Tanner, 2009). In the following, 
some selected results are briefly presented. When testing for the dimensionality of the 
sacred values construct, the direct (SVM-D) and the indirect (SVM-I) measure emerged 
as distinct but considerably correlated factors, which suggests a dual dimensionality of 
cognitive and affective components of sacred values. 
In terms of discriminant validity, it was shown that the sacred value construct is 
different from the concept of attitude importance (e.g., Petty & Krosnick, 1995; 
Pomerantz, Chaiken, & Tordesillas, 1995). Specifically, results confirmed that sacred 
values are indeed related to attitudes and values that are important with regard to the 
self-concept of a person, but go beyond the mere importance in that they exhibit specific 
characteristics such as absoluteness and inviolability (Tanner et al., 2009). This finding 
is in line with research showing that moral mandates (a concept sharing properties with 
sacred values) are similar to strong attitudes but have additional characteristics that go 
beyond those of strong attitudes (Skitka et al., 2005; see also Section 1.2.2). 
Moreover, in terms of convergent validity, some interesting associations 
between the extent of sacred value endorsements and several personality dimensions 
such as ethical ideologies (e.g., Forsyth, 1980), ethical basic positions (e.g., Witte & 
Doll, 1995), and moral identity (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002) were found. In concrete 
terms, sacred value endorsements were positively associated with an absolutistic 
perspective (i.e., pronouncing universal and inviolable principles as guiding values), 
deontological and intuitionist basic positions (i.e., emphasize the inherent moral 
rightness or wrongness of actions rather than consequences or other justifications), and 
strong self-importance of core moral values (i.e., internalization of moral traits that are 
seen as central to one’s self-concept).  
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1.3.4 Conclusion 
In this section, I made some considerations on the necessity of a reliable and 
valid instrument to capture sacred value endorsements, gave an overview of different 
measurement approaches, and presented a recently developed and validated instrument, 
the Sacred Value Measure (SVM; Tanner et al., 2009). This measure encompasses two 
different subscales, which reflect a direct and an indirect measure, respectively. While 
the SVM-D contains items that directly address essential features of sacred values, the 
SVM-I assesses sacred value endorsements indirectly through people’s reactions to 
observed violations or to hypothetical propositions. In several validation studies, it has 
been shown that sacred values are conceptually distinct from strong attitudes and 
important values, but are related to absolutist reasoning as well as to moral values that 
are seen as central to one’s moral identity. These findings further underline the 
distinctive characteristics of sacred values.  
Before introducing my first research project, which addressed the role of sacred 
values as facilitators or barriers in decision making and examined the link with negative 
emotions, I will present in the following a short overview of findings with respect to 
choice difficulty and emotions that I deem relevant for my research. 
1.4 Determinants of Choice Difficulty and Emotions in Decision Making 
Personal experiences in everyday life show us quite plainly that choices differ 
greatly with respect to their difficulty or emotional charge. Over some decisions, we 
dither and ponder a great deal, or we even try to avoid them, perceiving them as severe 
and highly stressful. For other forms of decisions, we might care much less, and 
therefore not make any special effort to come to a solution. In contrast to such 
experiences, classical theories of decision making – such as the previously mentioned 
normative, utility-based models (e.g., Keeney & Raiffa, 1976) – do not account for the 
question of why some choices are more difficult or emotion-laden than others. Whether 
choices are about buying a new car, selecting a job, getting married, laying off 
employees, performing an abortion, applying torture, or conducting animal experiments 
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– classical models of decision making would predict them to be solved in an equally 
rational and unemotional manner.  
Psychological research on judgment and decision making, however, has rejected 
this relatively simplistic perspective and identified plenty of factors which affect 
perceived decision difficulty, emotional charge, and tendencies to postpone or avoid 
when making decisions (e.g., Anderson, 2003; Janis & Mann, 1977; Luce, 1998; Luce, 
Bettman, & Payne, 1997; Luce, Payne, & Bettman, 1999; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 
1993). In the following, at least some important contributors to decision difficulty will 
be outlined more narrowly (see Anderson, 2003, for an extensive review). For example, 
the overall attractiveness of the choice set, differences in attractiveness between options, 
or the number of choice options may have an influence on choice difficulty (e.g., Dhar, 
1997; Dhar & Nowlis, 1999; Redelmeier & Shafir, 1995; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). 
Moreover, individual differences or specifics of the cultural background such as 
neuroticism, general decisiveness, confidence in one’s own decision making ability, 
thinking styles, aspirations, and beliefs and values such as the freedom of thought, may 
produce differences in choice difficulty (e.g., Mann et al., 1998; Milgram & Tenne, 
2000; Tse, Lee, Vertinsky, & Wehrung, 1988).  
1.4.1 Trade-Off Difficulty 
More central to my research, several studies suggest that decision difficulty as 
well as negative emotions may depend on the extent to which choices involve attributes 
that people deem difficult to trade off. This has been assumed to be the case when a 
trade-off involves attributes with potentially threatening consequences or highly valued 
goals (Luce, 1998; Luce et al., 1997, 1999). For instance, in a car purchase scenario, it 
is conceivable that the buyer has to trade off safety attributes against styling attributes. 
In this scenario, safety attributes are more likely to be related to potentially threatening 
consequences (e.g., car passengers being injured or killed in an accident) than styling 
attributes (e.g., attracting attention because of the car’s ugly shape), and are thus 
associated with a high trade-off difficulty, because the buyer of the car is more reluctant 
to accept a loss on safety attributes. As a consequence, when faced with difficult trade-
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offs, individuals experience higher levels of negative emotions and subsequently are 
more likely to avoid the choice (if possible) in order to reduce negative feelings (e.g., 
Luce, 1998). Hence, the level of negative emotions indicates the degree of trade-off 
difficulty in the choice situation. Even though not mentioned explicitly by the authors, it 
is plausible to assume that difficult and emotion-laden trade-offs are also associated 
with higher overall decision difficulty. In conclusion, this would imply that choices 
eliciting negative emotions are generally perceived as difficult. However, as I will point 
out later in more detail, I contradict this view by assuming that certain choices are easy 
to solve despite eliciting negative emotions. 
Another characteristic of choice options that may account for trade-off difficulty 
is the taxonomy or category of attributes that have to be traded off. Beattie and Barlas 
(2001) demonstrated that non-commodities (i.e., objects or attributes that cannot be 
transferred and are not tradable; e.g., friendship, health) are more difficult to trade off 
than commodities (i.e., objects or attributes that are sold or bought in markets; e.g., 
computers, cameras) or currencies (i.e., objects or attributes that act as substitutes for 
commodities; e.g., money, vouchers). In consequence, the combinations of categories 
that were involved in choices triggered specific decision strategies, and thus predicted 
how easy or difficult the overall choice will be (assessed by reaction times). 
Specifically, choices requesting trade-offs of non-commodities against commodities or 
currencies were found to be less difficult than those involving trade-offs of non-
commodities against other non-commodities. Probably, in the former, a non-
compensatory (i.e., lexicographic) choice rule was utilized that dictated a clear 
preference for non-commodities over the other categories, while in the latter, 
presumably other, more extensive (compensatory) strategies were used. It should be 
noted here that the concept of non-commodities is similar to the notion of sacred values 
in that both share features such as the preclusion from trade and transfer. 
1.4.2 Conclusion 
Interestingly, both emotional trade-off difficulty and categorical dimensions as 
potential determinants for decision difficulty reveal some parallels with the concepts of 
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sacred values and trade-off reluctance. Specifically, these approaches are similar in that 
they explain differences in emotions and trade-off difficulty by specific features of the 
attributes or objects (e.g., potentially threatening consequences, tradability, 
absoluteness) which are involved in choices. Moreover, they suggest that some trade-
offs and choices are more emotion-laden than others and differ with regard to perceived 
difficulty. However, an important difference may be, as stated above, that the trade-off 
difficulty approach suggests a positive relationship between negative emotions and 
choice difficulty. In contrast, I assume that certain choices involving sacred values may 
be perceived as quite easy despite eliciting negative emotions, while others may be 
experienced both as difficult and emotion-laden. This assumption is central to my first 
research project, as the next section will show. 
1.5 Sacred Values as Facilitators or Barriers in Decision Making 
In my first research project, I aimed to address the question of whether, and 
under which conditions, sacred values play the role of facilitators or barriers in decision 
making, and to explore the link with negative emotions. More specifically, I aimed to 
show that certain decisions tapping into sacred values are experienced subjectively as 
quite straightforward and easy even though they evoke negative feelings, while others 
are seen as both difficult and negatively emotion-laden.  
In line with my assumption, there is some evidence that choices on taboo values 
(i.e., sacred values) elicited negative emotions but were experienced as easy to solve 
and as not demanding extensive thought (Lichtenstein et al., 2007). This should be the 
case particularly when people are confronted with a taboo trade-off (i.e., a situation that 
pits a sacred value against a secular value; e.g., lives vs. money). Moreover, let us recall 
that, as Tetlock (2003) found, merely contemplating taboo trade-offs may embarrass 
decision makers and induce negative feelings of distress and disturbance. Thus, I 
believe that the mere fact of calling sacred values into question generally provokes 
negative emotions, because the decision maker may realize that something particularly 
important and highly delicate is at risk.  
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Taken together, unlike the research on emotional trade-off difficulty (e.g., Luce, 
1998), Lichtenstein et al.’s (2007) and Tetlock’s (2003) findings would imply that the 
experience of negative emotions is not necessarily equivalent to perceiving a certain 
choice as difficult. This should become clear when the concept of trade-off type is taken 
into account. As Tetlock et al. (2000) suggest, it is crucial to distinguish taboo trade-
offs from tragic trade-offs as predictors for decision difficulty. We can recall here that 
taboo trade-offs are choice situations in which a sacred value is pitted against a non-
sacred value (e.g., life against money), whereas tragic trade-offs are dilemmas which pit 
two sacred values against each other (e.g., life vs. another life). In their experiments, 
Tetlock et al. found first support for the notion that decision difficulty is strongly related 
to trade-off types. The authors provided their participants with either a taboo or a tragic 
trade-off vignette (as first independent variable). Each vignette described a resource 
allocation problem regarding an organ transplant in a hospital, where the hospital 
director, named Robert, was requested to make a decision. In the taboo trade-off 
condition, Robert had to decide whether to spend $1,000,000 for a liver transplant in 
order to save the life of a boy, or to spend the same $1,000,000 for various hospital 
equipment and salaries. In the tragic trade-off condition, Robert had to decide whether 
to save the life of the boy by a liver transplant or to save the life of another, equally sick 
boy by a liver transplant, when only one liver was available due to a shortage of organ 
donors. Just after depicting the choice problems, participants were informed about the 
ease and speed with which Robert made his choice (as second independent variable): 
Either Robert reported the choice as an easy one and was able to decide quickly, or he 
perceived the choice as very difficult and was only able to decide after extensive 
contemplation. Then, after reading this information, participants were asked to judge 
Robert’s choice on several items.  
As expected, the results yielded an interaction effect between the two factors 
trade-off type and decision difficulty on judgments. When Robert evaluated the taboo 
trade-off scenario as easy or the tragic trade-off scenario as difficult, he was judged 
positively by the participants. Conversely, when Robert evaluated the taboo trade-off 
scenario as difficult or the tragic trade-off scenario as easy, he was judged negatively by 
the participants. Although these results rely on judgments made from an observer 
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perspective, they yield first evidence about how trade-off types and decision difficulty 
are related. However, in my research, I explored this association in experiments in 
which participants are themselves in the role of the decision maker, being confronted 
with taboo trade-off, tragic trade-off, or routine trade-off scenarios.  
1.5.1 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this research was to examine the effects of sacred values 
and trade-off types on emotions and decision difficulty. I assumed that both negative 
emotions and perceived decision difficulty depend on sacred values and trade-off type. 
Moreover, according to the argument that mere contemplation of trade-offs involving 
sacred values may evoke negative emotions, which, however, are not necessarily 
equivalent to decision difficulty, I supposed that negative emotions and decision 
difficulty are interrelated in a non-linear fashion. Specifically, compared to routine 
trade-off scenarios (i.e., secular vs. secular value), scenarios involving a taboo trade-off 
were assumed to be more emotionally charged because the decision maker recognizes 
that with a sacred value, something important and delicate is at risk. Despite eliciting 
negative emotions, such a taboo trade-off scenario is assumed to be perceived as 
particularly easy and straightforward, because the involvement of just one sacred value 
may facilitate the choice in that it provides a strong reason for making the “right” 
decision. In other words, in taboo trade-off scenarios, sacred values may operate as 
facilitators of decision making. In contrast, tragic trade-off scenarios which enforce the 
violation of one sacred value are expected to be perceived as particularly difficult and 
highly negatively emotion-laden compared to taboo trade-off and routine trade-off 
scenarios. That is, in tragic trade-off scenarios, sacred values may represent barriers to 
decision making. The results, which largely support these considerations, have already 
been published (see Section 2; Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008). In short, this research 
confirms that sacred values may play the role of either a facilitator or a barrier in 
decision making, dependent on trade-off type. Moreover, it reveals that negative 
emotions may play an important role in choices involving sacred values. 
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1.5.2 Conclusion 
The assumptions and findings of my first project imply that sacred values may 
operate as strong facilitators of decision making under specific circumstances when 
moral issues are at stake, but as barriers to decision making under other conditions. In 
this regard, the structure of the conflict at hand (i.e., trade-off type) is assumed to be a 
crucial moderator. However, up to now, it remains unclear which mechanisms may 
account for these effects. Specifically, I assume that the negative emotions, which are 
elicited when sacred values are at stake, may play a distinctive role. Hence, my second 
research project addressed this question by taking a closer look at affective and 
cognitive processes that are triggered when a person is confronted with decisions on 
sacred values. Before I introduce this research, the following section will provide 
several selected theories and findings which may be indicative for possible processes.  
1.6 Mechanisms Underlying the Effects of Sacred Values  
To illuminate how facilitation or barrier effects may occur, I will present 
selected theories and findings from different areas of research that may account for 
underlying mechanisms. Note that I do not claim to provide a complete model which 
explains precisely how sacred values work, but I assume that some of these approaches 
could be at least partially indicative for my research theses.  
As previously mentioned, facilitation occurs especially in taboo trade-off 
scenarios in which sacred values provide a clear-cut solution for the choice problem at 
hand. In contrast, in tragic trade-off scenarios, in which sacred values compete against 
each other, they can no longer offer any help but may rather build up a barrier to 
reaching acceptable solutions. As I will argue in this section in more detail, this 
difference may be explained by distinct processes underlying the decision making 
process. Thereby, I refer to dual process accounts which distinguish, in general terms, a 
rather rapid and automatic from a rather effortful and deliberative system of 
information processing (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; 
Epstein, 1994; Stanovich & West, 2000). In concrete terms, while the consideration of 
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taboo trade-off scenarios may trigger certain heuristic, intuitive, or affective processes, 
which result in a fast and easy decision, tragic trade-off scenarios may engage analytic 
or deliberative reasoning processes, which result in a difficult and effortful choice (see 
Mandel & Vartanian, 2007, for a similar argumentation). In the following, I will mainly 
provide approaches that account for presumable mechanisms which reflect the 
facilitation of decision making in taboo trade-off situations. After this, I will speculate 
on possible processes that could account for the effects of sacred values as barriers in 
tragic trade-off situations.  
1.6.1 Mechanisms Reflecting Facilitation Effects 
1.6.1.1 Choice Rules and Heuristics 
As an ostensible explanation for facilitation in taboo trade-offs, decision makers 
who hold sacred values may adopt a certain decision strategy or choice rule when they 
perceive that sacred values are at stake. Specifically, since sacred values are associated 
with trade-off reluctance, a non-compensatory strategy such as a lexicographic choice 
rule may be triggered, which renders the application of trade-offs superfluous (Payne et 
al., 1993; see also Beattie & Barlas, 2001). As adopting such a choice rule would imply 
a selection among alternatives based on just one attribute, namely the most important 
one, all alternatives in the choice set which would assault the absoluteness and 
inviolability of the sacred value at hand would be eliminated from the outset. In other 
words, this strategy would facilitate the choice procedure by leaving out any forms of 
cognitively extensive trade-offs and comparisons.  
In line with the view of non-compensatory rules as facilitators of decision 
making, sacred values and taboo trade-off scenarios may trigger a form of “one-reason 
decision making”, whereby information search is constrained to one particular cue (i.e., 
attribute), and choice alternatives are compared and selected with respect only to this 
cue (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999). In other words, in the 
process of comparing choice alternatives, only the cue is considered which yields the 
best information about the consequences for the sacred value at hand, and subsequently, 
26   Introduction 
 
 
the option providing the best value on that cue is chosen. Sacred values may thus reduce 
complexity in that they provide a sufficient reason for deciding in a certain way. More 
generally, such a decision strategy could be seen as a tool among “fast and frugal 
heuristics”, which are assumed to be adaptive, context-sensitive, and embedded in social 
environments (Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer et al., 1999).  
It is important to emphasize that from this perspective, heuristics underlying 
moral decision making do not differ from those underlying other choices that are not 
morally tinged (Gigerenzer, 2008). More specifically, Gigerenzer argues that there are 
no specific “moral heuristics”; one and the same heuristic may steer both consumer 
choices (e.g., whether to buy newspaper A or newspaper B) and moral choices (e.g., 
whether or not to donate; whether or not to accept torture). As a consequence, this 
would imply that it should not make any difference from a subjective perspective 
whether a certain choice has to be made based on a cue like the topic of the cover story 
(e.g., when selecting newspapers) or the potential violation of human rights (e.g., when 
deciding on torture). 
In sum, following the approach of heuristics and choice rules, sacred values may 
facilitate decision making in the sense of a general choice rule; they provide just one 
sufficient reason for deciding in a certain way and thereby reduce the complexity of the 
problem at hand. However, from my point of view, such a perspective largely neglects 
characteristic features of sacred values, which may have their own explanation power, 
as I will substantiate below.  
1.6.1.2 Commitments to Act 
In particular, explanations of how sacred values may facilitate decisions should 
additionally take into consideration the commitment power as a distinctive feature of 
sacred values. Research on the relation of sacred values to deontological, principled 
reasoning (i.e., behavioral rules in terms of prohibitions and obligations; e.g., Tanner, 
2009; Tanner & Medin, 2004; Tanner et al., 2008) indicates that holding sacred values 
may be accompanied by strong commitments to act in a certain way. Thus, such 
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commitments may be expressed in both choices and actions, which serve to uphold the 
absolute status of the sacred values at hand.  
In line with the commitment function of sacred values, the notion of moral 
mandates suggests that certain internalized beliefs about what is morally right or wrong 
allow the individual to act or to choose quickly in a “good” way. As mentioned, in a 
given situation, moral mandates may build up an emotion-driven moral conviction as a 
strong motivational force, which was found to predict choices and behavior more 
reliably than simple preferences and attitudes (Bauman & Skitka, 2009).  
Interestingly, the notion of sacred values and their association with 
deontological principles has some affinity with the concept of “moral heuristics”, that 
is, simple rules of thumb based on certain beliefs, which operate as mental shortcuts 
providing easy and fast judgments and choices (Sunstein, 2005). To illustrate this, when 
faced with a decision involving sacred values, the moral heuristic “one should not trade 
money for lives” may be consulted in order to reach a quick choice. Obviously, unlike 
heuristics in Gigerenzer’s (2008) sense, moral heuristics are assumed to be specific 
principles applied selectively to moral problems. 
Taken together, sacred values may facilitate decision making by engaging 
simple behavioral principles in terms of prohibitions or obligations, or by strong 
emotion-driven convictions to act or to choose in a certain “morally right” way. 
Importantly, these principles and convictions go beyond general heuristics in 
Gigerenzer’s (2008) sense, by providing not only sufficient but also imperative reasons 
to choose, in a manner that ultimately serves the protection of sacred values. 
1.6.1.3 Emotions as Signals 
Furthermore, to better comprehend facilitation effects, I deem it indispensable to 
incorporate the issue of strong emotional reactions when moral issues or sacred values 
are called into question (e.g., Skitka, 2002; Tetlock, 2003). In particular, I assume that 
such emotions are not so much a merely unpleasant by-product of choices; rather, they 
may operate both as guiding signals to the decision maker and as commitment devices 
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in moral self-regulation serving the protection of sacred values, thereby facilitating 
choices in which sacred values are at stake.  
More precisely, emotions may operate as signals to the decision maker that with 
a sacred value, something particularly delicate and important is at risk that has to be 
defended. This assumption of emotions as signals has some affinity with the concept of 
affect as information (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1996) and with similar notions such 
as risk as feelings (e.g., Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001), affect heuristic 
(e.g., Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000), or somatic marker (e.g., Damasio, 
1994). All of these approaches have in common their emphasis on the power of 
affective influences on judgments and choices. Specifically, it is assumed that affective 
signals may provide information about the current status and value of objects or 
situations, and individuals attend to these feelings when making judgments or 
evaluations. A large body of empirical work has confirmed the role of affect as 
information, either focusing on general mood states (e.g., Pham, 1998; Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983), or addressing specific emotions such as fear, anger, or disgust (e.g., 
Bodenhausen, Shepard, & Kramer, 1994; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Lerner, Small, 
& Loewenstein, 2004; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). 
In terms of somatic markers, Damasio (1994) argued that the perception of one’s 
own somatic state, including bodily sensations such as visceral reactions or changes in 
heartbeat, provide individuals with information about the current situation and potential 
outcomes when they are faced with value-relevant decisions. In several studies 
examining brain patients, Damasio and colleagues assume that the function to consult 
somatic reactions in particular is represented by brain activities in the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex. For instance, the authors found lesions in this brain area to be 
especially associated with decreased experiences of emotions as reactions to threats of 
values, and with an impaired ability to make adaptive value-based decisions in various 
practical contexts (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Bechara, 
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996). In a 
similar vein, in an experiment using false physiological feedback, Batson, Engel, and 
Fridell (1999) were able to confirm that individuals consult their physiological state as 
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information about their reaction to a current situation when they are confronted with 
value-relevant decisions. 
Overall, I assume that emotions elicited by the mere contemplation of choices 
involving sacred values may operate as signals in that they provide information on a 
potential threat to sacred values in a given situation, and help the decision maker to 
choose in a certain way to minimize this threat. 
1.6.1.4 Moral Intuition 
The idea of emotions as signals has also been picked up by intuitionist theories 
of moral judgment, which have recently seen an upsurge. As the most prominent 
example, the social intuitionist model of moral judgment (e.g., Haidt, 2001, 2007) 
proposes that moral judgments are mainly the result of quick and automatic “gut” 
feelings, rather than of extensive reasoning. In terms of common dual process models 
(e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Chaiken & Trope, 1999), moral judgments are assumed 
to be based primarily on intuitive (i.e., quick, effortless, mostly affect-driven) rather 
than deliberative (i.e., slow, effortful, and analytical) processes. Moral intuition was 
defined as “the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an 
affective valence (good – bad, like – dislike) without any conscious awareness of having 
gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt, 
2001, p. 818). Thus, in this model, intuitive processes assert primacy. Deliberative 
processes of moral reasoning act mostly as post-hoc justifications for the judgment 
already generated; even though sometimes, reasoning processes may also be 
incorporated in forming judgments, for instance, through the fact that they override 
initial intuitions or search for a solution in the case of conflicting intuitions.  
Moreover, theory and research suggest that intuitive “gut” responses are 
grounded in the experience of specific moral emotions such as disgust or anger (e.g., 
Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley 
& Haidt, 2005). Specifically, studies showed an increase in the severity of moral 
judgments among participants, which were previously induced with disgust, using 
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various methods of priming and physical exposure (Schnall et al., 2008) or hypnosis 
(Wheatley & Haidt, 2005).  
Beyond this, the role of affective processes was further corroborated in 
neuroscientific studies, which focused on choice tasks comparable to taboo trade-off 
scenarios, either by assessing brain activities using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) (e.g., Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & 
Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001), or by 
examining patients with brain lesions (Koenigs, Young, Adolphs, Tranel, Cushman, 
Hauser, & Damasio, 2007). Altogether, these studies were able to demonstrate a 
selective involvement of brain areas associated with the processing of socio-emotional 
responses, such as, for instance, parts of the medial prefrontal cortex, which has 
previously been interpreted as a crucial area for the integration of (moral) emotions and 
somatic signals in decision making (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994; Damasio, 1994), or parts 
of the superior temporal sulcus as well as the posterior cingulum, which are known to 
be involved in various functions of social cognition (e.g., Greene & Haidt, 2002). 
In sum, following the converging evidence regarding the role of intuitive-
affective processes in moral decision making, sacred values and trade-off reluctance 
may mainly, or at least “by default”, operate on an intuitive and automatic level, as long 
as circumstances do not demand more extensive scrutiny of the problem at hand (e.g., 
dilemmas such as tragic trade-offs). In this vein, rapid “gut”-level responses may play a 
crucial role in signaling threats to sacred values and in rejecting trade-offs, thereby 
facilitating choices.  
1.6.1.5 Moral Emotions as Commitment Devices 
Beyond the signaling function of emotions, I assume that specific moral 
emotions may facilitate and guide decision making due to their motivational function, 
which serves to protect the sacred values at risk. In general, research on moral emotions 
distinguishes between “other-focused” emotions such as outrage and anger (i.e., 
responses are directed at other people) and “self-focused” emotions such as guilt and 
shame (i.e., responses addressing the self; e.g. Haidt, 2003; Tangney, Stuewig, & 
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Mashek, 2007). While “other-focused” emotions have already been highlighted as 
important regulators of interpersonal behavior in the context of observed violations of 
sacred values (see Section 1.2.2), it is still an open question whether “self-focused” 
emotions play a role as motivators of the protection of sacred values by the individual’s 
own acts and choices.  
Guilt, for instance, is generally known as a crucial driving force for the 
intrapersonal regulation of moral behavior (e.g., Frank, 1988; Pfister & Böhm, 2008). 
More specifically, guilt feelings primarily arise in the context of social interactions and 
are elicited by an individual’s perception that he or she has transgressed moral or social 
norms and caused harm to another individual. Subsequently, this aversive affective state 
induces the individual to make up for the transgression and to restore the damage with 
the goal of reaffirming the relationship (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 
1994).  
Moreover, moral emotions have been assumed to play an important role 
precisely in social settings in which conflicts emerge between the self-interest of the 
members of a group and the interest of the group as a whole. In such situations, moral 
emotions are assumed to bring people to act in favor of the group’s interests. In the 
tradition of Adam Smith’s (1759) seminal theory of moral sentiments, Frank (1988) 
hypothesized that moral emotions (i.e., guilt in particular) may operate as motivators or 
“commitment devices” promoting cooperative behavior. Especially in social dilemmas 
such as public good problems, in which people are seduced to behave selfishly at the 
expense of long-term benefits and the group’s interests, guilt may help to overcome the 
attraction of immediate rewards and to prevent people from pursuing self-interest. As a 
consequence of its unpleasant character, guilt commits people to act beneficially for the 
group in the long run and thus motivates cooperation. Following these arguments, 
several studies confirmed an increase of cooperative behavior in sequential social 
dilemma tasks due to feelings of guilt which had been elicited after having committed 
selfish choices or by an experimental priming procedure (e.g., de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & 
Breugelmans, 2007; Ketelaar & Au, 2003).  
In line with the conception of moral emotions as commitment devices, recent 
research on the mechanics of moral self-regulation suggests that guilt is primarily 
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associated with a prescriptive regulatory focus (i.e., focus on what one should do rather 
than on what one should not do). That is, guilt is sensitive to positive end-states and 
promotes moral conduct (e.g., helping, cooperation; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 
2009; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). Ultimately, such mechanisms of moral self-
regulation may help to uphold central parts of one’s moral identity (cf., for example, 
Aquino & Reed, 2002; Skitka, 2002).  
In sum, following the findings on moral emotions as commitment devices and 
moral self-regulation, I believe that emotions elicited by the mere confrontation with 
choice scenarios involving sacred values may contain an additional commitment 
component that goes beyond the function of signaling potential threats to sacred values. 
Hence, moral emotions such as guilt may facilitate choices in that they insistently 
advise individuals to act and decide in a certain way, which enables the fulfillment and 
protection of sacred values.  
1.6.1.6 Implicit Moral Beliefs and Preconscious Processing 
Even though the aforementioned mechanisms primarily emphasize the role of 
affective and intuitive processes when considering taboo trade-off scenarios, this does 
not necessarily suggest that sacred values and trade-off reluctance operate generally and 
exclusively on an affective level. In fact, recent research suggests that both affective and 
cognitive dimensions may operate as distinct mechanisms behind the effects of sacred 
values. More specifically, the above-mentioned studies that examined distinct affective 
and cognitive contributors to the behavioral consequences of moral conviction indicate 
that the specific content of the cognitive belief regarding the issue under consideration 
(e.g., “this is something absolute and inviolable”) may be the primary mechanism 
behind effects on behavior (Wright et al., 2008). Additionally, the emotional intensity 
with which such beliefs are experienced when called into question substantially 
magnifies these effects. In other words, these findings insistently suggest that sacred 
values and taboo reactions are based on more than just a strong emotional component, 
and additionally involve a characteristic cognitive belief component (which is, 
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incidentally, also in line with the finding of dual factors regarding the sacred value 
construct, cf. Tanner et al., 2009). 
Nonetheless, this dual view on sacred values does not imply that considering 
taboo trade-offs and facilitation through sacred values necessarily invokes a conscious 
and intentional application of choice rules and heuristics; rather, they may also be 
processed solely on a preconscious and automatic level. The theoretical and empirical 
evidence for this argument is twofold. On the one hand, in line with the recent schema 
accessibility approach to moral cognition and expertise (e.g., Lapsley & Hill, 2008; 
Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005), it is conceivable that beliefs 
associated with sacred values may be represented as an implicit, schematic, and chronic 
accessible form of moral knowledge which influences choices and behavior primarily 
on an “intuitive” (i.e., tacit, preconscious and automatic) level. It is noteworthy that 
such a view does not preclude that sacred values may also be stored in explicit and 
declarative forms of mental representation; but it is assumed that primarily implicit 
components guide choices and action (e.g., see Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, or Hogarth, 
2001, regarding the predominant role of intuitive and automatic processes in decision 
making and social cognition). 
On the other hand, according to the primacy-of-affect perspective (e.g., Zajonc, 
1984; Zajonc & Markus, 1982) and, more similarly, to Haidt’s (2001) notion of moral 
intuition, it might be argued that sacred values and taboo trade-offs may simply 
predetermine the choice process on a preconscious level due to their affective power, 
irrespective of any cognitive belief component and prior to the deliberative 
consideration of any arguments.  
To conclude, albeit rather speculatively, I suggest that scenarios involving taboo 
trade-offs trigger both affective processes (emotions as signals and commitment 
devices) and the processing of cognitive beliefs, which are represented in implicit 
knowledge structures. As a consequence, they may facilitate decision making in parallel 
primarily on a preconscious level, and probably predetermine choices before explicit 
forms of beliefs enter into consciousness. 
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1.6.2 Mechanisms Reflecting Barrier Effects  
1.6.2.1 Parallel Affective and Deliberative Processes 
Let us recall here that tragic trade-off scenarios involve conflicting sacred 
values. They confront individuals with troublesome and difficult requests to choose the 
lesser of two evils, or even to override the initial reluctance of trade-offs and to sacrifice 
one of the two sacred values. Thus, sacred values can no longer operate as a facilitator, 
but rather form a barrier to an acceptable choice.  
In terms of dual process accounts (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999), I assume that 
tragic trade-off scenarios may simultaneously trigger both affective and deliberative 
processes. Affective processes may reflect similar mechanisms to those triggered in 
taboo trade-off scenarios (i.e., initial emotions or intuitions signaling in particular acute 
threats to sacred values), and additionally considerable forms of emotional stress, since 
the initial intuitions may conflict with each other and fail to lead to an acceptable 
solution. Hence, I assume that deliberative reasoning processes are elicited in addition 
to affective processes, which should help to overcome this barrier and to resolve the 
dilemma at hand. The existing literature offers at least some possible evidence for such 
an interpretation. In concrete terms, the recruitment of deliberative processes is in 
accordance with findings from decision making research, showing that choices between 
two similarly attractive and highly valued options trigger negative emotions, engage 
extensive, vigilant and information-acquisitive processing, and increase the probability 
of decision avoidance (e.g., Dhar, 1997; Luce, 1998; Luce et al., 1997).  
Importantly, the idea of simultaneous affective as well as reasoning processes 
does not necessarily contradict the approach of moral intuition. In actual fact, Haidt’s 
(2001) intuitionist model acknowledges that in some situations, moral judgments are not 
only based on affect-driven intuitions but also on deliberative reasoning processes, and 
assumes this to be specifically the case in situations in which multiple intuitive inputs 
conflict with each other (i.e., similar to tragic trade-offs). Haidt argues that an abortion, 
for example, may feel wrong to many people when their perspective is on the fetus but 
right when their focus is on the woman. In such situations, reasoning processes are 
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proposed to be triggered in order to build up imaginative cases as a support for each 
point of view, and thus to search for further evidence in addition to initial intuitions. 
1.6.2.2 Cognitive Neuroscience Research on Dual Processes 
Moreover, findings from brain imaging studies lent support to the assumption of 
simultaneous affective and deliberative processes, especially in cases of difficult moral 
dilemmas comparable to tragic trade-off scenarios (Greene et al., 2004). Specifically, 
such scenarios were associated with particularly long decision times and triggered 
activities in brain areas associated with abstract reasoning and utilitarian judgments 
(e.g., the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and detection of cognitive conflicts (e.g., the 
anterior cingulate cortex), in addition to areas which are related to emotion-related 
processing (e.g., the insula, which is assumed to serve the processing of feelings of 
disgust; and other areas which show activities in tasks comparable to taboo trade-offs, 
as mentioned previously). In other words, this pattern of simultaneous activities in 
“affective” and “cognitive” brain areas, together with activities indicating cognitive 
conflict, strongly suggests a selective involvement of competing mechanisms serving 
moral judgments and choices, and processes which are recruited to resolve troublesome 
moral dilemmas comparable to tragic trade-offs. 
1.6.3 Conclusion 
This section presented several theoretical and empirical approaches that might 
account for mechanisms behind the effects of sacred values in decision making. First, 
sacred values may trigger non-compensatory choice rules and heuristics in that they 
provide a sufficient reason for making choices. Second, research suggests that sacred 
values are associated with a commitment component, which provides an imperative 
reason to choose easily in a “morally good” way. Third, converging evidence from 
different fields of research suggests that emotions, elicited by merely contemplating 
taboo trade-offs, may operate both as signals to the decision maker that sacred values 
are at risk, and as commitment devices in moral self-regulation processes serving the 
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protection of sacred values, thereby facilitating choices. Fourth, choices involving taboo 
trade-offs may trigger rather intuitive and automatic processes which facilitates decision 
making, whereas tragic trade-offs may engage deliberative and effortful processes 
which hinder the choice process. Finally, it is important to note that rapid and automatic 
mechanisms underlying facilitation effects can be explained by either purely affective 
processing (cf. moral intuition, primacy-of-affect) or by preconscious processing of 
certain beliefs as implicit forms of moral knowledge (cf. schema accessibility). 
However, it is also conceivable that facilitation occurs by both affective processes and 
preconscious processing of moral beliefs. In the following, I will introduce my second 
research project, which picked up several parts of the above-mentioned approaches in 
order to explore the mechanisms underlying the effects of sacred values in decision 
making. 
1.7 Cognitive and Affective Indicators for Conflict and Self-Regulation Processes 
The goal of my second research project was to address more thoroughly the role 
of sacred values as facilitators or barriers in decision making, and to take a closer look 
at possible mechanisms behind these effects. Let us recall that the subjective ease or 
difficulty of deciding on issues which individuals deem as concerning sacred values 
crucially depends on features of the task structure at hand (i.e., trade-off type). That is, 
subjective experiences of decision difficulty are dependent on whether individuals 
perceive just one (i.e., taboo trade-off) or two conflicting sacred values (i.e., tragic 
trade-off) associated with the choice. Hence, as I argued, sacred values may facilitate 
decision making by triggering rather intuitive and affective processes in the case of a 
taboo trade-off situation, but may hinder it by engaging deliberative and particularly 
effortful processes in a tragic trade-off situation.  
To better understand the mechanisms behind such effects, my intention for this 
research was to capture more closely intrapersonal conflict and self-regulation processes 
which individuals undergo when faced with taboo and tragic trade-off scenarios. To this 
aim, several cognitive and affective variables as indicators for intrapersonal processes 
were selected for examination. My focus was on experienced ambivalence as a measure 
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of cognitive conflict, on emotional stress as a general measure of perceived burden, and 
on the emotions fear and guilt to prove specifically the assumed roles of emotions as 
signals and commitment devices.  
The taboo and tragic trade-off scenarios that were presented in this research 
addressed human rights as sacred values in the question of whether or not suspects 
should be tortured to gain important information. 
1.7.1 Research Objectives 
Whereas the first research project assessed the perceptions of choice difficulty as 
a rather global and distal measure of whether sacred values facilitate or hinder decision 
making, the second project aimed to capture more narrowly the perceptions of cognitive 
conflict resulting from distinct trade-off types (cf. Mandel & Vartanian, 2007). More 
specifically, my research used a measure of experienced ambivalence as a cognitive 
indicator of decisional conflict. Experienced ambivalence has been defined as reflecting 
the simultaneous existence of positive and negative beliefs or emotions with regard to 
the same object (Jonas, Broemer, & Diehl, 2000a).  
Of course, decision makers often have to deal with contradicting beliefs or 
arguments, which reflect the perception of simultaneous pros and cons for each choice 
alternative that have to be traded off against each other. Imagine, for instance, a car 
purchase scenario in which a buyer has to decide between car A and B. Car A provides 
the better motor performance, whereas car B provides the better styling. When faced 
with this choice, a buyer may experience ambivalence to the extent that both aspects 
(i.e., performance and styling) are similarly important to him. As long as these aspects 
do not represent sacred values, they might constitute a routine trade-off.  
However, in terms of taboo versus tragic trade-off scenarios, arguments or 
beliefs reflect either one (in the case of taboo trade-offs) or two competing sacred values 
(in the case of tragic trade-offs), which, in turn, may reduce or increase ambivalence, 
respectively. To specify these effects, imagine the following two choice scenarios 
regarding the application of torture to force information from a suspect. The taboo 
trade-off scenario raises the question of whether or not torture should be allowed in 
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return for money (i.e., getting information about the whereabouts of a money haul in a 
robbery case). Implicitly, this scenario pits the contradicting beliefs “torturing the 
suspect violates human rights” against “torturing the suspect may help to get the money 
back”. In contrast, the tragic trade-off scenario raises the question of whether or not 
torture should be allowed in order to force information to be revealed about a live time 
bomb in a crowded location. Implicitly, this scenario pits the contradicting arguments 
“torturing the suspect violates human rights” against “torturing the suspect may help to 
save innocent lives”.  
Hence, my assumptions with respect to ambivalence were as follows: In the 
taboo trade-off scenario, individuals who endorse human rights and the prohibition of 
torture as a sacred value may experience less ambivalence compared to other people 
who do not endorse it as a sacred value, because they benefit from relying on an 
absolute principle, which helps them to override the contradicting “monetary” argument 
or even to weaken or disable its influence due to trade-off reluctance. This, in turn, 
should facilitate the choice process. In contrast, in the tragic trade-off scenario, 
individuals may associate both beliefs with sacred values, which increases experienced 
ambivalence and, in turn, hinders the choice process because both arguments are 
deemed as absolute and mandatory. 
Beyond addressing experienced ambivalence as a cognitive indicator of choice 
conflict, my research explored affective conflict and self-regulation parameters such as 
emotional stress, fear, and guilt. Emotional stress may generally reflect perceived 
burden and the extent to which people struggle with the conflict at hand. Moreover, the 
specific emotions fear and guilt may represent indicators of the presumed signaling and 
commitment functions of emotions in choices on sacred values. Fear may play the role 
of a signal and information to the individual that something particularly relevant and 
delicate is at risk (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000; Schwarz & Clore, 1996), 
and guilt may operate as a commitment device, promoting and obligating the decision 
maker to act in a manner that reaffirms the status of the sacred values at hand (e.g., 
Frank, 1988; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010).  
Generally speaking, I expected that individuals with higher levels of sacred 
value endorsement should show larger differences between taboo and tragic trade-off 
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scenarios in emotional stress, fear, and guilt than people with lower levels, because for 
the former, different prospects to succeed or fail in protecting their sacred values have 
largely different intrapersonal implications. Hence, in terms of facilitation, I expected 
taboo trade-off scenarios to lead to less stress, fear, and guilt for people with higher 
levels of sacred value endorsement compared to those with lower levels. Conversely, in 
terms of barriers, I assumed for tragic trade-off scenarios that people with higher levels 
of sacred value endorsement should feel more stress, fear, and guilt than those with 
lower levels. Altogether, these emotions might be initial indicators of possible 
mechanisms behind the facilitation and barrier effects of sacred values in that they 
reflect specific characteristics of sacred values that go beyond the mere preference for 
important values or attitudes. The results of this research, which mostly support the 
assumptions, have recently been submitted for publication (see Section 3; Hanselmann, 
Tanner, & Duc, 2010). 
1.7.2 Conclusion 
The goal of my second research project was to take a closer look at intrapersonal 
processes which individuals undergo when they are confronted with taboo and tragic 
trade-off choices on the issue of torture. Specifically, my research explored cognitive 
and affective indicators for conflict and self-regulation processes such as experienced 
ambivalence, emotional stress, fear, and guilt. In doing so, I expected to gain initial 
insights into the mechanisms behind the effects of sacred values as facilitators or 
barriers in decision making.  
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Abstract 
Previous studies suggest that choices are perceived as difficult as well as negatively 
emotion-laden when they tap into moral considerations. However, we propose that the 
involvement of moral issues and values can also facilitate decisions because people 
often insistently preclude them from trade-offs with other values. Because such values 
are treated as inviolable and absolute, they are called sacred values (e.g., Tetlock et al., 
2000). Two experiments examined the influence of sacred values (measured by a recent 
self-report scale) and variation of trade-off type (taboo, tragic, routine trade-offs) on 
perceived decision difficulty and negative emotions. As hypothesized, decision 
difficulty and negative emotions show diverging patterns as a function of sacred values 
and trade-off types. When the decision situation involved two conflicting sacred values 
(i.e., tragic trade-off), people perceived the decision task as emotionally stressful and 
difficult. However, when the decision situation was associated with only one sacred 
value (i.e., taboo trade-off), people perceived the task as more negatively emotion-
laden, but as easier to solve, compared to a situation not involving sacred values (i.e., 
routine trade-off). These findings suggest that reliance on sacred values may work as a 
heuristic. 
Keywords: Sacred values, protected values, taboo, decision making, decision 
difficulty, emotion, morality 
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Taboos and conflicts in decision making: Sacred values, decision difficulty, and 
emotions 
 
Most normative theories of decision making view it as a process that requires 
trade-offs between values. A trade-off means compensating for a disadvantage on one 
value with a benefit on some other value (e.g., Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1947). For example, the choice between two job offers may imply a trade-
off between salary and traveling distance to work. According to normative theories, any 
types of values or attributes can be traded off, in order to arrive at a choice that 
maximizes subjective utility.  
Decision making research, however, has rejected this relatively simplistic view 
(e.g., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). Decision tasks are sometimes perceived as 
difficult, negatively emotion-laden and distressing, and that people often avoid making 
decisions (e.g., Anderson, 2003; Luce, 1998; Payne et al., 1993). We know from 
personal experience that choices differ greatly in their difficulty and emotional charge. 
For example, imagine two managers of global companies who are faced with rather 
different decision problems. One manager is faced with the problem of whether to 
improve the poor working conditions for which the company has been criticized by a 
human rights organization, or to invest in new production facilities in order to improve 
competitive capacity. The other manager has to decide whether to improve the poor 
working conditions for which the company has been criticized by a human rights 
organization, or to solve the company’s widely criticized severe environmental 
pollution issues. 
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Comparing these choices – improved working conditions versus competitive 
capacity on the one hand, and improved working conditions versus environmental 
issues on the other – we believe that they vary in perceived decision difficulty and 
emotional charge. Both decisions may tap into moral or ethical considerations (such as 
human health, environmental protection), but they may differ in terms of how the choice 
options relate to moral values. In the first decision problem, just one option may be 
related to a moral value (i.e., safety at work), whereas the second decision problem may 
involve two conflicting moral values (i.e., safety at work vs. environmental protection). 
In general, we believe that a decision problem will be perceived as easier if people 
consider moral aspects for one but not the other option. More specifically, we argue that 
decisions become easier when one of the options reflects sacred values. As we will 
describe later in more detail, sacred values are values that are seen as absolute and thus 
protected from trade-offs with other values because they tap into moral or ethical 
principles. In contrast, a decision problem should be perceived as much more difficult 
and emotionally distressing if both options reflect sacred values. Such situations imply 
the necessity of trading off two moral values and, therefore, of sacrificing one of the 
values. Traditional normative views of decision making do not take into account such 
differences. They presume that people solve both decision problems in an equally 
rational and unemotional manner, and that people are able to make trade-offs among 
any conflicting values.  
In this paper, we focus on decision problems involving moral considerations, 
and we attempt to specify the effects of sacred values on decision difficulty and 
emotions. We define decision difficulty as the level of perceived difficulty or ease of 
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selecting among choice options. Previous studies have identified a plenty of factors that 
affect decision difficulty (for a review, see Anderson, 2003). For instance, some 
research suggests that decision difficulty may depend on the extent to which choices 
contain attributes that are difficult to trade off. This is the case, for instance, when trade-
offs pertain to attributes that are associated with valued goals or potentially threatening 
consequences (e.g., the trade-off between safety and price attributes when buying a car). 
Luce and colleagues (Luce, 1998; Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 1997; Luce, Payne, & 
Bettman, 1999) have shown that difficult trade-offs elicited higher levels of negative 
emotions and stronger tendencies to avoid such trade-offs. Hence, the level of negative 
emotions reflects the degree of trade-off difficulty. Although it has not been measured 
explicitly, it is plausible to assume that difficult and negatively emotion-laden trade-offs 
may also increase perceived decision difficulty. Note that this would suggest a positive 
relationship between negative emotions and decision difficulty. In other words, choices 
eliciting negative emotions should also be perceived as difficult. 
In the current study, however, we attempt to show that certain decisions are 
perceived as quite easy and straightforward even though they elicit negative emotions. 
We assume that this is particularly pronounced when decisions involve moral or ethical 
considerations. Compared to everyday choices (e.g., whether to buy newspaper A or B), 
decisions involving moral considerations are very likely to be more distressing and 
disturbing, probably since the decision-maker realizes that something particularly 
important and delicate is at stake. 
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Sacred values and trade-off types 
The concept of sacred values (or protected values) was developed to express the 
idea that certain values and moral principles are seen as absolute and non-negotiable 
and thus are protected from trade-offs with other values (Baron & Spranca, 1997; 
Tanner & Medin, 2004; Tanner, Ryf, & Hanselmann, 2007; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, 
Lerner, & Green, 2000). A sacred value has been defined as “any value that a moral 
community implicitly or explicitly treats as possessing infinite or transcendental 
significance that precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with 
bounded or secular values” (Tetlock et al., 2000, p. 853). Values like human life, health, 
nature, love, honor, justice, or human rights are seen as absolute and inviolable – in 
effect sacred. Trading them off against secular values (e.g., money) is considered taboo. 
For instance, previous research has shown that people struggle to protect sacred values 
from trade-offs against other values and respond with strong moral outrage when faced 
with violations of such taboo trade-offs. Moreover, it has been suggested that even the 
mere contemplation of taboo trade-offs elicits strong negative feelings of distress and 
disturbance (Tetlock, 2003). 
The aim of the present research is to examine the effects of sacred values on 
decision difficulty and emotions. More specifically, we study the effects of the 
following three distinct trade-off types on decision difficulty and emotions: Taboo 
trade-offs (i.e., a situation that pits a sacred value against a secular value), tragic trade-
offs (i.e., a situation that pits two sacred values against each other) and routine trade-
offs (i.e., a situation that pits two secular values against each other). Tetlock et al. 
(2000) indicated that such trade-off types and decision difficulty are closely related. The 
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authors examined how participants judged another person who was faced with a taboo 
or a tragic trade-off situation and who reported the task to be easy or difficult. The 
authors found that decision-makers who evaluated taboo trade-off decisions as easy and 
tragic trade-off decisions as difficult were judged positively by the participants. 
However, decision-makers who evaluated taboo trade-off decisions as difficult and 
tragic trade-off decisions as easy were judged negatively. It is important to note that 
these findings rely on judgments made from an observer perspective. Our research will 
study relations between trade-off types and decision difficulty when participants are 
themselves in the role of the decision-maker.  
We hypothesize that decision difficulty and negative emotions vary as a function 
of sacred values and trade-off type, and that decision difficulty and negative emotions 
are associated in a non-linear fashion. Specifically, compared to routine trade-offs, we 
expect taboo trade-offs to be more negatively emotion-laden, because the decision 
maker may realize that sacred values are involved and something important and delicate 
is at stake. Despite provoking negative emotions, we suppose that the involvement of 
just one sacred value in taboo trade-offs will help to make decisions easier. Conversely, 
we expect decision situations that imply the necessity of trading off two sacred values 
and sacrificing one of them (tragic trade-offs) to be associated with higher levels of 
negative emotions and decision difficulty, compared to the other conditions. 
 
Overview of experiments 
We report two experiments that examined how sacred values and manipulation 
of trade-off types affect decision difficulty and negative emotions. In both experiments, 
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participants were provided with decision scenarios that refer to hot issues as well as 
everyday decisions, such as poor working conditions, flood protection, or job selection. 
Each experiment includes a manipulation of trade-off type (i.e., taboo vs. tragic vs. 
routine trade-off scenarios), and each scenario provides a choice between two options. 
As an important manipulation check, we examine the extent to which 
participants associate sacred values with the choice options and whether trade-off types 
really correspond with sacred value endorsements. To assess people’s endorsement of 
sacred values, we utilize the recently developed Sacred Values Measure (SVM; Tanner 
et al., 2007). In Experiment 1, a previous version of the instrument is used, whereas 
Experiment 2 contains the improved final version (see Appendix B). This scale was 
designed to tap into important features of sacred values (e.g., unwillingness to sacrifice 
a value, incommensurability, trade-off resistance). Participants are provided with 
several items and asked to indicate the extent of their agreement on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
The SVM was shown to have good internal consistency in several studies, 
yielding α’s higher than .79 (Tanner et al., 2007). In terms of construct validity, the 
scale was compared with measures of moral outrage (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2000) and 
attitude strength (e.g., Pomerantz, Chaiken, & Tordesillas, 1995). Although the moral 
outrage items represent a more “indirect” approach to sacred values (i.e., people’s 
reactions to observed violations of sacred values are assessed), the SVM is designed to 
measure essential features of sacred values in a more “direct” manner. The studies 
revealed that moral outrage measures and our sacred values measure represent 
conceptually distinct factors, even though they are highly correlated (rs > .76). 
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Furthermore, we found evidence in several studies that sacred values differ conceptually 
from strong attitudes. As our focus in the current research lies on the decision-maker’s 
perspective rather than the observer’s perspective, sacred value measurement by the 
SVM seems to be more appropriate than the moral outrage approach. 
In both experiments, the primary dependent variables were perceived decision 
difficulty and negative emotions. Decision difficulty was measured by a single item 
(Experiment 1) or by a short set of items regarding various aspects of decision difficulty 
(Experiment 2). Negative emotions were also assessed using various approaches. In 
Experiment 1, we present a set of five items focusing on emotional stress. In 
Experiment 2, we utilize the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 examines how sacred values and trade-off type are related to 
decision difficulty and negative emotions. As outlined in the introduction, we 
hypothesize that decision difficulty and negative emotions are associated in a non-linear 
fashion, depending on trade-off type. We call the three types: taboo, meaning that one 
of the values is sacred; tragic, meaning that both are sacred; and routine, meaning that 
neither value is sacred. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. A sample of 84 students from the University of Zurich 
(65 women, 19 men) completed a paper-and-pencil questionnaire that contained three 
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decision scenarios. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 63 years (M = 25.39). They 
were recruited by advertisements in several study courses. In return for their 
participation, respondents were given the opportunity to take part in a prize draw. 
Participants were provided with one of two different scenario combinations, 
each consisting of a taboo, a tragic, and a routine trade-off scenario. Therefore, the 
design was a 3 (trade-off type: taboo vs. tragic vs. routine) X 2 (scenario combination: 
A vs. B) factorial design with trade-off type as within-subject factor and scenario 
combination as between-subject factor. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the two between-subject conditions. Dependent variables were sacred value 
endorsements, negative emotions, decision, and decision difficulty.  
Materials and procedure. Subjects were tested in small groups containing a 
maximum of five persons. Materials were written in German. Each participant was 
presented with three scenarios, representing a taboo, a tragic or a routine trade-off, that 
were selected from a total set of five scenarios. 
This set of scenarios involved three different topics (i.e., “flood protection”, 
“safety at work”, and “job offer”), based upon which two taboo trade-off scenarios, two 
tragic trade-off scenarios, and one routine trade-off scenario were constructed. In order 
to ensure that each participant received a taboo and a tragic trade-off scenario dealing 
with different topics, two scenario combinations were utilized as between-subject factor. 
More precisely, participants assigned to scenario combination A received the topic 
“flood protection” as the taboo, “safety at work” as the tragic, and “job offer” as the 
routine trade-off scenario, whereas those assigned to scenario combination B received 
the topic “safety at work” as the taboo, “flood protection” as the tragic, and “job offer” 
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as the routine trade-off scenario. Within each scenario combination, scenarios were 
presented in an order randomized for each subject.  
Each scenario provided a choice between two options. For instance, the taboo 
trade-off scenario with the topic “flood protection” was as follows (for a description of 
the other scenarios and tasks, see Appendix A). 
 
Imagine that you are the president of the local authority of a village that has been severely 
affected by a flood. The local authority is discussing whether to invest a considerable amount of 
the annual budget in improved flood protection measures. In this case, however, the village 
would have to forego a planned facelift for the village square. As president, you have to decide 
between the improvements in flood protection (option 1) and the facelift for the village square 
(option 2). 
 
After presenting the scenario, participants were asked to respond to a previous 
version of the SVM consisting of 4 items (α = .66) (see Appendix B). This was done for 
each option separately. A set of 5 questions was then provided to assess negative 
emotions associated with the decision situation (α = .89; see Appendix B). These items 
were adapted following Luce et al. (1999) and Gaab, Rohleder, Nater, and Ehlert 
(2005). Participants were asked to indicate their agreement on a 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (e.g., “I am swamped with this 
decision”). After that, they had to make a choice between these two alternatives on a 7-
point scale ranging from 1 (clearly in favor of option 1) to 7 (clearly in favor of option 
2). Finally, participants were given one item to indicate the perceived decision difficulty 
on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very easy) to 7 (very difficult).  
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Results and discussion 
One participant was excluded from analyses because of missing data. Table 1 
shows scale means and standard deviations for sacred value endorsements, decision, 
perceived decision difficulty, and negative emotions, listed for each scenario. Decision 
responses were not further analyzed as they are not of primary interest with regard to 
our hypotheses. 
 
Table 1 
Scale means (standard deviations) for sacred value endorsements, decision, decision difficulty, and 
negative emotions, for each scenario (n = 83) 
 Sacred valuea    
Scenario Option 1 Option 2  Decisionb Difficultyc Neg. emot.d 
Taboo trade-offs      
Flood protection 4.77 (1.24) 3.14 (1.07) 1.26 (0.59) 1.83 (0.94) 2.58 (0.81) 
Safety at work 4.93 (1.40) 3.09 (0.81) 1.59 (0.87) 2.85 (1.57) 3.98 (1.30) 
Tragic trade-offs      
Flood protection 3.73 (0.94) 4.11 (1.01) 3.71 (1.71) 4.98 (1.67) 4.37 (1.39) 
Safety at work 4.53 (1.29) 4.00 (1.19) 2.79 (1.35) 5.52 (1.47) 5.13 (1.31) 
Routine trade-off      
Job offer 3.03 (0.77) 3.92 (1.23) 5.27 (1.87) 2.89 (1.65) 2.90 (1.20) 
Note. All ratings were made on 7-point scales. aThe higher the scores, the higher the sacred value 
endorsements. bThe lower the score, the stronger the preference for option 1. cThe higher the score, the 
higher the level of perceived decision difficulty. dThe higher the score, the higher the level of negative 
emotions. 
 
As a manipulation check, we first examined whether trade-off types 
corresponded with endorsements of sacred values (SVM). These endorsements were 
analyzed with a mixed model ANOVA (trade-off type X option X scenario 
combination), with trade-off type and option as within-subject factors and scenario 
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combination as between-subject factor. The trade-off type X option interaction was 
significant, F(2, 162) = 80.95, p < .001. This interaction effect was analyzed by 
computing simple main effects for both trade-off type and option. Table 2 shows the 
main results revealed by Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons. Significant simple 
main effects of trade-off type were found for options 1 and 2, Fs(2, 80) > 29.71, ps < 
.001. Furthermore, options differed from each other in the taboo trade-off condition, 
F(1, 81) = 104.05, p < .001, to a lesser extent in the routine trade-off condition, F(1, 81) 
= 50.30, p < .001, but not in the tragic trade-off condition, F(1, 81) = 0.30, p = .586. 
Importantly, the results confirm that the (objective) manipulation of trade-off types 
corresponded with the (subjective) sacred value endorsements. In other words, people 
were likely to associate only one option with sacred values in taboo trade-off scenarios 
and both options in tragic trade-off scenarios. Contrary to our expectations, the 
endorsement for option 2 was somewhat higher for the routine trade-off scenario, 
indicating that the underlying issue also tapped into a sacred value. 
 
Table 2 
Scale means (standard deviations) for sacred value endorsements as a function of trade-off type and 
option (n = 83) 
 Sacred value 
 Taboo Tragic Routine 
Option 1 a4.85x (1.31) b4.13x (1.19) c3.03x (0.77) 
Option 2 a3.11y (0.94) b4.06x (1.10) b3.92y (1.23) 
Note. Within a row, cell means with different subscripts (a, b, c) differ significantly at p < .001 in 
Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons. Within a column, cell means with different subscripts (x, y) 
differ significantly at p < .001 in Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons.  
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Next, we tested our hypothesis that decision difficulty and negative emotions 
vary as a function of trade-off type. A MANOVA was conducted to examine the effects 
of trade-off types on decision difficulty and negative emotions. Significant effects were 
further analyzed by Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons. Most importantly, the 
findings provide support for the hypothesis that decision difficulty and negative 
emotions vary as a function of trade-off type, Wilks’ Λ = .23, F(4, 78) = 66.35, p < 
.001. For decision difficulty, a significant main effect of trade-off type emerged, F(2, 
162) = 94.42, p < .001. Compared to the routine trade-off condition (M = 2.89), the 
decision was perceived as easier in the taboo trade-off condition (M = 2.34), and as 
considerably more difficult in the tragic trade-off condition (M = 5.25). Pairwise 
comparisons showed that all mean differences with regard to decision difficulty were 
significant (ps < .05). Additionally, in line with our expectations, we found a significant 
main effect for negative emotions, F(2, 162) = 91.31, p < .001. Compared to the routine 
trade-off condition (M = 2.90), participants felt slightly more negative in the taboo 
trade-off condition (M = 3.28) and considerably more negative in the tragic trade-off 
condition (M = 4.75). Pairwise comparisons yielded significant mean differences (ps < 
.05). 
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Figure 1. Scale means (+ SE) for decision difficulty and negative emotions as a function of trade-off type 
(n = 83). 
 
As can be seen in Figure 1, taboo trade-offs were perceived as easier compared 
to routine trade-offs, while tragic trade-offs were perceived as most difficult. Negative 
emotions also showed the expected pattern, though the scores reflected in general only 
moderate levels of emotions. Compared to routine trade-off scenarios, negative 
emotions were somewhat stronger in taboo trade-off scenarios and considerably 
stronger in tragic trade-off scenarios. Altogether, the findings lend initial support to the 
proposition that perceived decision difficulty and negative emotions vary as a function 
of trade-off types (and indirectly also as a function of sacred value endorsements). 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 aimed to replicate previous findings by addressing four possibly 
critical points. First, we wished to improve the measure for decision difficulty by using 
multiple items instead of a single item. Second, with regard to negative emotions, we 
wished to replicate our findings using the PANAS scale (Watson et al., 1988), a well-
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established and validated instrument. Third, in order to strengthen the manipulation of 
trade-off type, we slightly modified the content of some scenarios. Fourth, we wanted to 
ensure that the measurement of sacred value of option 1 and 2 is not influenced by any 
direct trade-offs among these options. We therefore improved our design to uncouple 
sacred value assessments from the subsequent trade-off and choice processes. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. A sample of 130 students from the University of Zurich 
(90 women, 40 men) completed an online questionnaire that contained two hypothetical 
decision scenarios. Subjects’ ages ranged from 18 to 46 years (M = 24.37). They were 
recruited by advertisements via e-mail. In return for their participation, respondents 
obtained course credit points and were given the opportunity to take part in a prize 
draw. 
Two different scenario combinations, each consisting of a taboo, a tragic, and a 
routine trade-off scenario, were utilized. In each combination, the scenarios varied in 
topic. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two scenario combinations. 
From this combination, participants were provided with only two of the three trade-off 
types, which were also randomly selected. For our analyses, we extracted a trade-off 
type variable (i.e., taboo vs. tragic vs. routine trade-off) based on these combinations. 
Thus, trade-off type and scenario combination were used as independent variables. The 
dependent variables were sacred value endorsements, negative emotions, decision 
difficulty, and decision. 
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Materials and procedure. Materials were written in German. Again, a total set of 
five scenarios was utilized. This set involved the same three topics as in Experiment 1 
(i.e., “flood protection”, “safety at work”, and “job offer”), based upon which two taboo 
scenarios, two tragic scenarios, and one routine trade-off scenario were constructed. In 
order to ensure that each participant received two scenarios representing two different 
trade-off types as well as two different topics, two scenario combinations were used. 
More precisely, scenario combination A included the topic “flood protection” as the 
taboo, “safety at work” as the tragic, and “job offer” as the routine trade-off scenario, 
whereas scenario combination B included the topic “safety at work” as the taboo, “flood 
protection” as the tragic, and “job offer” as the routine trade-off scenario. As mentioned 
above, participants were randomly assigned to one of these two scenario combinations, 
and were presented with only two of three trade-off types, which were randomly 
selected from the respective scenario combination.  
The description of the choice options referring to some scenarios was slightly 
modified. In particular, we tried to improve the routine trade-off scenario, making it less 
likely to be associated with sacred values (for a description of scenarios, see Appendix 
A). Furthermore, different from the previous study, the choice options were presented 
sequentially (rather than simultaneously), and sacred value endorsements for each 
option were assessed before any trade-off task was salient to the participant. Note that 
the order of the options was randomly selected throughout the experiment, and that the 
instructions as well as the descriptions of the scenarios were adjusted accordingly. An 
example of the procedure is the following (tragic trade-off dealing with conflicting 
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issues “safety at work” vs. “environmental protection”; see Appendix A for a 
description of the other scenarios).  
 
Imagine that you are the CEO of a global company that has been criticized for poor working 
conditions in a Chinese factory. You are attending a meeting of the management. There is a 
discussion of whether measures to improve safety at work should be taken. You now have to 
consider your position on improving safety at work, because there will be a vote at the end of the 
meeting. 
 
Participants were then given the final version of the SVM (5 items, α = .81; see 
Appendix B for items) to assess the extent to which “safety at work” was associated 
with sacred values. After completing this task, participants were provided with the 
continuation of the scenario and the second option.  
 
Before the final vote, further topics are discussed. Your company has come under fire because 
large amounts of waste and pollutants are being discharged by the factories. There is a discussion 
about whether measures for environmental protection should be taken. You should now consider 
your position on environmental protection, because there will be a vote at the end of the meeting. 
 
Again, respondents were given the SVM, this time to examine the extent to 
which “environmental protection” was associated with sacred values. Finally, the 
decision task was introduced and participants were asked to make a choice between 
options 1 and 2. 
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This is the end of the meeting, and both suggestions, investing in safety at work and in 
environmental protection, have been approved. Because the implementation of both projects 
would exceed the available budget, you as CEO have to make the final choice between investing 
in safety at work (option 1) and investing in environmental protection (option 2).  
 
After being presented with the final decision situation, participants were given 
the PANAS (20 items) to measure positive and negative emotions associated with the 
decision situation (Watson et al., 1988; German translation by Krohne, Egloff, 
Kohlmann, & Tausch, 1996; see Appendix B). Participants were asked to indicate their 
feelings on 5-point scales ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely) 
(e.g., “afraid”, “jittery”). The positive emotion items were also included, although we 
only used the negative emotion items in this study (α = .90 for negative emotions 
subscale). 
Perceived decision difficulty was assessed using 5 items (α = .89), designed to 
measure various aspects of decision difficulty (such as ambivalence, certainty of 
decision, readiness to decide, or need for additional time). People are asked to indicate 
their extent of agreement on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (very easy) to 7 (very 
difficult) or from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (e.g., “I feel very 
ambivalent about this decision”) (see Appendix B). 
Finally, they indicated their decision on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (clearly 
in favor of option 1) to 7 (clearly in favor of option 2). 
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Results and discussion 
Data collection yielded a total of 260 scenarios, completed by 130 subjects. Due 
to failures in data transfer, 37 scenarios had to be excluded. Therefore, data analyses are 
based upon the remaining 223 scenarios. Table 3 shows scale means and standard 
deviations for sacred value endorsements (SVM), decision, perceived decision 
difficulty, and negative emotions, listed for each scenario. Decision responses were not 
further examined as they are not of primary interest with regard to our hypotheses. 
 
Table 3 
Scale means (standard deviations) for sacred value endorsements, decision, decision difficulty, and 
negative emotions, for each scenario (n = 223) 
 Sacred valuea    
Scenario Option 1 Option 2 Decisionb Difficultyc Neg. emot.d 
Taboo trade-offs      
Flood protection 4.07 (1.13) 2.82 (1.01) 1.67 (0.71) 3.51 (1.77) 2.07 (0.73) 
Safety at work 5.18 (1.13) 2.33 (1.13) 2.08 (1.77) 2.71 (1.23) 2.06 (0.74) 
Tragic trade-offs      
Flood protection 3.78 (1.23) 4.32 (1.16) 3.96 (1.95) 4.26 (1.70) 2.36 (0.85) 
Safety at work 5.49 (1.31) 5.41 (1.17) 3.93 (2.07) 5.01 (1.51) 3.11 (0.75) 
Routine trade-off      
Job offer 2.77 (0.81) 2.46 (0.80) 2.74 (1.64) 3.77 (1.46) 1.86 (0.70) 
Note. Ratings for sacred values, decision, and decision difficulty were made on 7-point scales, whereas 
ratings for negative emotions were made on 5-point scales. aThe higher the scores, the higher the sacred 
value endorsements; for each scenario, scores refer to the order of options as it is shown in the method 
section and the appendix. bThe lower the score, the stronger the preference for option 1. cThe higher the 
score, the higher the level of perceived decision difficulty. dThe higher the score, the higher the level of 
negative emotions.  
 
As a manipulation check, we first examined whether trade-off types 
corresponded with endorsements of sacred values. These endorsements were analyzed 
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with a mixed model ANOVA (trade-off type X option X scenario combination), with 
trade-off type and scenario combination as between subject factors and option as within-
subject factor. As a result, a significant trade-off type X option interaction emerged, 
F(2, 217) = 60.09, p < .001. This interaction was further analyzed by computing simple 
main effects for both trade-off type and option. Table 4 shows the main results revealed 
by Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons. Simple main effect analyses yielded 
significant effects of trade-off type for options 1 and 2, Fs(2, 217) > 75.76, p < .001. 
Moreover, options differed from each other in the taboo trade-off condition, F(1, 217) = 
163.09, p < .001, and, to a lesser extent, in the tragic trade-off condition, F(1, 217) = 
2.57, p = .11, as well as in the routine trade-off condition, F(1, 217) = 5.31, p < .05. 
Thus, the results confirm that the sacred value endorsements varied as expected and the 
manipulation of trade-off type was therefore successful for the taboo and tragic trade-off 
condition. For the routine trade-off condition, however, the difference between options 
1 and 2 was not expected, but the considerably low endorsements indicate that 
participants perceived the options as not being associated with sacred values. 
 
Table 4 
Scale means (standard deviations) for sacred value endorsements as a function of trade-off type and 
option (n = 223) 
 Sacred value 
 Taboo Tragic Routine 
Option 1 a4.63x (1.13) a4.63x (1.27) b2.77x (0.81) 
Option 2 a2.57y (1.07) b4.86x (1.16) a2.46y (0.80) 
Note. Scores refer to the order of options as it is shown in the method section and the appendix. Within a 
row, cell means with different subscripts (a, b) differ significantly at p < .001 in Bonferroni-adjusted 
pairwise comparisons. Within a column, cell means with different subscripts (x, y) differ significantly at p 
< .05 in Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons.  
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Next, we tested our hypothesis that decision difficulty and negative emotions 
vary as a function of trade-off type. A MANOVA provided further support that decision 
difficulty and negative emotions vary as a function of trade-off type, Wilks’ Λ = .74, 
F(4, 432) = 17.99, p < .001. For decision difficulty, a significant main effect of trade-off 
type emerged, F(2, 217) = 15.91, p < .001. Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons 
revealed that the means showed the expected pattern: Compared to the routine trade-off 
condition (M = 3.77), the decision was perceived as more difficult in the tragic trade-off 
condition (M = 4.64), and as easier in the taboo trade-off condition (M = 3.11). Pairwise 
comparisons showed that all mean differences were significant (ps < .05). Furthermore, 
we found again a significant main effect for negative emotions, F(2, 217) = 28.37, p < 
.001. Closer examination of the emotions revealed the expected tendencies, even though 
the pattern was somewhat less prevalent than in Experiment 1. Compared to the routine 
trade-off condition (M = 1.86), participants tended to feel more negative in the taboo 
trade-off condition (M = 2.07); although this difference failed to reach significance (p = 
.326). In the tragic trade-off condition, the reported level of negative emotions (M = 
2.74), however, was significantly higher than in the other trade-off conditions (ps < 
.001). 
Overall, the patterns tend to replicate those of Experiment 1, in that decision 
difficulty and negative emotions are associated in a non-linear fashion as a function of 
distinct trade-off types and sacred value endorsements. 
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General discussion 
The present research helps to clarify how decision difficulty and emotions are 
associated with trade-off types and sacred values. Our main findings were as follows: 
First, trade-offs involving sacred values tended to be more negatively emotion-laden 
than trade-offs not involving sacred values. This applied particularly to situations that 
pit one sacred value against another sacred value (i.e., tragic trade-off), and to a lesser 
extent to situations that pit one sacred value against a secular value (i.e., taboo trade-
off). Second, the decision difficulty varied as a function of trade-off types. Compared to 
routine trade-off situations (i.e., two opposing secular values), decisions were perceived 
as easier when they involve taboo trade-offs, but, conversely, as more difficult when 
they involve tragic trade-offs. Third, negative emotions and perceived decision 
difficulty showed a non-linear relationship. In the taboo trade-off condition, people 
perceived the tasks as more negatively emotion-laden, but as easier to solve, compared 
to the routine trade-off condition. However, in the tragic trade-off condition, people 
perceived the decision tasks as most stressful and difficult. 
The finding that trade-offs involving sacred values are relatively more 
negatively emotion-laden than routine trade-offs is in line with Tetlock’s (2003) 
assumption that the mere contemplation of trade-offs that touch on sacred values elicits 
negative feelings of distress and disturbance. We believe that the emotions function as a 
signal to the decision-maker that something delicate and important is at stake that has to 
be protected. In this sense, the emotions may play an “advisory” or “informational” role 
in decision making (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 
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2000; Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Zajonc, 1998; see also Pfister & Böhm, and Zeelenberg, 
Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters in this issue). 
Trade-off types and decision difficulty were related in that taboo trade-off 
situations were perceived as easy, whereas tragic trade-off situations were perceived as 
difficult. At least with regard to the supposed association between taboo trade-off 
situations and decision difficulty, our findings are consistent with recent findings from 
Lichtenstein, Gregory, and Irwin (2007). In order to examine people’s reactions to 
decision tasks addressing “taboo values” (i.e., sacred values), Lichtenstein et al. utilized 
a variety of preference measures (e.g., willingness to accept). Consistent with our 
research, they showed that decisions involving taboo values provoke negative emotions, 
while being perceived as easy to judge and as not demanding extensive thought. 
However, the authors did not examine trade-offs involving several conflicting values. 
As to tragic trade-offs, our findings suggest that the necessity of sacrificing one of these 
values intensifies both negative emotions and decision difficulty. 
Our findings on how taboo and tragic trade-offs are linked to perceived decision 
difficulty can, in a sense, be seen as complementary to findings by Tetlock et al. (2000). 
As mentioned above, these authors examined the relationship between trade-off type 
and decision difficulty by letting participants judge other people’s decision making. 
Their results provide an idea of which associations between trade-off type and decision 
difficulty are socially approved or disapproved. In contrast, we examined the 
relationship between trade-off type and decision difficulty by examining participants’ 
own decision making. We found that taboo trade-off situations were perceived as easy 
and tragic trade-off situations were perceived as difficult. In line with this, Tetlock et al. 
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showed that people will gain social approval when they perceive the relationship 
between trade-off type and decision difficulty in this mentioned way. However, people 
will gain social disapproval when they evaluate taboo trade-off decisions as difficult and 
tragic trade-off decisions as easy. 
As mentioned, decisions involving taboo trade-offs appear to be perceived as 
easy. This suggests that one function of sacred values could be to facilitate decisions (as 
long as they do not conflict with other sacred values). As stated, sacred values are 
protected from trade-offs with other values (i.e., secular values), therefore triggering 
noncompensatory decision strategies. Perhaps a form of “one-reason decision making” 
(Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999) might apply here, with sacred 
values providing a sufficient reason for preferring a particular option. Sacred values 
may work as a kind of moral heuristic or choice rule (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Luce, 1998; 
Sunstein, 2005). Of course, future research is needed to examine more thoroughly how 
sacred values affect decision processes.  
The idea of a heuristic function of sacred values has some affinity with theories 
of moral judgment that refer to dual process models (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; 
Chaiken & Trope, 1999). It has been proposed that moral judgment is primarily based 
on intuitive (i.e., fast and effortless) rather than deliberative (i.e., slow and effortful) 
processes (Haidt, 2001). It is possible that taboo trade-offs engage intuitive or affective 
processes, whereas tragic trade-offs engage deliberate processes. In the former case, the 
presence of just one sacred value option allows a quick choice in the sense of the 
mentioned moral heuristic. This notion is in accordance with Lichtenstein et al.’s 
findings (2007) that responses to taboo scenarios are driven primarily by affect. 
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However, in the case of a tragic trade-off (i.e., two conflicting sacred values), our 
findings of high negative emotions as well as high decision difficulty suggest stronger 
deliberate reasoning, in addition to emotional processes. This interpretation is in 
accordance with findings based on manipulated differences of the attractiveness of 
choice options (e.g., Dhar, 1997; Luce, 1998; Luce et al., 1997): Conflict between 
similarly attractive options was found to increase negative emotions, vigilant and 
information-acquisitive processing, and preference for avoidance options, if available. 
Moreover, the suggestion of simultaneous affective as well as reasoning processes of 
moral judgments was supported by recent findings from cognitive neuroscience (Greene 
& Haidt, 2002). In difficult moral dilemmas comparable to tragic trade-off situations, 
increased activities in brain regions associated with conflict perception, emotions (e.g., 
contempt and disgust) as well as with abstract reasoning and utilitarian judgments have 
been found (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004).  
Clearly, future research is needed to uncover in more detail the nature of 
processes underlying the facilitating effects of sacred values. With respect to the 
measurement of decision difficulty, additional or alternative measurement methods 
(e.g., reaction times or neural indicators) may be considered in future designs. Another 
methodological issue will also be further improving the assessment of emotions and 
clarifying the role of emotions when decisions tap into sacred values. It is important to 
note that our experiments evoked, on the whole, relatively mild emotions. Even though 
the emotional ratings in the situations containing taboo trade-offs tended to be perceived 
as more negative than in the routine trade-off situations, the emotional intensities and 
differences were smaller than expected. Recently, research also examining the 
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emotional reactions to taboo trade-offs has found considerably stronger emotions 
triggered by taboo issues (Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007; Lichtenstein et al., 
2007). It may be that our scenarios were not vivid enough to provoke stronger emotions. 
Furthermore, recall that we used two different measures for negative emotions. These 
measures might not be entirely comparable (i.e., focus on emotional stress vs. negative 
affect in general); this could possibly explain why we found a significant difference in 
negative emotions between taboo and routine trade-off scenarios in the first but not in 
the second experiment. 
In conclusion, sacred values as a possible source of decision difficulty, conflict, 
and emotions have mostly been neglected in prior research. Our findings suggest that 
sacred values may play a distinctive role in decision making because people preclude 
sacred values from trade-offs with other values. By introducing the role of sacred values 
and trade-off reluctance, we believe that our approach contributes significantly to the 
growing body of research on moral intuition and moral heuristics. 
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Appendix A 
Decision scenarios used in Experiment 1 
Note. The following scenarios are described in an abbreviated version; the original was 
in German. The taboo trade-off “flood protection” scenario is omitted here since it is 
provided in the text.  
 
Taboo trade-off, “safety at work” 
Imagine that you are the CEO of a global company that has been criticized for 
poor working conditions in a Chinese factory. The management is discussing whether 
substantial investments to improve safety at work should be made. In this case, 
however, you would have to give up the goal of a profit increase. As CEO, you have to 
decide between investing in safety at work (option 1) and increasing profit (option 2). 
 
Tragic trade-off, “flood protection” 
Imagine that you are the president of the local authority of a village that has been 
severely affected by a flood. The local authority is discussing whether to invest a 
considerable amount of the annual budget in improved flood protection measures. In 
this case, however, the village would have to forego a planned project for vocational 
training and integration for unemployed adolescents. As president, you have to decide 
between the improvements in flood protection (option 1) and the project for vocational 
training and integration (option 2). 
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Tragic trade-off, “safety at work” 
Imagine that you are the CEO of a global company that has been criticized for 
poor working conditions in a Chinese factory. The management is discussing whether 
substantial investments to improve safety at work should be made. In this case, 
however, you would have to accept the layoff of a third of the workforce due to 
financial reasons, thereby jeopardizing the future of many families. As CEO, you have 
to decide between investing in safety at work (option 1) and preserving jobs (option 2). 
 
Routine trade-off, “job offer” 
Imagine that you, as a parent, are solely responsible for your family’s livelihood. 
You have made several applications to find a new job. You have just received two 
offers, and it is now up to you to select one of them. Company A offers you an annual 
salary of CHF 80,000 [USD 66,000] and 20 vacation days per year, whereas company B 
offers you an annual salary of CHF 60,000 [USD 50,000] and 30 vacation days per 
year. You now have to decide between the job with a greater annual salary (option 1) 
and the job with a greater number of vacation days per year (option 2). 
 
Decision scenarios used in Experiment 2 
Note. The following scenarios are described in an abbreviated version; the original was 
in German. The tragic trade-off “safety at work” scenario is omitted here since it is 
provided in the text. Numbers in parentheses at the beginning of each paragraph were 
not given to the participants; they represent the position in the sequential experimental 
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procedure, that is, (1) presentation of option 1, (2) presentation of option 2, and (3) 
presentation of the final decision situation. 
 
Taboo trade-off, “flood protection” 
(1) Imagine that you are the president of the local authority of a village that has 
been severely affected by a flood. Currently, you are attending a meeting of the 
authority. There is a discussion about whether measures to improve flood protection 
should be taken. You now have to consider your position on improving flood protection, 
because there will be a vote at the end of the meeting. 
(2) Before the final vote, further topics are discussed. Your village square has 
been in a pitiful condition due to unauthorized parking and damaged paving. There is a 
discussion about whether measures for a facelift for the village square should be taken. 
You should now consider your position on the facelift for the village square, because 
there will be a vote at the end of the meeting. 
(3) This is the end of the meeting, and both suggestions, improvements in flood 
protection as well as the facelift for the village, have been approved. Because the 
implementation of both projects exceeds the available budget, you as president have to 
make the final choice between improvements in flood protection (option 1) and facelift 
for the village square (option 2). 
 
Taboo trade-off, “safety at work” 
 (1) Imagine that you are the CEO of a global company that has been criticized 
for poor working conditions in a Chinese factory. You are attending a meeting of the 
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management. There is a discussion of whether measures to improve safety at work 
should be taken. You now have to consider your position on improving safety at work, 
because there will be a vote at the end of the meeting. 
(2) Before the final vote, other topics are discussed. Your company has come 
under pricing pressure, because many competitors have a higher production volume. 
Hence, in order to cut prices, it has been suggested that production should be increased 
through additional facilities. You should now consider your position on increasing the 
production through additional facilities, because there will be a vote at the end of the 
meeting. 
(3) This is the end of the meeting, and both suggestions, improving safety at 
work as well as increasing the production, have been approved. Because the 
implementation of both projects would exceed the available budget, you as CEO have to 
make the final choice between investing in safety at work (option 1) and increasing the 
production (option 2). 
 
Tragic trade-off, “flood protection” 
(1) Imagine that you are a member of the local authority of a village that has 
been severely affected by a flood. Currently, you are attending a meeting of the 
authority. There is a discussion about whether measures for improved flood protection 
should be taken. You now have to consider your position on improving flood protection, 
because there will be a vote at the end of the meeting. 
(2) Before the final vote, further topics are discussed. Your village has been 
faced with growing juvenile violence and delinquency. Hence, there is a discussion 
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about whether a project for vocational training and integration for unemployed 
adolescents should be launched. You should now consider your position on the project 
for vocational training and integration, because there will be a vote at the end of the 
meeting. 
(3) This is the end of the meeting, and both suggestions, improvements in flood 
protection as well as the project for vocational training and integration for unemployed 
adolescents, have been approved. Because the implementation of both projects exceeds 
the available budget, you as president have to make the final choice between 
improvements in flood protection (option 1) and the project for vocational training and 
integration (option 2). 
 
Routine trade-off, “job offer” 
(1) Imagine that you, as a parent, are solely responsible for your family’s 
livelihood. One day, you hear about a vacant position in another division, which 
provides a better salary than your current one. You now have to consider your opinion 
about the level of your income.  
(2) A couple of days later, you hear about a vacant position at another branch 
office, which requires a shorter traveling distance to work than is currently the case. 
You should now consider your opinion about the traveling distance to work. 
(3) Your boss informs you that the division you are working for is going to be 
closed, but that he intends to employ you further. He offers you the same two jobs that 
you have already heard about. The first offer provides a better salary, but requires a 
longer traveling distance to work since it has been relocated to another branch. The 
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second offer requires a shorter traveling distance to work, but provides a lower salary. 
You now have to decide between a better salary (option 1) and a shorter traveling 
distance to work (option 2). 
 
Appendix B 
Sacred value measure 
Note. Each item is followed by a 7-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). 
 
Experiment 1 (previous version of SVM) 
Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements about [insert 
option 1 or 2; e.g., improving safety at work]. 
1. My stance on this issue might change over time. 
2. I would not change my opinion, no matter what the costs. 
3. I would have problems making any concessions on this topic. 
4. There are principles involved in this topic that we should defend under any 
circumstances. 
 
Experiment 2 (final version of SVM) 
Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements about [insert 
option 1 or 2; e.g., improving safety at work]: [Insert option 1 or 2] is about 
something... 
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1. …that we should not sacrifice, no matter what the benefits (money or something 
else). 
2. ...which one cannot quantify with money. 
3. …for which I think it is right to make the cost-benefit analyses. 
4. …that involves issues or values which are inviolable. 
5. …for which I can be flexible if the situation demands it. 
 
Negative emotions measures 
Experiment 1 (scale of 5 items) 
Note. Each item is followed by a 7-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree).  
Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements, with respect 
to the current decision situation. 
1. I am afraid to make the wrong choice. 
2. This choice is threatening to me. 
3. I am afraid to make a choice. 
4. I am swamped with this decision. 
5. This decision leaves me cold. 
 
Experiment 2 (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) 
Note. Instruction: “In the following you are presented with a number of words that 
describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate 
level of intensity on the scale next to that word. You can select from five levels.” Each 
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item is followed by a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 
(extremely). aNegative emotion items, bpositive emotion items. 
In the current decision situation, I am feeling: alertb, afraida, proudb, upseta, 
hostilea, strongb, irritablea, ashameda, nervousa, activeb, distresseda, scareda, attentiveb, 
guiltya, determinedb, interestedb, enthusiasticb, excitedb, jitterya, inspiredb. 
 
Decision difficulty measures 
Experiment 1 (single item) 
How easy or difficult was it for you to decide? For me, this decision was... (7-
point scale ranging from 1 [very easy] to 7 [very difficult]) 
 
Experiment 2 (scale of 5 items) 
Note. Each item is followed by a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree), except for item 1. 
 
Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements, with respect 
to the current decision situation. 
1. For me, this decision is... (7-point scale ranging from 1 [very easy] to 7 [very 
difficult]) 
2. I would need more time to decide. 
3. I would not ponder for a long time on this decision.  
4. I feel very ambivalent about this decision. 
5. For this decision, I feel certain which option to choose.  
Manuscript Hanselmann & Tanner (2008)  81 
 
 
Author note 
The present research was supported by Swiss National Science Foundation Grant 
PP001-102845 to the second author. We wish to thank Brigitte Rietmann, Christoph 
Egeler, Diana Meierhans, and Rea von Siebenthal for assisting in conducting the 
experiments. Martin Hanselmann would also like to thank Bettina Ryf, Martin 
Grossmann, Renee Stadler, Sabine Glück, and Nicolas Berkowitsch for valuable 
comments.  
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Martin Hanselmann or 
Carmen Tanner, University of Zurich, Department of Psychology, Binzmühlestrasse 
14/18, 8050 Zürich, Switzerland, E-mail: martin.hanselmann@psychologie.uzh.ch or 
c.tanner@psychologie.uzh.ch. 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript Hanselmann, Tanner, & Duc (2010) 83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Manuscript Hanselmann, Tanner, & Duc (2010) 
84  Manuscript Hanselmann, Tanner, & Duc (2010) 
 
 
Running head: DECISIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES 
 
 
 
 
 
Should I Approve of Torture or Not? Conflict and Self-Regulation Processes When 
Deciding on Human Rights Issues 
 
Martin Hanselmann, Carmen Tanner, and Corinne Duc 
Department of Psychology, University of Zurich, Switzerland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The final version of this manuscript has been submitted for publication in: 
European Journal of Social Psychology 
 
Manuscript Hanselmann, Tanner, & Duc (2010) 85 
 
 
Abstract 
This article examines intrapersonal conflict and self-regulation processes which 
individuals undergo when confronted with choice situations in which human rights 
compete with other legitimate or moral requirements (e.g., national security or saving 
innocent lives). We propose that such processes are affected by the extent to which 
individuals consider human rights as absolute. To assess perceived absoluteness, we 
utilized the concept of sacred values (SV), which reflect issues or values individuals 
deem as absolute and precluded from trade-offs. Three experiments, including various 
choice scenarios, examined measures of ambivalence, emotional stress, fear, and guilt, 
as a function of SV endorsement and manipulation of trade-off type (taboo vs. tragic). 
As expected, people with higher levels of SV endorsement for human rights 
demonstrated more variation in intrapersonal measures depending on trade-off type than 
people with lower levels of SV, and showed predominantly lower scores in taboo 
scenarios. Overall, findings suggest that SV facilitate decisions on human rights issues, 
and highlight the role of self-regulation in moral decision making. 
Keywords: Sacred values, protected values, human rights, torture, conflict, 
emotion, self-regulation, decision making 
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Should I Approve of Torture or Not? Conflict and Self-Regulation Processes When 
Deciding on Human Rights Issues 
 
The prohibition of torture is a main concern of the human rights movement of 
the United Nations (UN). As an expression of this concern, in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, the UN proclaimed respect for the integrity and 
dignity of human beings, and in Article 5, declared torture to be an unacceptable 
violation of human rights (United Nations, 2002, p. 2). In 1984, in the Convention 
against Torture, the UN stated that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever” justify 
torture (United Nations, 2002, p. 316). In other words, the protection of human rights 
and calls to stop torture have gained an absolute character. 
However, heated debates regarding the pros and cons of torture reveal that the 
absoluteness is not as universally supported and commonly approved of as one might 
expect. For example, the discovery of severe maltreatments of terror suspects held in 
various U.S. army bases has prompted the question of whether the United States should 
allow torture to force information from terror suspects. Prominent opinion leaders have 
justified human rights violations in the name of protecting national security. A further 
contentious issue concerned the case of two police officers in Germany. In 2002, they 
threatened the arrested kidnapper of an 11-year-old boy with torture in order to force 
information to be revealed about the boy’s whereabouts, in the hope of saving his life. 
Later, this threat of torture was judged in several judicial proceedings as violating 
human rights law, and the two police officers were condemned for coercion. Such cases 
have not only given rise to a revival of interest in human rights and torture, but also 
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clearly reflect conflicts and different positions underlying judgment and decision 
making about torture. Indeed, polls usually show that people are divided on whether or 
not torture can ever be justified (e.g., Kull et al., 2008). Some clearly oppose torturing 
and emphasize the absoluteness of the human rights principle that prohibits torture 
under any circumstances (as proclaimed in the UN Convention); others point out that its 
application to force information can save innocent lives. 
To explain individual differences in commitment to human rights, research has 
traditionally dealt with different aspects and determinants, such as attitudinal structure 
underlying human rights principles (e.g., Cohrs, Maes, Moschner, & Kielmann, 2007; 
Diaz-Veizades, Widaman, Little, & Gibbs, 1995; McFarland & Mathews, 2005), 
representation of human rights and their relations to value priorities (e.g., Doise, Spini, 
Jesuino, Ng, & Emler, 1994; Spini & Doise, 1998), knowledge about human rights 
(Stellmacher, Sommer, & Brähler, 2005), and willingness to engage in behaviors related 
to human rights issues (Stellmacher et al., 2005; Stellmacher, Sommer, & Imbeck, 
2003).  
Other studies have shown that the approval of human rights apparently varies 
depending on whether human rights violations are discussed on a general or a concrete 
level (Doise, Dell’Ambrogio, & Spini, 1991). While the vast majority of people express 
adherence to the principles of human rights when they are discussed on an abstract 
level, their judgments drift apart when faced with concrete cases of human rights 
violations. Concrete cases bring some individuals to switch their focus. The focus is 
then no longer on principles of human rights, but on the evaluation of an actor’s 
behavior. If the person’s acts are judged as bad and unacceptable, sanctions are 
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preferred, irrespective of whether these sanctions violate human rights (Staerklé & 
Clémence, 2004).  
Even though previous research has largely contributed to a better comprehension 
of the psychological basis of human rights, still very little is known about the cognitive-
affective and self-regulation processes which individuals undergo when confronted with 
conflict situations that put the purpose of human rights at risk. For example, how do 
individuals deal or struggle with situations in which human rights compete with other 
legitimate or moral requirements (such as national security or saving innocent lives)? In 
this paper, we argue that such processes are affected by the extent to which individuals 
consider human rights as absolute and universal. One approach in social psychology 
that is concerned with the role of values that people hold as absolute and inviolable is 
the theory of sacred (or protected) values (e.g., Atran, Axelrod, & Davis, 2007; Baron & 
Spranca, 1997; Tanner, 2009; Tanner, Ryf, & Hanselmann, 2009; Tetlock, 2003; 
Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Lerner, & Green, 2000). Sacred values refer to issues or values 
which individuals believe ought to be absolute and protected from trade-offs. Given 
their proclaimed absolute character, we deem human rights to be a prototypical example 
of a sacred value. Previous research has shown that sacred values powerfully shape 
decision making processes. In this article, we propose that different intrapersonal 
processes operate when human rights – or more specifically, prohibition of torture – are 
treated as sacred. 
Sacred Values and Trade-Off Types 
Sacred values (or protected values, taboo values, moral mandates, for similar 
notions) refer to core values to which individuals are strongly committed, and which 
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they deem as absolute and excluded from trade-offs (Baron & Spranca, 1997; 
Lichtenstein, Gregory, & Irwin, 2007; Skitka, 2002; Tanner, 2009; Tanner & Medin, 
2004; Tanner et al., 2009; Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock et al., 2000). Importantly, sacred 
values meet specific criteria that go beyond simply valuing entities or issues. For this 
paper, we wish to focus on the following three characteristics:  
(1) Sacred values are associated with trade-off reluctance. Trade-offs are typical 
processes involved in human decision making, and the capacity to make trade-offs and 
apply exchanges between competing values is a defining attribute of decision making. It 
is evident from past research, however, that individuals who endorse sacred values tend 
to be highly reluctant to trade off certain values or entities. For example, many 
individuals deem it as unacceptable and morally wrong to sacrifice freedom, love, 
honor, natural resources, or human lives in return for any other values, in particular 
economic benefit (e.g., Baron & Spranca, 1997; Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock, 2003; 
Tetlock et al., 2000). It may be important to emphasize that sacred values are similar, 
but not identical, to other value concepts, commonly seen as stable beliefs about 
desirable states or conducts of behaviors (e.g., Rohan, 2000; Schwartz, 1992). While the 
concept of values does not necessarily exclude trade-offs, sacred values are those that 
people believe “ought” to be protected from trade-offs and which are associated with 
non-instrumental defense reactions (Atran et al., 2007). Sacred values (or moral 
mandates) are also similar to strong attitudes, but are usually held with strong moral 
convictions (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005) and associated with principled, non-
consequentialist reasoning (Tanner, Medin, & Iliev, 2008). 
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(2) Trade-offs involving sacred values are negatively emotion-laden. Studies 
have shown that individuals react with strong feelings of anger or moral outrage to 
others violating such values or moral mandates (e.g., Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 
2007; Tetlock et al., 2000); they protest, show an increase in social and physical 
distance, or even demonstrate intentions to sanction the transgressor (Atran et al., 2007; 
Ginges et al., 2007; Skitka et al., 2005; Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008). In a study 
testing the role of sacred values in the context of the Middle East conflict between 
Israeli settlers and Palestinians, Ginges et al. found that individuals who endorse sacred 
values respond not only with strong outrage to offers to sacrifice sacred values in 
exchange for money, but also with increased support for violence (such as suicide 
attacks) toward others who attack their sacred values. Beyond this, initial research also 
suggests that individuals suffer emotionally from trading off sacred values when they 
are themselves in the position of the decision maker (Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008). 
These findings are in line with Tetlock’s (2003) assumption that even the mere 
contemplation of taboo trade-offs may elicit negative feelings of stress and disturbance. 
(3) Sacred values can work as a decision tool or moral heuristic. Hanselmann 
and Tanner (2008) proposed that sacred values can help to facilitate decision making 
because people can then rely on values that are precluded from trade-offs. Consistent 
with this, individuals were found to perceive a choice task as easier to solve when it 
reflected a taboo trade-off (i.e., situations which pit a sacred value against a secular 
value), compared to a task that was not linked with sacred values. In contrast, when the 
task reflected a tragic trade-off (i.e., situations which pit two sacred values against each 
other), people were forced to choose the lesser of two evils and to violate one of the two 
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sacred values (Mandel & Vartanian, 2008; Tetlock et al., 2000). Consequently, they 
perceived the situation as very difficult to solve.  
As an explanation for how sacred values facilitate decision making, Hanselmann 
and Tanner (2008) suggested that sacred values work as a heuristic (e.g., Haidt, 2001; 
Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999; Sunstein, 2005), as long as they 
do not conflict with other sacred values or moral requirements. For example, sacred 
values may be similar to “one-reason decision making” (Gigerenzer et al., 1999) in that 
that they provide a sufficient reason for choosing a particular option, and to Haidt’s 
(2001) notion of moral intuition in that they are highly, if not essentially, affect-laden, 
providing rapid “gut” responses. In addition, the emotions which are elicited by the 
mere contemplation of taboo trade-offs may play an “informational” role in signaling 
that something delicate and important is at risk (cf. Damasio, 1994; Finucane, 
Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Luce, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). 
Overall, the findings suggest that sacred values can work as a facilitator or 
barrier in decision making. Decision making can be more or less difficult depending on 
agents’ characteristics (whether or not individuals associate sacred concerns with the 
task) and on the characteristics of the problems themselves, such as trade-off types (i.e., 
whether the problem has the structure of a taboo or tragic trade-off situation). In the 
present article, we aim to generalize these findings by applying the notion of sacred 
values to the human rights context and to extend previous research by taking a closer 
look at intrapersonal processes. Past research and theory on the role of sacred values has 
paid much attention to the other-focused emotions and interpersonal regulation 
mechanism. Yet, we lack knowledge about self-focused (moral) emotions and conflict 
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processes with which individuals who endorse sacred values struggle when confronted 
with trading them off. To address this, the focus is less on people’s choices per se and 
rather on various cognitive and affective dimensions which reflect how much conflict 
the decision maker may experience in reaching a decision.  
Specifically, we will address the following important dimensions of perceived 
conflict and moral emotions: (1) Experienced ambivalence, as a relevant cognitive 
indicator of conflict. Ambivalence is typically defined as reflecting the simultaneous 
existence of positive and negative beliefs with regard to the same object (Jonas, 
Broemer, & Diehl, 2000a). (2) Emotional stress, as a general indicator of perceived 
burden, as well as (3) fear as a specific emotional conflict indicator and as a signal to 
the individual that something relevant is at risk (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Finucane et al., 
2000; Luce, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). (4) Guilt refers to an important emotion 
related to moral self-regulation, prompting people to act in good way and preventing 
them from committing a transgression of moral or social norms (Frank, 1988; Haidt, 
2003; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). Research and theory has 
suggested that guilt may operate as a “commitment device” that motivates individuals to 
reaffirm the status of moral values at hand and thereby helps to protect central elements 
of one’s moral identity (cf. Aquino & Reed, 2002). To summarize, we thus believe that 
individuals who consider human rights as a sacred value will respond differently to 
various conflict situations, which will be reflected in distinct cognitive and affective 
processes. 
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Goals and Predictions 
The main goals of the present article are to examine 1) how concerns for human 
right principles as sacred values are associated with choices on allowing or rejecting the 
application of torture, 2) how they affect cognitive and affective conflict dimensions 
and moral emotions, such as ambivalence, emotional stress, fear, and guilt, and 3) how 
these processes depend on trade-off types. We report three experiments that include 
various choice scenarios, assessment of sacred values, and a manipulation of taboo 
versus tragic trade-offs. Our hypotheses are as follows.  
Hypothesis 1: People with higher levels of sacred value endorsement for human 
rights will show more extreme choices of rejecting torture than people with lower levels 
of sacred value endorsement. This follows from the idea that sacred values are 
associated with strong commitments to protect the principle at hand and to reject any 
trade-offs. Even though opposing torture should be easier under taboo than tragic trade-
off conditions, we expect that considering human rights as a sacred value will generally 
augment trade-off aversion and rejection of torture. This hypothesis refers to behavioral 
expressions of sacred values, but choices per se do not reveal anything about the 
subjective perception of the problem at hand. This aspect will be addressed in the next 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2: People with higher levels of sacred value endorsement for human 
rights will show more variation in intrapersonal conflict processes depending on trade-
off type than people with lower levels of sacred value endorsement. Specifically, we 
hypothesize that people with higher levels of sacred value endorsement will 
demonstrate larger differences between taboo and tragic trade-off scenarios in 
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ambivalence (H2a), emotional stress (H2b), fear (H2c) and guilt (H2d). These 
propositions follow from the idea that various conflict situations with different 
prospects to succeed or fail in protecting human rights have different implications for 
people who consider human rights as absolute principles.  
Hypothesis 3: In this context, we also further explore which of two plausible 
mechanisms is more likely to account for these distinct cognitive-affective reactions: 
sacred values as a “facilitator” or sacred values as a “barrier”. On the one hand, sacred 
values as a facilitator or moral heuristic suggests that people who endorse such values 
will benefit from relying on an absolute principle; the feasibility of affirming its 
absolute status helps to reduce negative intrapersonal reactions. If this is the case, we 
expect differences to emerge between people with high or low levels of sacred values 
predominantly in conflict situations that pit a sacred value against another (not sacred) 
value (i.e., taboo trade-offs). In this case, taboo trade-off scenarios are expected to lead 
to less ambivalence, more emotional relief, and less fear and guilt for people with higher 
levels of sacred values compared to those with lower levels (H3a).  
On the other hand, sacred values as a barrier emphasizes that people who 
endorse such values will be more likely to suffer from upholding an absolute principle. 
If so, we would expect to find differences in negative cognitive-affective reactions 
between people with high and low levels of sacred values in problems that pit human 
rights against another important (moral) requirement (i.e., tragic trade-offs). In this case, 
tragic trade-off scenarios are expected to prompt more ambivalence, distress, fear and 
guilt for people with higher levels of sacred values compared to those with lower levels 
(H3b). 
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Experiment 1 
This experiment examined Hypotheses 1 and 2a by utilizing two conflict 
situations that reflected hotly debated issues in the public domain: The taboo trade-off 
scenario (“counterterrorism”) raised the question of whether or not torture should be 
allowed to force information from terror suspects. It was designed to reflect a conflict 
between upholding human rights versus ensuring national security. The other task, the 
tragic trade-off scenario (“kidnapping”) raises the question of whether or not torture 
should be allowed to force information from a child kidnapper. This scenario was 
designed to reflect a conflict between upholding human rights versus saving a child’s 
life. 
In addition, to back up our assumption that our manipulation of trade-off type 
reflects the proposed conflict structure, we referred to Schwartz’s value system structure 
(Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). This approach displays individuals’ value 
priorities on a circular structure and permits value combinations to be deduced, which 
are likely to be conflicting or not conflicting. In this study, we made use of this 
characteristic to verify the structure of our tragic and taboo trade-off scenarios. 
 
Value Structure and Trade-Off Types 
Schwartz’s value theory (e.g., 1992) suggests that individuals differ in the 
relative importance they place on a universal set of 10 motivationally distinct value 
types. The dynamic relations among these value types can be displayed on a circular 
structure, along two dimensions. One dimension opposes self-transcendence 
(universalism, benevolence) against self-enhancement (power, achievement, hedonism), 
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while the other opposes openness to change (self-direction, stimulation) against 
conservation (security, conformity, tradition). For our purposes, it is essential that the 
circular structure also permits patterns of individually conflicting or non-conflicting 
value relations to be specified (Schwartz, 1992). Specifically, two values that are both 
important for an individual and close to one another on the circle imply a conflict for 
this individual when faced with a trade-off that pits one value against the other. On the 
other hand, values that lie in a more opposing direction from the center depict an 
important and unimportant value for the individual and imply less conflict when faced 
with a trade-off between these two values.  
Following other authors (cf. Doise et al., 1994; Spini & Doise, 1998), we 
assumed that people who value human rights highly also assign a high priority to 
universalism values. Applied to our study, we concluded that for such people, a taboo 
trade-off situation is likely when pitting universalism values (such as human rights) 
against security values (such as national security), representing opposing values in 
Schwartz’s circular structure. Conversely, a tragic trade-off structure is likely when 
pitting two universalism values (such as human rights versus protecting a child’s life) 
against each other, representing close values in Schwartz’s circular structure (cf. 
Schwartz, 2007). Accordingly, our “counterterrorism” (taboo trade-off) and 
“kidnapping” (tragic trade-off) scenario were designed to reflect these constellations. In 
order to examine whether our trade-off type manipulation reflected these structures, we 
assessed respondents’ relative value priorities using the short version of the Portrait 
Values Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, & Harris, 2001; 
Schwartz, 2003). 
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Method 
Participants and design. A sample of 192 students from the University of 
Zurich participated in the online experiment. They consisted of 115 women and 77 men, 
ranging in age from 19 to 83 years (M = 25.59). Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two decision scenarios, either the taboo trade-off scenario (“counterterrorism”) or 
the tragic trade-off scenario (“kidnapping”). Sacred values (SV) endorsement and value 
priorities were assessed separately. Dependent variables were ambivalence and decision 
to allow or reject the application of torture.  
Procedure and materials. Participants were initially introduced to the topic and 
informed about the purpose of the study. To assess the extent to which participants treat 
human rights in the context of torture as a sacred value, they were provided with a 
previous version of the Sacred Value Measure (SVM) by Tanner et al. (2009). 
Participants were presented with four statements (e.g., “Human rights are something 
that we should defend under any circumstances”; “Human rights are something for 
which I would have problems to make any concessions”) and were asked to indicate the 
extent of their agreement on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) (α = .64). 
Later, participants responded to the short 21-item version of the PVQ (Schwartz, 
2003; Schwartz et al., 2001) in order to assess their value priorities. This instrument 
contains short verbal portraits of 21 different people, with gender being matched to the 
participants’ own gender. Each portrait describes a person’s aspiration, which relates to 
one particular value type. For example, an item representing the importance of 
universalism was: “He thinks it is important that every person in the world is treated 
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equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.” Participants 
were asked to rate, on a 6-point scale, their perceived similarity to the portrayed person 
(1 = very much like me; 6 = not like me at all). To capture more explicitly the values 
manipulated in the scenarios, we added two portraits to the original set, one pointing to 
the value of upholding human rights, and the other to the value of ensuring children’s 
welfare. Note that the value of ensuring national security was already captured by one 
of the original portraits. 
Participants were then given one of the two decision scenarios. The taboo trade-
off scenario “counterterrorism” was as follows (shortened): 
 
Imagine that you work as a chief investigator for the police. The police arrested a man suspected 
of planning terror attacks together with other accomplices. The suspect refuses to reveal his 
plans and accomplices. You have to decide about the further steps. You therefore initiate a 
discussion with your team regarding whether or not torture should be allowed to force 
information from the suspect. Some colleagues point out that applying torture violates basic 
human rights, for which reason they would oppose torturing the suspect in this case. Other 
colleagues emphasize that national security is at risk, for which reason they would allow the 
torturing of the suspect in this case. What is your choice in this case? 
 
The tragic trade-off scenario “kidnapping” was as follows (shortened): 
 
Imagine that you work as a chief investigator for the police. The police arrested the kidnapper of 
a five-year-old child, but it is still unknown where the child is being hidden. The kidnapper 
refuses to reveal the hide-out and the status of the child. You have to decide about the further 
steps. You therefore initiate a discussion with your team regarding whether or not torture should 
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be allowed to force information from the kidnapper. Some colleagues point out that applying 
torture violates basic human rights, for which reason they would oppose torture in this case. 
Other colleagues emphasize that the child’s life is at risk, for which reason they would allow 
torture in this case. What is your choice in this case? 
 
Participants were then asked to indicate their ambivalence on four items 
(adapted following Jonas, Broemer, & Diehl, 2000b; α = .93). For example, two items 
were: “My thoughts concerning the application of torture are…” (1 = not at all mixed; 7 
= very mixed) or “Concerning the application of torture, I feel myself….” (1 = not at all 
wavering; 7 = very wavering). Finally, they indicated their choice regarding torture on a 
scale ranging from 1 (clearly in favor of torture) to 7 (clearly against torture). At the 
end, participants were debriefed. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses. We began by examining how respondents’ value 
priorities (based on the PVQ ratings) corresponded with the trade-off type 
manipulations. Following Schwartz (2003), PVQ ratings were centered to eliminate 
individual differences in the use of the response scale. The mean score across the items 
measuring a particular value type indicates how important this value type is as a guiding 
principle in the participant’s life. The scores for each value type were subjected to an 
ANOVA with repeated measures. We found a significant main effect for value type, 
F(5.74, 1095.93) = 136.51, p < .001, η2 = .42, and among the ten value types, 
participants assigned the highest priorities to universalism (M = -0.91) and benevolence 
(M = -0.97) (whose means did not differ from each other, p > .999). As expected, 
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security (M = 0.27) was found to be considerably less important than universalism (p < 
.001). In addition, we found that our additional item pointing to the value of upholding 
human rights correlated positively with universalism (r = .57, p < .001).  
Confirming the taboo trade-off structure, human rights and universalism were 
negatively associated with national security (r = -.23, p = .001, and r = -.34, p < .001, 
respectively); and in accordance with the tragic trade-off structure, human rights and 
universalism were positively associated with valuing children’s well-being (r = .43 and 
r = .38, respectively, ps < .001). Overall, these findings suggest that the manipulation of 
taboo versus tragic trade-off types matched reasonably well with participants’ relative 
value priorities.  
Main analyses. To test Hypotheses 1 and 2a, two multiple regression analyses 
were conducted, with decision and ambivalence as dependent variables. Age and gender 
served as control variables. SV endorsement as continuous variable was centered 
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Trade-off type (0 = taboo; 1 = tragic) and SV 
endorsement, followed by the interaction term SV × Trade-Off Type, were used as 
predictors.  
For the decision, the total variance explained by the model was (adjusted) R2 = 
.29. SV endorsement (ß = .49, p < .001) and trade-off type (ß = -.23, p < .001) were 
revealed as significant predictors. The results show that rejection of torture was more 
extreme in taboo than in tragic conflict situations. However, as expected, people who 
more strongly endorsed human rights as an SV were generally more extremely against 
torture, across both trade-off conditions. This supports Hypothesis 1.  
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For ambivalence, the total variance explained by the model was (adjusted) R2 = 
.12. Again, SV endorsement (ß = -.39, p < .001) and trade-off type (ß = .11, p = .095) 
were revealed as significant and marginally significant predictors, respectively. More 
importantly, these effects were qualified by a significant SV × Trade-Off Type 
interaction (ß = .21, p = .026). Decomposing the interaction one standard deviation 
above and below the mean of SV endorsement (Aiken & West, 1991; Baron & Kenny, 
1986), we found a significant effect of trade-off type among participants with high 
levels of SV (ß = .27, p = .006), but not among people with low levels of SV (ß = -.04, p 
= .681). As illustrated in Figure 1a, these results reflect the greater magnitude of 
differences in ambivalence ratings between the trade-off types among participants with 
high levels of SV compared to those with low levels of SV. This confirms Hypothesis 
2a. Moreover, Figure 1a suggests that these differences were based in particular on 
different reactions to the taboo trade-off scenario: Participants with high levels of SV 
reported less ambivalence in the taboo trade-off condition than participants with low 
levels of SV. This finding supports Hypothesis 3a.  
Overall, the results of Experiment 1 lend first support to our hypotheses. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, treating human rights as a sacred value generally 
augments rejection of torture. Furthermore, in support of Hypothesis 2a, we found that 
people with higher levels of SV endorsement show more variation in experienced 
ambivalence depending on trade-off type than people with lower levels of SV, 
indicating that various conflict situations have different implications for people who 
consider human rights as an absolute principle. More specifically, these people 
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experienced less ambivalence in the taboo trade-off scenario, lending first support to the 
assumption of sacred values serving as a facilitator (Hypothesis 3a).  
 
Experiments 2 and 3 
Experiments 2 and 3 used nearly identical procedures, but examined different 
dependent variables. Due to space restrictions, we will therefore present them together 
and combine the method and results sections. In these studies, we sought to replicate 
and extend the results of Experiment 1. For this purpose, three modifications were 
applied. First, beyond using other variants of decision and ambivalence measures, we 
also included emotional stress, fear and guilt as additional dependent variables. Second, 
we manipulated trade-off types in a more straightforward manner and utilized two 
different scenarios: The taboo trade-off situation was this time more in line with a 
prototypical sacred-secular value trade-off situation (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2000), 
reflecting a conflict between human rights versus monetary benefits. Specifically, the 
taboo trade-off scenario (“robbery”) raised the question of whether or not torture should 
be allowed in return for money (i.e., getting information about the whereabouts of a 
money haul). The tragic trade-off scenario (“time bomb”) raised the question of whether 
or not torture should be allowed in order to force information to be revealed about a live 
time bomb in a crowded location. This scenario reflected a conflict between upholding 
human rights versus saving people’s lives. Third, to check whether participants indeed 
perceived the trade-off types as different, we asked them to judge the acceptability of 
the choice options (allowing or rejecting torture). We expected to find larger differences 
in acceptability ratings between the options in the taboo trade-off (with one option being 
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clearly more unacceptable than the other), and smaller differences in the tragic trade-off 
scenario (with both options being perceived as similarly unacceptable). 
In the following, information and findings enclosed by brackets relate to 
Experiment 3, where not otherwise stated. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 258 [276] students from the 
University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich participated 
in this online experiment, which was advertised through e-mails (169 [182] women, 87 
[93] men, 2 [1] unknown). Their ages ranged from 18 to 58 [17 to 71] years, M = 25.03 
[M = 26.70]. They randomly received one of two decision scenarios, either the taboo 
trade-off scenario (“robbery”) or the tragic trade-off scenario (“time bomb”). Sacred 
values were again assessed separately. Both experiments shared the dependent 
variables, ambivalence, decision on torture, and acceptability of the two choice options. 
Beyond that, additional dependent variables were emotional stress (in Experiment 2 
only), and fear and guilt (in Experiment 3 only). 
Procedure and materials. In both studies, participants were provided with 
either the taboo or tragic trade-off scenario upon reading the introduction. The taboo 
trade-off scenario “robbery” was as follows (shortened): 
 
Imagine that you work as a chief investigator for the police. You are in charge of a serious 
robbery case. After several fruitless attempts, the police arrested one of the robbers. The robber 
refuses to reveal the location of the hauled money. One more failure in this case would 
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jeopardize your public image. You now have to consider whether or not you should allow the 
torturing of the robber to force information to be revealed about the whereabouts of the money. 
What is your choice in this case? 
 
The tragic trade-off scenario “time bomb” was as follows (shortened): 
 
Imagine that you work as a chief investigator for the police. You were informed that a live time 
bomb had been placed by a terrorist organization in a highly frequented district, but the exact 
location of the bomb still remains unknown. The police arrested a man suspected of being the 
head of the planned attack. The suspect refuses to reveal the location. You now have to consider 
whether or not you should allow the torturing of the suspect to force information to be revealed 
about the whereabouts of the bomb. There is probably still enough time to deactivate the bomb. 
What is your choice in this case?  
 
After reading the scenario, participants indicated their choice regarding whether 
they would allow (option 1) or reject (option 2) torture in this case. Next, as 
manipulation check, participants were asked to indicate how acceptable they judge each 
of the two choice options to be on a 7-point [5-point] scale ranging from 1 (not at all 
acceptable) to 7 [5] (very acceptable). To assess sacred value endorsements, 
participants were then provided with a subscale of the current SVM by Tanner et al. 
(2009) (α = .79 [α = .77]), encompassing five statements (e.g., “This decision is about 
something that we should not sacrifice, no matter what the benefits (money or 
otherwise)”; “This decision involves issues or values which are inviolable”). 
Participants indicated their extent of agreement on 7-point [5-point] scales (1 = strongly 
disagree; 7 [5] = strongly agree).  
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In Experiment 2, the final block assessed emotional stress, and ambivalence 
through a combination of items that tapped into decisional conflict and choice difficulty 
(cf. Hänze, 2002). Emotional stress was assessed by three items (e.g., “When faced with 
this decision, I feel bad”; “This decision is stressful for me”; α = .94), ambivalence by 
four items (e.g., “When faced with this decision, I feel myself wavering”; “When faced 
with this decision, I get into conflict”; α = .95). Respondents indicated the extent of 
their agreement (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree), and evaluated the decision 
difficulty (1 = very easy; 7 = very difficult).  
In Experiment 3, the final block of questions assessed fear, guilt, and 
ambivalence. Participants were asked to indicate their current feelings of fear and guilt, 
interspersed with other emotions as filler items, on 5-point scales (1 = strongly 
disagree; 5 = strongly agree). Thereafter, participants indicated the extent of their 
agreement with the statement “When faced with this decision, I feel myself wavering” 
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree), and were given one item to evaluate 
decision difficulty (1 = very easy; 5 = very difficult). The items on ambivalence and 
decision difficulty were combined again into a joint measure of ambivalence (α = .92). 
Upon completion, participants were debriefed. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. The analyses assured that the trade-off type manipulation 
was effective in both studies. A mixed model ANOVA with trade-off type (taboo vs. 
tragic; between-subject factor) and option (1. allowing torture vs. 2. rejecting torture; 
within-subject factor) as independent variables and acceptability ratings as dependent 
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variable revealed a significant Trade-Off Type × Option interaction, F(1, 256) = 150.94, 
p < .001, η2 = .37, [F(1, 274) = 119.06, p < .001, η2 = .30]. As support for the 
manipulation, further inspection revealed that acceptability ratings (lower scores 
indicated more unacceptable options) between allowing and rejecting torture differed to 
a much larger extent in the taboo than in the tragic trade-off scenario. In Experiment 2, 
participants evaluated option 1 as much more unacceptable than option 2 (MOption1 = 
1.52; MOption2 = 6.60), F(1, 256) = 532.86, p < .001, η2 = .68, in the taboo trade-off 
scenario, compared to the tragic trade-off scenario (MOption1 = 3.67; MOption2 = 4.92), F(1, 
256) = 32.60, p < .001, η2 = .11. Similarly, in Experiment 3, participants differed 
broadly between option 1 and option 2 (MOption1 = 1.53, MOption2 = 4.54) in the taboo 
trade-off scenario, F(1, 274) = 412.20, p < .001, η2 = .60, but they did so to a lesser 
extent in the tragic trade-off scenario (MOption1 = 2.75, MOption2 = 3.44), F(1, 274) = 
21.16, p < .001, η2 = .07. 
Main analyses. Several regression analyses were conducted to test for 
Hypotheses 1 and 2a-d. Again, age and gender served as control variables, and SV was 
centered. Trade-off type (0 = taboo; 1 = tragic) and SV, followed by the interaction term 
SV × Trade-Off Type, served as predictors. 
Since decision on torture was a binary variable in both Experiments 2 and 3, 
logistic regression analyses were run. The total variance explained by the model in 
Experiment 2 was (adjusted) R2 = .62, and in Experiment 3 (adjusted) R2 = .65. Both 
experiments replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and lend further support to 
Hypothesis 1. Again, rejection of torture was more likely in taboo trade-off than in 
tragic trade-off scenarios (B = 4.26, SE = 1.58, Wald = 7.23, p = .007, OR = 70.78 [B = 
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3.78, SE = 0.96, Wald = 15.62, p < .001, OR = 43.84]). However, as expected, 
participants who more strongly endorsed human rights as an SV were more likely to 
reject torture (B = 1.27, SE = 0.24, Wald = 28.27, p < .001, OR = 3.56 [B = 2.17, SE = 
0.38, Wald = 32.70, p < .001, OR = 8.77]), across both trade-off conditions. 
For the other dependent variables, separate multiple regression analyses were 
run. The analyses provided support for Hypothesis 2, that taboo and tragic trade-off 
scenarios prompt different responses among people with high or low levels of SV. For 
ambivalence, both experiments revealed patterns similar to those in the previous study 
and therefore provided further support for Hypothesis 2a. The total variance explained 
by the model in Experiment 2 was (adjusted) R2 = .53, and in Experiment 3 (adjusted) 
R2 = .39. In both studies, SV endorsement (ß = -.41, p < .001, [ß = -.47, p < .001]) and 
trade-off type (ß = .54, p < .001, [ß = .46, p < .001]) were revealed as significant 
predictors. The SV × Trade-Off Type interaction was also significant (ß = .14, p = .041, 
[ß = .24, p < .001]). As in Experiment 1, inspection of the interactions showed greater 
differences in ambivalence between trade-off types among participants with high levels 
of SV (ß = .63, p < .001, [ß = .64, p < .001]) than among participants with low levels of 
SV (ß = .44, p < .001, [ß = .28, p < .001]), and further exploration revealed that these 
differences were based in particular on different reactions to the taboo trade-off 
scenario. 
Experiment 2 used emotional stress as an additional dependent variable and 
supported Hypothesis 2b. The regression analysis revealed a total variance explained by 
the model of (adjusted) R2 = .35. As before, SV endorsement (ß = -.25, p = .002), trade-
off type (ß = .55, p < .001), as well as the SV × Trade-Off Type interaction (ß = .25, p = 
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.001) proved to be significant. Further inspection of the interaction revealed that trade-
off types had a stronger effect on the level of distress for people with high (ß = .73, p < 
.001) than low levels of SV (ß = .37, p < .001). To explore these differences, Figure 1b 
shows that people with high levels of SV felt less distressed in the taboo trade-off 
scenario, but more distressed in the tragic trade-off scenario, compared to people with 
low levels of SV. This finding provides support for both Hypothesis 3a and 3b.  
Experiment 3 used fear and guilt as additional dependent variables and 
supported Hypotheses 2c and 2d. The total variance explained by the model was 
(adjusted) R2 = .17 when fear was analyzed, and (adjusted) R2 = .23 when guilt was 
analyzed. In both regressions, SV endorsement and trade-off type emerged as 
significant (or at least marginally significant) predictors of fear (ß = -.14, p = .080, and 
ß = .41, p < .001, respectively), and of guilt (ß = -.24, p = .002; and ß = .44, p < .001, 
respectively). More importantly, the SV × Trade-Off Type interaction proved to be 
significant for fear (ß = .15, p = .047), as well as for guilt (ß = .17, p = .025). Inspection 
of these interactions revealed that people with high levels of SV reflect a greater 
magnitude of differences in fear (ß = .52, p < .001) and guilt (ß = .56, p < .001) 
responses between the two trade-off types than people with low levels of SV (ß = .29, p 
< .001, for fear, and ß = .31, p < .001, for guilt, respectively). Further exploration of 
differences in fear ratings shows that, similar to emotional stress, people with high 
levels of SV felt less fearful in taboo trade-off scenarios, but more fearful in tragic 
trade-off scenarios, compared to people with low levels of SV. As Figure 1c suggests, 
this finding again provides support for both Hypothesis 3a and 3b. However, differences 
in guilt ratings between people high and low in SV were primarily based on the 
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responses to the taboo trade-off rather than to the tragic trade-off scenario, lending 
further support to Hypothesis 3a (see Figure 1d).  
 
 
Figure 1. Scale means for (a) ambivalence in Experiment 1, (b) emotional stress in Experiment 2, and (c) 
fear and (d) guilt in Experiment 3, as a function of sacred value (SV) endorsement and trade-off type. 
Plots depict means at -1 SD and +1 SD of SV endorsement. 
 
To sum up, Experiments 2 and 3 yielded further support for our expectations. 
Again, consistent with Hypothesis 1, treating human rights as a sacred value generally 
augments rejection of torture. Furthermore, results confirm Hypothesis 2, since 
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participants with high levels of SV demonstrated larger differences between taboo and 
tragic trade-off scenarios in ambivalence (H2a), emotional stress (H2b), fear (H2c), and 
guilt (H2d). More specifically, in most cases, we found that differences were based 
primarily on different reactions to taboo trade-offs. Participants with higher levels of SV 
showed less ambivalence, stress, fear, and guilt reactions than participants with lower 
levels of SV in the taboo trade-off condition. However, an inverse pattern emerged in 
tragic trade-off scenarios, but only with respect to stress and fear. Overall, our findings 
suggest that given these scenarios, SV are more likely to serve as a facilitator than a 
barrier in decision making (Hypothesis 3a).  
 
General Discussion 
The present research demonstrates that considering human rights – or more 
specifically, prohibition of torture – as a sacred value strongly shapes cognitive-
affective and self-regulation processes which individuals undergo when confronted with 
choice situations that put the purpose of human rights at risk. The main findings are as 
follows: Individuals who strongly endorse human rights as a sacred value differ from 
other people in that they show (1) generally more extreme decisions against torture than 
individuals with lower levels of sacred value endorsement (i.e., supporting Hypothesis 
1), but (2) larger variation in intrapersonal processes (such as ambivalence, emotional 
stress, fear, and guilt) depending on trade-off type (i.e., supporting Hypotheses 2a-d). 
(3) We found that these differences were primarily based on different reactions to taboo 
trade-off scenarios. Specifically, people with higher levels of sacred value endorsement 
showed less ambivalence, emotional stress, and fear, and fewer guilt reactions in taboo 
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trade-off scenarios than other participants, while in tragic trade-off scenarios, an inverse 
pattern emerged, at least for stress and fear ratings (i.e., stronger support for Hypothesis 
3a than 3b).  
While the results demonstrate how human rights as sacred values are expressed 
in choices, decisions per se do not reveal anything about the subjective perception of the 
problem at hand. More importantly, the results show large individual differences in 
cognitive-affective responses to conflicts, as a function of whether people treat human 
rights as a sacred value and regarding the type of conflict. Various choice conflicts in 
which human rights compete with other legitimate or moral requirements (such as 
national security or saving innocent lives) have largely distinct cognitive and affective 
implications for people who treat human rights as absolute principles, presumably 
because conflicts reflect different prospects of succeeding or failing to protect these 
rights. 
Strikingly, differences in individual reactions emerged primarily within taboo 
trade-off conditions; people with higher levels of sacred value endorsement reported 
less ambivalence, more emotional relief, and less fear and guilt than individuals with 
lower levels. These findings strongly support the assumption that sacred values serve as 
facilitators for decision making. This suggests that individuals who endorse such values 
benefit from relying on an absolute principle, in that the feasibility of affirming its 
absolute status reduces negative intrapersonal reactions. As a consequence, they 
experience less ambivalence, which reflects lower levels of cognitive conflict (cf. 
Hänze, 2002; Jonas et al., 2000a). This result is in line with previous research showing 
that taboo trade-offs are perceived as easy to solve and not demanding extensive 
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thought (Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008; Lichtenstein et al., 2007; Tetlock, 2003), and 
lend further support to the idea of sacred values working as a heuristic (e.g., Gigerenzer 
et al., 1999; Haidt, 2001; Sunstein, 2005).  
Furthermore, our findings of emotional relief and reduced feelings of fear and 
guilt highlight the role of emotions and identity-related self-regulation processes when 
sacred values are at stake. While emotional stress indicates the extent of perceived 
burden, fear may operate as a specific conflict indicator and as a signal to the individual 
that something relevant and important is at risk (Damasio, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000; 
Luce, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). Beyond this, guilt refers to an emotion associated 
with moral self-regulation, motivating people to act morally and preventing them from 
committing a transgression of norms (Frank, 1988; Haidt, 2003; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; 
Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). In other words, guilt may work as a “commitment 
device”, promoting individuals to affirm the status of moral values at hand. Hence, we 
interpret our results as indicating that among individuals who endorse sacred values, the 
mere feasibility of affirming the absolute status of human rights in taboo trade-off 
scenarios may have led to an emotional relief and a reduction in fear and guilt, and 
thereby to a protection of central elements of their self-concept and moral identity (cf. 
Aquino & Reed, 2002). 
While our findings clearly confirm the assumption of sacred values serving as 
facilitators (in taboo trade-off situations), they only partially support the role as a barrier 
in decision making in tragic trade-off scenarios. In such situations, people are faced 
with a trade-off of human rights against another important moral requirement (such as 
saving innocent lives). Based on previous findings showing that tragic trade-off 
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situations are perceived as very stressful and difficult to solve (Hanselmann & Tanner, 
2008), we expected such problems to prompt more ambivalence, distress, fear and guilt 
for people with higher than with lower levels of sacred values. Nonetheless, the present 
results show a somewhat different pattern. Indeed, levels of emotional stress and fear 
slightly increased among individuals who endorse sacred values, presumably because 
they experienced a stronger burden from this dilemma and perceived human rights as 
acutely threatened. However, levels of ambivalence and guilt did not increase among 
these individuals. It may be that our hypothetical scenarios were not vivid enough to 
evoke stronger reactions – which, at least to a certain degree, is an inherent constraint 
when examining dilemmas regarding human rights issues under experimental 
conditions. Alternatively, we speculate that people with strong sacred values may have 
utilized specific coping mechanisms or cognitive strategies in searching for and 
justifying an acceptable solution to the tragic dilemma, thereby reducing ambivalence 
and guilt.  
Further research is needed to uncover in more detail how sacred values facilitate 
decisions, and to clarify the role and possible causal effects of self-regulation processes 
on decision making. In this regard, it would be interesting to extend the focus to other 
moral emotions like outrage and disgust, which have also been suggested to play 
important roles in moral judgment and decision making (e.g., Haidt, 2003; Schnall, 
Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008), as well as to examine whether such effects are primarily 
based on intuitive-affective or deliberative processes (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Greene 
& Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001). From a methodological point of view, a critical issue 
could have been the use of different points of time at which dependent measures were 
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taken. Whereas they were assessed in Experiment 1 in advance of making a choice, they 
were taken retrospectively in Experiments 2 and 3. In future designs, it would seem 
worthwhile to better consider the time course during decision making and to compare 
stages prior to and after making the choice. Finally, with regard to contents, it would be 
interesting to extend the focus to further human rights principles that possibly tap into 
sacred values and to prove whether our findings can be generalized across a wider range 
of human rights issues. For instance, the right to freedom of opinion and expression and 
its universal validity has been repeatedly subject to intense discussions, particularly 
during the worldwide controversy about Mohammed cartoons published in a Danish 
newspaper in 2005.  
In conclusion, our findings highlight the personal consequences of treating 
human rights as sacred values and reveal how individuals deal or struggle with 
situations in which human rights compete with other legitimate or moral requirements. 
The extent to which individuals consider human rights as absolute and inviolable 
strongly shapes choices, cognitive-affective conflict dimensions, and self-regulation 
processes. This research may help to understand what decision makers in real-world 
settings go through when confronted with choices that tap into (sometimes conflicting) 
human rights principles: Imagine, for instance, a criminal investigator who has to decide 
whether to disclose information about a wanted person in order to get hints from the 
public; or a prison doctor who has to decide whether to apply force feeding in the case 
of a convict on hunger strike; or a governmental authority that has to decide whether to 
ban the wearing of burkas in public. Finally, by adopting the proclaimed absolute 
character as a distinct feature of human rights principles, our research significantly 
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contributes to the growing body of work on the psychological basis of human rights, 
moral decision making, and heuristics. 
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4.1 Summary of Research Objectives and Findings 
Human rights, human lives or health, human or animal dignity: These are some 
prototypical examples of sacred values, representing issues or entities that individuals 
mostly deem as absolute and inviolable, and thus protected from trade-offs with other 
issues or values. The general goal of my research was to examine what individuals 
undergo when they are confronted with choices involving sacred values, and to explore 
the cognitive and affective processes underlying these decisions. Initially, I argued that 
the extent to which decision makers treat issues or values such as human rights or 
dignity as sacred values has great implications for intrapersonal choice processes in that 
they affect the perceived decision difficulty and the experience of negative emotions. 
Furthermore, I assumed that the structure of the choice conflict (i.e., trade-off type) also 
plays a crucial role regarding these processes. 
4.1.1 First Research Project 
In my first research project (Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008), I examined whether 
negative emotions and decision difficulty varied as a function of sacred values and 
trade-off types (i.e., taboo, tragic, and routine trade-offs). I hypothesized that choices 
involving sacred values generally elicit negative emotions, and that sacred values may 
play the role either of facilitators or barriers, dependent on trade-off type, and render 
decisions easier or more difficult, respectively.  
The main findings of this project were as follows: Firstly, choices involving 
trade-offs that tap into sacred values were generally more negatively emotion-laden than 
choices which do not refer to sacred values. This was especially true for tragic trade-off 
scenarios (i.e., situations pitting two sacred values against each other), and to a lesser 
extent for taboo trade-off scenarios (i.e., situations pitting a sacred value against a 
secular value). Secondly, the decision difficulty varied as a function of trade-off type. 
Compared to routine trade-off scenarios (i.e., situations pitting two secular values 
against each other), choices were experienced as easier when they involved taboo trade-
offs, but, inversely, as much more difficult when they involved tragic trade-offs. 
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Thirdly, findings show a non-linear relationship between negative emotions and 
decision difficulty. That is, taboo trade-off scenarios were seen as more negatively 
emotion-laden but easier choice tasks than routine trade-off scenarios. In contrast, tragic 
trade-off scenarios were experienced as the most stressful and difficult tasks. Overall, 
these findings suggest that sacred values may play the role of facilitators or barriers, 
presumably triggering either intuitive or deliberative processes, dependent on trade-off 
type. Moreover, they strongly suggest that negative emotions may play a distinctive role 
in scenarios that tap into sacred values.  
4.1.2 Second Research Project 
Hence, the goal of my second research project (Hanselmann, Tanner, & Duc, 
2010) was to explore in more detail cognitive and affective indicators for mechanisms 
that may reflect the facilitation and barrier effects. Not least due to their officially 
proclaimed absolute character, this research addressed human rights (or more 
specifically, prohibition of torture) as a prototypical example of a sacred value. In order 
to shed light on intrapersonal conflict and self-regulation processes when people are 
confronted with choices that put the purpose of human rights at risk, cognitive and 
affective parameters such as experienced ambivalence, emotional stress, fear, and guilt 
were examined.  
The main findings for individuals who strongly endorse human rights as a sacred 
value, compared to people not endorsing a sacred value, were as follows: Firstly, these 
people generally showed more extreme choices against the application of torture. 
Secondly, they revealed larger differences on intrapersonal variables such as 
experienced ambivalence, emotional stress, fear, and guilt, between taboo and tragic 
trade-off scenarios. Thirdly, these differences were mainly due to distinct reactions to 
taboo trade-off situations. In taboo trade-off scenarios, individuals with higher levels of 
sacred value endorsement showed less ambivalence, emotional stress, fear, and fewer 
guilt feelings than other individuals. However, in tragic trade-off scenarios, they at least 
partially showed an inverse pattern, namely for emotional stress and fear. Altogether, 
these findings confirm the presumed role of sacred values as facilitators in decision 
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making to a stronger extent than the role as barriers, and provide first evidence for 
conflict and self-regulation processes when individuals are confronted with choices on 
sacred issues. 
4.2 Discussion of Findings 
4.2.1 Sacred Values and Negative Emotions 
The findings of my first research project confirm that choice scenarios tapping 
into sacred values generally elicit negative emotions (Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008). 
The observation that certain choices and trade-offs are more negatively emotion-laden 
than others is not really surprising, at least given our experiences of everyday life. 
However, it contradicts normative views of decision making (e.g., Keeney & Raiffa, 
1976), which claim that individuals should always be able to solve all kinds of choices 
and trade-offs in an equally rational and unemotional manner. In sharp contrast to such 
a view, my results tend to parallel previous assumptions and findings showing that 
certain trade-offs are more likely to elicit negative emotions if they pertain to attributes 
which are related to potentially threatening consequences or highly important goals 
(e.g., Luce, 1998; Luce et al., 1997). More importantly, they fit in with Tetlock’s (2003) 
assumption that even the mere contemplation of choice scenarios involving sacred 
values may evoke negative feelings of distress and disturbance. Altogether, the findings 
of my research suggest that emotions may play a crucial role in choices that put sacred 
values at risk, and go significantly beyond previous research which highlighted the role 
of emotions in reactions to observed violations of sacred values (e.g., Tetlock et al., 
2000). Indeed, merely calling sacred values into question may provoke negative 
emotions, because the decision maker realizes that something particularly important and 
delicate is at risk that has to be defended. As I will argue later in more detail, this 
interpretation would be in line with the assumption of emotions operating as signals or 
information about potential threats in the current situation (e.g., Damasio, 1994; 
Schwarz & Clore, 1996). 
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4.2.2 Sacred Values and Decision Difficulty 
Moreover, with regard to the association of trade-off types and decision 
difficulty, the findings show that taboo trade-off scenarios were perceived as easier to 
solve compared to routine trade-off scenarios, whereas, conversely, tragic trade-off 
scenarios were experienced as much more difficult. Inasmuch as these findings are 
based on participants’ own decision making, they considerably extend previous 
research, which focused in a rather indirect manner on the participants’ judgments of 
other people’s choices (Tetlock et al., 2000). More specifically, previous research found 
that participants approve of other individuals who perceive taboo trade-off scenarios as 
easy and tragic trade-off scenarios as difficult tasks, and disapprove of others who, 
conversely, perceive taboo trade-off scenarios as difficult and tragic trade-off scenarios 
as easy tasks. 
More importantly, as stated above, my findings indicate on the whole that 
negative emotions and choice difficulty are related in a non-linear fashion, unlike the 
theory of emotional trade-off difficulty (e.g., Luce, 1998), which suggests a positive 
association of negative emotions and choice difficulty. In other words, choices touching 
on sacred values obviously evoke negative emotions, but simultaneously are judged as 
easy to solve and as not demanding extensive thought in the case of a taboo trade-off 
(see also Lichtenstein et al., 2007 for similar findings). In contrast, in tragic trade-off 
scenarios, individuals are forced to choose the lesser of two evils or even to sacrifice a 
sacred value, which results in both particularly strong negative emotions and high 
decision difficulty. In sum, these results provide first insights into how sacred values 
may affect affective and cognitive choice processes when participants are themselves in 
the role of a decision maker. In particular, they suggest that sacred values may operate 
as facilitators of decision making under certain conditions (i.e., taboo trade-offs), but as 
barriers under other conditions (i.e., tragic trade-offs), and that negative emotions may 
play a distinctive role in both types of conflict. The next sections will address this role 
in more detail. 
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4.2.3 Conflict and Self-Regulation Processes 
To further explore the effects of sacred values, my second research project took 
a closer look at intrapersonal conflict and self-regulation processes which individuals 
undergo when faced with choice scenarios that put sacred values at risk. The findings 
demonstrate that choice scenarios asking for an application of torture under various 
conditions have largely distinct implications for individuals who endorse human rights 
as a sacred value (Hanselmann, Tanner, & Duc, 2010). More precisely, these people 
showed larger differences between taboo and tragic trade-off scenarios with respect to 
experienced ambivalence, emotional stress, fear, and guilt, compared to people with 
lower levels of sacred value endorsements, presumably because these scenarios reflect 
distinct prospects of succeeding or failing to uphold the absolute status of human rights. 
Importantly, differences on intrapersonal variables emerged especially in taboo trade-off 
scenarios. In these situations, people with higher levels of sacred value endorsement 
exhibited less ambivalence, more emotional relief, and less fear and guilt than people 
with lower levels. As I will substantiate in the following, this response pattern again 
strongly supports the presumed role of sacred values serving as facilitators of decision 
making.  
4.2.3.1 Sacred Values as Facilitators 
First, the facilitation of the choice process is reflected in lesser experiences of 
ambivalence. People who endorse human rights as a sacred value may benefit from 
relying on the absolute character of the sacred value at hand, which helps them to 
override contradicting but non-absolute arguments simply due to the reluctance of 
carrying out trade-offs. Thus, the feasibility of affirming the absolute status reduces 
ambivalence, which reflects lower extents of cognitive conflict (cf. Hänze, 2002; Jonas 
et al., 2000a). This finding is in line with previous studies demonstrating that taboo 
trade-off scenarios are perceived as not highly conflict-laden (Mandel & Vartanian, 
2007), as particularly easy to solve, and as not demanding extensive consideration 
(Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008; Lichtenstein et al., 2007; Tetlock et al., 2000). 
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Furthermore, this finding lends further support to the assumption that sacred values 
operate as a facilitator of decision making, probably reflecting heuristics (e.g., 
Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Sunstein, 2005) or intuitive or preconscious processes (e.g., 
Haidt, 2001; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004), even though interpretations about the precise 
underlying mechanisms remain speculative.  
Second, the facilitation becomes apparent due to the emotional relief and lesser 
feelings of fear and guilt. These findings corroborate the role of (moral) emotions and 
self-regulation processes when sacred values are called into question. While emotional 
stress may reflect the extent to which individuals generally feel burdened by the task at 
hand, feelings of fear may indicate how conflict-laden a task is experienced as being, 
and more specifically, may operate as a signal or information to the decision maker that 
something delicate and particularly important is at risk, which has to be protected (e.g., 
Damasio, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 
1983, 1996). Furthermore, guilt represents an important moral emotion that is 
associated with moral self-regulation, promoting and obligating individuals to act in 
accordance with moral principles (e.g., Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). Guilt has been 
assumed and shown to operate as a “commitment device”, preventing individuals from 
committing a violation of social and moral norms which should serve the long-term 
interests of a group or the society (e.g., Frank, 1988; Haidt, 2003; Ketelaar & Au, 
2003). Hence, the findings of my research may indicate that in taboo trade-off scenarios 
and among people with high sacred value endorsements, the mere feasibility of 
affirming human rights as absolute principles may have triggered specific self-
regulation mechanisms serving the protection of sacred values. Consequently, as sacred 
values may reflect central parts of one’s moral identity (cf. Aquino & Reed, 2002; 
Skitka, 2002), such self-regulation mechanisms may have led to a reaffirmation of one’s 
own moral self-regard and thereby resulted in reduced experiences of emotional stress, 
fear, and guilt. Section 4.4 will provide some propositions regarding how future 
research could explore mechanisms underlying facilitation effects in more detail. 
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4.2.3.2 Sacred Values as Barriers 
In contrast to taboo trade-off scenarios, in which the role of sacred values as 
facilitators has been supported, the findings in tragic trade-off scenarios showed a 
pattern that only partially confirmed the assumed role of sacred values as barriers. In 
line with my expectations, emotional stress and fear were increased among individuals 
who endorse sacred values. These findings indicate that individuals perceive the tough 
dilemma at hand as a particularly strong burden, and see human rights as acutely 
threatened, because they feel forced to violate a sacred value themselves, no matter 
what their choice will be. 
However, contrary to my expectations, experiences of ambivalence and guilt 
were not increased. Perhaps the scenario at hand was not sufficiently vivid to evoke a 
considerable increase on these variables, or more likely, individuals adopted specific 
cognitive strategies to solve the dilemma, which prevented an increase of ambivalence 
and guilt. For instance, individuals may have applied coping strategies to justify 
acceptable solutions of the tragic dilemma despite violating sacred values. Some 
possibilities to capture such strategies are also outlined in Section 4.4.  
4.3 Limitations 
4.3.1 Potential Ambiguities With Regard to Concepts and Measures 
A major critical issue in both research projects might be, on the one hand, 
potential ambiguities in theoretical conceptualizations and assumptions, and, on the 
other hand, inconsistencies in measurement procedures. General negative emotions (in 
the first project) and, more concretely, fear (in the second project) were assumed to play 
the role of a signal or information to the decision maker that something important is at 
risk. This assumption is indeed in line with Tetlock’s (2003) notion that merely 
contemplating taboo trade-offs elicits negative feelings of distress and disturbance, and 
is similar to the hypothesis of emotions operating as signals in decision making (e.g. 
Damasio, 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). In accordance with these assumptions, the 
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results of the first project actually showed that taboo trade-off scenarios are more 
negatively emotion-laden than routine trade-off scenarios. However, in an ostensible 
contradiction of this pattern, the findings of the second project showed a reduction of 
fear in taboo trade-off scenarios among people with strong sacred value endorsements. 
My interpretation that the mere feasibility of affirming sacred values may have reduced 
fear in these people does indeed not necessarily contradict the former assumption of 
emotions as signals, but reveals a potential ambiguity in these findings and thus a 
certain problem in their interpretability. This problem may be associated not least with 
an inconsistency in the methodological procedures used in my research. Whereas in the 
first project, negative emotions were assessed in advance of the decision, they were 
measured retrospectively, after the decision, in the second project. In this regard, the use 
of a retrospective measure could have been problematic because people’s retrospective 
assessments of pre-choice emotions were biased precisely because sacred values could 
be reaffirmed by choosing appropriately. Accordingly, the pattern of results for 
ambivalence and guilt that emerged in tragic trade-off scenarios could also be explained 
by a similar retrospective bias. Possibly, individuals may have used emotion-focused 
coping strategies to protect their self-image after having made the choice, or may have 
searched for post-hoc justifications for their decision, which dampened their 
retrospective ratings of ambivalence and guilt. Hence, in order to better trace processes 
along the time course and to prevent retrospective biases, it would be necessary for 
future research to take measures at several given time points and to compare stages prior 
to and after making the choice. For instance, emotions could be assessed repeatedly by 
requiring people to report their emotional status using a slider at several time points of 
the decision process (see e.g. Luce, 1998, for similar arguments and procedures).  
In a similar vein, future studies should draw better conceptual distinctions 
between specific negative emotions and disentangle their assumed functions. It is likely 
that emotional stress and fear (which actually showed a parallel pattern in my research) 
may mainly reflect individuals’ affective state when they are confronted with tragic 
trade-offs that force them to sacrifice one of the sacred values or to search exhaustively 
for an alternative solution of the hard dilemma. In contrast, but conceptually more 
similar to Tetlock’s (2003) assumptions, an unspecific and rather incomprehensible 
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state of negative affect, which reflects disturbance and nervousness, may possibly better 
account for initial signals to the decision maker that sacred values are at risk. Such a 
more generalized conceptualization of negative affect would also have more affinity 
with the concept of somatic markers representing mainly unspecific bodily sensations 
such as visceral reactions or changes in heartbeat (Damasio, 1994), as well as with the 
notion of “gut” feelings with regard to moral intuition (Haidt, 2001). Alternatively, it is 
also recommendable to focus on specific moral emotions such as disgust as possibly 
crucial emotions in people who are merely contemplating choices on sacred values (cf. 
Rozin et al., 1999; Schnall et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005).  
In any case, in order to better comprehend the causal roles of emotions and 
disentangle their functions during the choice process, it seems worthwhile to selectively 
manipulate the influence of emotions using an affective priming procedure or a 
misattribution paradigm. Such possibilities will be discussed in more detail in Section 
4.4.  
4.3.2 Generalizability of Findings 
Another possibly critical issue in my research may be the external validity due to 
the exclusive focus on student samples. As decisions on sacred values, especially 
delicate tragic trade-offs, are seldom part of the everyday life of “naive” students, future 
research should extend the range of samples on decision makers in real-world settings 
such as politicians, legal or medical practitioners, scientists, and businesspeople. 
Accordingly, it would also be worthwhile to extend the focus to further topics that 
possibly tap into sacred values, such as different human rights issues, ethical 
considerations in biological sciences, or business decisions. 
In this vein, it is important to note that sacred values do not necessarily represent 
normative principles that are generally shared across individuals and cultures. Indeed, 
certain issues or entities such as human dignity and lives or human rights may be, at 
least in Western societies, consensually perceived as sacred values. Nonetheless, sacred 
values and trade-off reluctance may also reflect rather subjective phenomena that reveal 
large interindividual variations with regard to relevant domains, focal situations, and 
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presumably psychological consequences (cf. Bauman & Skitka, 2009 for a similar 
argumentation with respect to moral convictions). Hence, without touching on a nature-
nurture debate with respect to sacred values, I believe that the mechanisms behind 
sacred values and trade-off reluctance may, to a certain degree, be based on a set of 
evolved and innate hard-wired “moral modules” (cf. Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008), 
particularly in terms of consensually shared sacred issues such as human lives or 
integrity. However, sacred values may, probably to a much stronger extent, be the result 
of learning, enculturation, and personal experience (cf. Lapsley & Hill, 2008). Overall, 
it seems particularly worthwhile and important to explore the generalizability regarding 
the subjective experiences and consequences of sacred values on decision making 
across different social groups, cultures, and domains.  
4.3.3 Forced Choice Paradigm 
A final criticism concerns the forced choice paradigm that was used in my 
research, providing a set of two clear-cut alternatives whose ecological validity is at 
least questionable. On the one hand, such a procedure may be rather prone to tendencies 
of social desirability and demand characteristics (probably mostly in the case of taboo 
trade-off scenarios). On the other hand, in tragic trade-off scenarios, it forces the 
individual to violate a sacred value even though in real-world settings, creative solutions 
and “third ways”, apart from simply avoiding the dilemma, are also conceivable. 
Future research should therefore develop designs that allow processes and 
choices to be captured in a more subtle and less suggestive manner, and to observe 
participants’ active search for information, guidance of selective attention, generation of 
their own arguments, and so on. Such a design could be implemented through 
modifiable and interactive computer software (e.g., Mouselab; Payne et al., 1993), 
which allows participants’ information acquisitions and response times to be monitored 
or their guidance of attention to be tracked. 
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4.4 Outlook 
Although my research shed some initial light on cognitive and affective 
processes which people undergo when confronted with decisions tapping into sacred 
values, the precise nature of mechanisms underlying such decisions and the causal role 
of the examined variables need to be analyzed more thoroughly. In the following, I will 
present some theoretical and methodological considerations regarding these issues for 
future research. 
4.4.1 Indirect Indicators 
With regard to the effects of sacred values and their presumed association with 
intuitive or deliberative processes, it is advisable to address additional variables as 
indirect indicators for the mechanisms which take place during the choice process. For 
instance, the level of experienced confidence in making the right choice may be an 
appropriate indicator for whether rapid and intuitive processes or slow effortful 
processes to reach a decision occurred. According to previous findings showing that 
intuitive choosing is associated with high confidence (e.g., Simmons & Nelson, 2006), 
it may be assumed that taboo trade-off choices will result in higher levels of 
experienced confidence than tragic trade-off choices (cf. Mandel & Vartanian, 2007). 
In a similar vein, the level of experienced satisfaction after having made a 
choice may indicate whether individuals relied on their intuitive “gut” feelings or 
whether they adopted more extensive strategies to reach a choice. In line with research 
demonstrating that reliance on intuitions and feelings may result in greater satisfaction 
than extensively analyzing reasons and weighing costs and benefits (e.g., Iyengar, 
Wells, & Schwartz, 2006; Wilson, Lisle, Schooler, Hodges, Klaaren, & LaFleur, 1993), 
it may be expected that taboo trade-off choices will evoke more post-choice satisfaction 
than tragic trade-off choices. 
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4.4.2 Mechanisms Reflecting Facilitation and Barrier Effects 
Most importantly, it is recommendable to focus more directly on whether rather 
intuitive, effortless or deliberative, effortful processes take place. By using specific 
experimental procedures to selectively explore underlying mechanisms of such 
processes, it should be possible to look more closely at the roles of emotions as signals 
(e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1996), somatic markers (e.g., Damasio, 1994), disgust as 
intuitive “gut” feelings (e.g., Schnall et al, 2008), emotions as commitment devices and 
self-regulation (e.g., Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010), implicit 
moral knowledge (e.g., Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005), cognitive strategies that should help 
to overcome barriers in moral dilemmas (e.g., Hänze, 2002), and imaging brain 
activities dedicated to specific affective and cognitive processes in moral decision 
making (e.g., Greene et al., 2004). In the following, I will provide some research 
propositions. 
4.4.2.1 Emotion as Signals and Somatic Markers 
In terms of emotions as signals, a misattribution paradigm may be utilized to 
selectively control for the reliance on emotions as signals by manipulating their 
subjective validity for the choice at hand (e.g., Pham, 1998). More specifically, by 
increasing the salience of an alleged source of arousal or negative affect, participants 
can be led to misattribute their current affective status being associated with the choice 
issue to the other alleged source, thereby mitigating the influence of the current 
emotions as valid signals about the choice situation. As a consequence, such 
participants no longer rely on these emotions as helping signals due to their lost validity, 
which, in turn, should make choices less easy and straightforward. In a recent student 
research study conducted under my supervision (Derungs & Steiger, 2009), a 
misattribution paradigm similar to that used by Pham (1998) was applied in the context 
of sacred values and taboo trade-offs. To manipulate the salience of the alleged source 
of arousal, certain potentially arousing pieces of music were played in the background at 
a rather low volume level during the choice task. In short, the results showed that the 
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salience manipulation had no effect on the dependent variables (e.g., choice extremity, 
confidence, satisfaction, etc.), which were assessed as indicators for effects of emotions 
as signals in taboo trade-off scenarios. To explain this finding, it can be assumed that 
the null effect may have been due to a failure to provide an appropriate and reliable 
stimulus as a plausible source of arousal. Importantly, according to Pham, decision 
makers only rely on emotions as signals if they perceive these feelings as actually 
representative and relevant for the choice target at hand. Hence, it is plausible to 
interpret the finding by Derungs and Steiger insofar as the alleged source of arousal 
(i.e., music) did not match with the choice target sufficiently well (i.e., taboo trade-off) 
in terms of the precise nature and subjective significance of the respective emotions 
each elicits. Future research should improve this match by better selecting and testing 
stimuli of arousal.  
Then, in terms of somatic markers, an experimental procedure providing either 
false or real physiological feedback as signals to the decision maker would possibly 
help to overcome the mentioned matching problem related to the misattribution 
paradigm. Procedures addressing somatic markers have already been applied 
successfully with respect to value-relevant decision making (e.g., Batson et al., 1999). 
Finally, in terms of specific moral emotions as intuitive “gut” feelings, it would 
be worthwhile to use an affective priming procedure to examine disgust as a possible 
determinant of facilitation (e.g., Schnall et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). 
4.4.2.2 Emotions as Commitment Devices and Self-Regulation 
In terms of emotions as commitment devices and moral-self regulation, a 
procedure using sequential choice tasks similar to that of Ketelaar and Au (2003) would 
allow the observation of how individuals deal with violations of sacred values 
committed by themselves. In other words, people’s responses in two sequential tasks 
could be assessed and compared, and the role of guilt feelings as a possible mediator 
between the two tasks could be examined. For instance, it is conceivable to present 
participants in the first task with a tragic trade-off scenario in which they are requested 
to violate a sacred value. Subsequently, after an assessment of guilt feelings 
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representing the mediator, they could be provided with a second task in which they are 
given the opportunity to reaffirm the sacred value that they had violated in the first task. 
In addition, such a procedure using two sequential tasks would allow an exploration of 
the role of moral cleansing as a regulatory mechanism and moral identity operating as 
an individual “ideal” moral self.  
Alternatively, using a priming of guilt combined with a misattribution paradigm, 
the mediating role of guilt as a commitment device regarding the protection of sacred 
values could be examined in a more controlled manner. 
4.4.2.3 Implicit Moral Concepts and Preconscious Processing 
Moreover, in terms of sacred values as implicit moral concepts, an experimental 
design could be used which compares whether implicit or explicit concepts have a 
stronger impact on decision making in taboo trade-off scenarios. As a measure of the 
implicit components associated with sacred values, a form of the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) could be applied. In a similar vein, 
Marquardt (2010) examined the relative impacts of implicit and explicit forms of moral 
attitudes on various processes in managerial decision making (e.g., choices that 
involved a trade-off of product safety against cutting costs). Prior to asking participants 
how they would choose, implicit and explicit attitudes toward the issues associated with 
the trade-off at hand were assessed using an IAT and an ordinary questionnaire, 
respectively. In brief, both measures assessed how moral or immoral individuals judge 
issues to be that potentially tap into moral considerations (e.g., safety, health protection, 
life), and how moral or immoral they judge issues to be that potentially tap into 
monetary considerations (e.g., money, profitability, sales), in order to subsequently 
compare these two kinds of judgments. The results showed that implicit assessments 
predicted resulting choices and the preceding stages of the choice process such as moral 
sensitivity, selective attention, or intentions, to a much stronger extent than explicit 
assessments. Although this research did not refer explicitly to distinct characteristics of 
sacred values, it emphasizes the relevance and power of implicit concepts and 
preconscious processes on choices similar to taboo trade-off scenarios.  
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As an alternative approach to explore the role of preconscious processes, it 
would be interesting to use a semantic priming procedure in order to selectively 
strengthen or inhibit the accessibility of implicit moral beliefs such as “inviolability” or 
“dignity”, or potentially incongruent and interfering schemata such as “money” or 
“cost-benefit considerations”, in order to detect interferences when assessing processes 
or reaction times in subsequent tasks. 
4.4.2.4 Cognitive Strategies 
In terms of cognitive strategies to overcome barriers in tragic trade-off scenarios, 
the concept of emotional amplification should be considered and explored (e.g., Hänze, 
2002). Emotional amplification is a form of problem-focused coping which is often 
applied by individuals confronted with highly ambivalent and stressful decision 
scenarios. It encompasses a wide range of cognitive strategies and aims to polarize 
individuals’ preference hierarchies by building up associations of choice options with 
clear-cut affective evaluations. For instance, individuals apply strategies such as search 
for new information in order to obtain additional affective cues, dominance structuring 
(e.g., bolstering, spreading apart), or mental simulation (i.e., vivid imagination of the 
consequences of each choice option). In order to track such processes, it will be 
necessary to widen the range of choice alternatives or to open up the space for creative 
solutions (see Section 4.3.3). 
4.4.2.5 Brain Imaging 
Finally, in terms of brain activities, studies using fMRI might be able to gain 
more comprehensive insights into the processes in individuals who are presented with 
taboo and tragic trade-off scenarios. In this vein, a recent collaborative research project 
found several distinctive patterns of brain activities, which nicely reflect psychological 
processes underlying taboo and tragic trade-off scenarios (Duc, Hanselmann, Tanner, & 
Boesiger, 2010). In short, taboo trade-off scenarios triggered activities in brain areas 
which are assumed to be linked to emotion-driven facilitation of behavior (e.g., the right 
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amygdala) and to processes such as retrieval of social knowledge and social cognition 
(e.g., anterior parts of the left temporal lobe). In contrast, tragic trade-off scenarios 
engaged activities in areas which are assumed to be linked to fear reactions and the 
processing of cognitive conflict (e.g., the left amygdala, the anterior insulae, and parts 
of the prefrontal cortex); moreover, they triggered mechanisms which may serve the 
inhibition of the aforementioned taboo-related processes. Overall, these findings lend 
further support to my assumption that sacred values and taboo trade-offs involve 
affective processes as well as cognitive beliefs, while tragic trade-offs engage conflict 
processing and inhibit initial taboo reactions, in order to overcome the barrier to 
reaching acceptable solutions. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Public debates on a large variety of topics such as torture, assisted suicide, 
research on stem cells using human embryos, force feeding in cases of hunger strike, or 
the wearing of burkas in public reveal that sacred values are omnipresent sources of 
heated controversy. However, intrapersonal consequences of sacred values in decision 
making have mostly been neglected in previous research. My research aimed to 
contribute to a better comprehension of what individuals undergo when confronted with 
choices tapping into sacred values. The findings demonstrate that sacred values 
considerably shape decision making in terms of decision difficulty, emotions, and 
conflict and self-regulation processes. Specifically, the results show that sacred values 
may facilitate decision making in certain taboo scenarios by rejecting trade-offs and by 
helping individuals to choose in accordance with sacred values, and suggest that 
emotions may play distinctive roles in this regard. Furthermore, they show that decision 
makers often severely struggle to reach choices, especially when they are confronted 
with tragic dilemmas. Future studies are needed to better comprehend the precise nature 
of the processes underlying choices on sacred values. In the long term, the fruits of this 
research will possibly allow a greater understanding of why decision makers in real-
world settings decide in one way and not another, and to instruct and advise such 
decision makers on how to reach good solutions, especially in cases of tragic dilemmas. 
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6.1 Appendix to the Manuscript Hanselmann & Tanner (2008) 
6.1.1 Experiment 1: Decision Scenarios 
6.1.1.1 Taboo Trade-Off “Flood Protection” 
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie seien Mitglied einer Gemeindebehörde. Ihre Gemeinde wurde vom 
Hochwasser des vergangenen Sommers arg in Mitleidenschaft gezogen. Da sie sich in einer 
gefährdeten Zone befindet, sind in Zukunft weitere Hochwasser nicht auszuschliessen.  
 
Es wird diskutiert, ob ein bedeutender Teil des Jahresbudgets in die Verbesserung des 
Hochwasserschutzes investiert werden soll. Dafür müsste jedoch auf eine geplante Verschönerung des 
Dorfplatzes verzichtet werden.  
 
Sie als Behördenmitglied stehen nun vor einer Entscheidung mit folgenden Alternativen: 
A: Verbesserung des Hochwasserschutzes oder B: Verschönerung des Dorfplatzes 
 
 
6.1.1.2 Taboo Trade-Off “Safety at Work” 
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie seien Mitglied der Geschäftsleitung einer global tätigen Firma. Eine 
Menschenrechtsorganisation wirft Ihnen vor, dass die Angestellten der Niederlassung in China unter 
miserablen Bedingungen arbeiten müssen (unzumutbar hohe Lufttemperaturen, Kontakt mit giftigen 
Chemikalien etc.). Um einen Imageverlust Ihrer Firma zu vermeiden, müssen Sie handeln. 
 
Die Verbesserung der Arbeitsbedingungen bedeutet aber grosse Investitionen. Sie sehen sich 
gezwungen, hierzu einen deutlichen Rückgang des Gewinns in Kauf zu nehmen. Auf diese Weise 
würde das Ziel einer jährlichen Gewinnsteigerung verfehlt. 
 
Sie als Geschäftsleitungsmitglied stehen nun vor einer Entscheidung mit folgenden Alternativen: 
A: Verbesserung der Arbeitsbedingungen oder B: Steigerung des Gewinns 
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6.1.1.3 Tragic Trade-Off “Flood Protection” 
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie seien Mitglied einer Gemeindebehörde. Ihre Gemeinde wurde vom 
Hochwasser des vergangenen Sommers arg in Mitleidenschaft gezogen. Da sie sich in einer 
gefährdeten Zone befindet, sind in Zukunft weitere Hochwasser nicht auszuschliessen.  
 
Es wird diskutiert, ob ein bedeutender Teil des Jahresbudgets in die Verbesserung des 
Hochwasserschutzes investiert werden soll. Dafür müsste jedoch auf ein geplantes Weiterbildungs- 
und Integrationsprojekt für arbeitslose Jugendliche verzichtet werden.  
 
Sie als Behördenmitglied stehen nun vor einer Entscheidung mit folgenden Alternativen: 
A: Verbesserung des Hochwasserschutzes 
oder 
B: Weiterbildungs- und 
Integrationsprojekt für arbeitslose 
Jugendliche 
 
 
6.1.1.4 Tragic Trade-Off “Safety at Work” 
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie seien Mitglied der Geschäftsleitung einer global tätigen Firma. Eine 
Menschenrechtsorganisation wirft Ihnen vor, dass die Angestellten der Niederlassung in China unter 
miserablen Bedingungen arbeiten müssen (unzumutbar hohe Lufttemperaturen, Kontakt mit giftigen 
Chemikalien etc.). Um einen Imageverlust Ihrer Firma zu vermeiden, müssen Sie handeln. 
 
Die Verbesserung der Arbeitsbedingungen bedeutet aber grosse Investitionen. Sie sehen sich 
gezwungen, hierzu eine Entlassung von rund einem Drittel der betroffenen Belegschaft in Kauf zu 
nehmen. Auf diese Weise würde die Existenz vieler Familien gefährdet. 
 
Sie als Geschäftsleitungsmitglied stehen nun vor einer Entscheidung mit folgenden Alternativen: 
A: Verbesserung der Arbeitsbedingungen oder B: Erhalt der Arbeitsplätze 
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6.1.1.5 Routine Trade-Off “Job Offer” 
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie sind als Elternteil allein für den finanziellen Unterhalt Ihrer dreiköpfigen 
Familie zuständig. Sie haben sich bei verschiedenen Firmen für eine neue Stelle beworben. Bei zwei 
Firmen könnten Sie die Stelle haben. 
 
Bei Firma A bekämen Sie einen Lohn von 80’000 Franken im Jahr und hätten 4 Wochen Ferien zu 
Gute, während Sie bei Firma B einen Lohn von 60’000 Franken und 6 Wochen Ferien erhielten. 
Ansonsten sind die Firmen und die Stellenangebote sehr ähnlich, sie entsprechen beide Ihren 
Fähigkeiten und Bedürfnissen.  
 
Sie stehen nun vor einer Entscheidung mit folgenden Alternativen: 
A: Stelle mit höherem Lohn  
(Firma A) oder 
B: Stelle mit mehr Ferienwochen 
(Firma B) 
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6.1.2 Experiment 1: Recruitment of Participants 
Note. Participants were recruited by advertisements in several study courses. This was 
done in cooperation with Bettina Ryf, who was conducting another line of experiments. 
 
 
6.1.2.1 Overhead Transparency 
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6.1.2.2 Sign-Up Sheet 
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6.1.3 Experiment 1: Paper-and-Pencil Questionnaire 
Note. Below, the general procedure of the questionnaire using one selected decision 
scenario is shown. The other scenarios followed the same procedure. In some cases, 
response scales have been recoded for the purpose of the manuscript. Items which do 
not pertain to the research reported here are omitted. 
 
 
6.1.3.1 Introduction 
 
        VPNR:___________ 
 
Liebe Teilnehmerin, lieber Teilnehmer 
 
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an unserer Studie zum Thema Entscheidungsprozesse! 
Ihnen werden 3 verschiedene Szenarien präsentiert, welche jeweils eine 
Entscheidungssituation beinhalten. Bitte versuchen Sie in jedem Fall so gut wie möglich, 
sich in die jeweilige Situation des Szenarios hinein zu versetzen, als müssten Sie 
tatsächlich die entsprechende Entscheidung fällen – und beantworten Sie dann eine Reihe 
von Fragen zu den Szenarien. 
Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten, uns interessiert Ihre persönliche Meinung. 
Ihre Antworten werden streng vertraulich und anonym behandelt.  
Der Zeitaufwand beträgt ca. 25 Minuten. 
Wenn Sie Fragen zum Vorgehen oder zum Verständnis haben, wenden Sie sich bitte an die 
Untersuchungsleiterin. 
 
Zuerst ein paar persönliche Angaben: 
 
Alter:  __________ 
 
 
Geschlecht:   F männlich  
                    F weiblich  
Studienfach / Beruf: _________________________________ 
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6.1.3.2 Scenario: Taboo Trade-Off “Flood Protection” 
 
        VPNR:___________ 
 
 
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie seien Mitglied einer Gemeindebehörde. Ihre Gemeinde wurde vom 
Hochwasser des vergangenen Sommers arg in Mitleidenschaft gezogen. Da sie sich in einer 
gefährdeten Zone befindet, sind in Zukunft weitere Hochwasser nicht auszuschliessen.  
 
Es wird diskutiert, ob ein bedeutender Teil des Jahresbudgets in die Verbesserung des 
Hochwasserschutzes investiert werden soll. Dafür müsste jedoch auf eine geplante Verschönerung 
des Dorfplatzes verzichtet werden.  
 
Sie als Behördenmitglied stehen nun vor einer Entscheidung mit folgenden Alternativen: 
A: Verbesserung des 
Hochwasserschutzes oder 
B: Verschönerung des Dorfplatzes 
 
 
Bitte legen Sie dieses Blatt so zur Seite, dass Sie es weiterhin in Ihrem Blickfeld 
haben, und beginnen Sie mit der Beantwortung der ersten Frage auf der nächsten 
Seite. 
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Auf dieser und der nächsten Seite geht es um Ihre Meinung zu den beiden 
Entscheidungsalternativen. 
 
Inwieweit stimmen Sie mit folgenden Aussagen überein? 
 
 
Verbesserung des Hochwasserschutzes: Hierbei geht es um etwas, ... 
 
... bei dem sich meine Haltung im Verlauf der Zeit ändern könnte. 
 
stimme überhaupt 
nicht zu 
  mittelmässig   stimme voll und 
ganz zu 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       
 
... bei dem ich meine Meinung nicht ändern werde, koste es was es wolle. 
 
stimme überhaupt 
nicht zu 
  mittelmässig   stimme voll und 
ganz zu 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       
 
... bei dem ich Mühe hätte, Zugeständnisse zu machen. 
 
stimme überhaupt 
nicht zu 
  mittelmässig   stimme voll und 
ganz zu 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       
 
... das man unter allen Umständen verteidigen sollte. 
 
stimme überhaupt 
nicht zu 
  mittelmässig   stimme voll und 
ganz zu 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Inwieweit stimmen Sie mit folgenden Aussagen überein? 
 
 
Verschönerung des Dorfplatzes: Hierbei geht es um etwas, ... 
 
... bei dem sich meine Haltung im Verlauf der Zeit ändern könnte. 
 
stimme überhaupt 
nicht zu 
  mittelmässig   stimme voll und 
ganz zu 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       
 
... bei dem ich meine Meinung nicht ändern werde, koste es was es wolle. 
 
stimme überhaupt 
nicht zu 
  mittelmässig   stimme voll und 
ganz zu 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       
 
... bei dem ich Mühe hätte, Zugeständnisse zu machen. 
 
stimme überhaupt 
nicht zu 
  mittelmässig   stimme voll und 
ganz zu 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       
 
... das man unter allen Umständen verteidigen sollte. 
 
stimme überhaupt 
nicht zu 
  mittelmässig   stimme voll und 
ganz zu 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Bitte kreuzen Sie bei jeder der folgenden Fragen jeweils die Antwortmöglichkeit an, 
die am ehesten für die Entscheidungssituation zutrifft. 
 
 
 
Ich fürchte mich vor einer falschen Entscheidung.  
 
trifft überhaupt 
nicht zu 
  trifft zum 
Teil zu 
  trifft voll
und ganz zu 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       
 
 
Diese Entscheidung ist bedrohlich für mich.  
 
trifft überhaupt 
nicht zu 
  trifft zum 
Teil zu 
  trifft voll
und ganz zu 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       
 
 
Ich scheue mich davor, eine Entscheidung zu treffen.  
 
trifft überhaupt 
nicht zu 
  trifft zum 
Teil zu 
  trifft voll
und ganz zu 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       
 
 
Bei dieser Entscheidung fühle ich mich überfordert. 
 
trifft überhaupt 
nicht zu 
  trifft zum 
Teil zu 
  trifft voll
und ganz zu 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       
 
 
Diese Entscheidung lässt mich kalt.  
 
trifft überhaupt 
nicht zu 
  trifft zum 
Teil zu 
  trifft voll
und ganz zu 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Bitte versetzen Sie sich nochmals in die Situation, um danach die Entscheidung 
abzugeben. Zur Erinnerung ist sie hier nochmals aufgeführt. 
 
 
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie seien Mitglied einer Gemeindebehörde. Ihre Gemeinde wurde vom 
Hochwasser des vergangenen Sommers arg in Mitleidenschaft gezogen. Da sie sich in einer 
gefährdeten Zone befindet, sind in Zukunft weitere Hochwasser nicht auszuschliessen.  
 
Es wird diskutiert, ob ein bedeutender Teil des Jahresbudgets in die Verbesserung des 
Hochwasserschutzes investiert werden soll. Dafür müsste jedoch auf eine geplante Verschönerung 
des Dorfplatzes verzichtet werden.  
 
Sie als Behördenmitglied stehen nun vor einer Entscheidung mit folgenden Alternativen: 
A: Verbesserung des 
Hochwasserschutzes oder 
B: Verschönerung des Dorfplatzes 
 
 
 
 
Ich entscheide mich... 
 
A: klar für die 
Verbesserung des 
Hochwasserschutzes   weder noch   
B: klar für die 
Verschönerung des 
Dorfplatzes 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
       
 
 
Wie schwierig oder leicht ist Ihnen diese Entscheidung gefallen? 
 
sehr leicht   mittelmässig   sehr schwer 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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6.1.3.3 Conclusion 
 
Information zur Untersuchung 
 
Unser Forschungsprojekt befasst sich mit dem Phänomen, dass sich Menschen bei 
bestimmten Themen weigern, Kosten-Nutzen-Abwägungen zu machen und Kompromisse 
einzugehen. Es handelt sich um Werte, welche als absolut und nicht kompensierbar 
wahrgenommen werden. Sie werden deshalb „geschützte Werte“ genannt. Beispiele für 
solche Werte sind: Sicherheit der Menschen, Schutz der Gesundheit, Schutz der Natur, 
Gerechtigkeit, Recht auf ein Leben in Würde etc. 
Die vorliegende Studie untersucht spezifische Entscheidungssituationen, welche solche 
Werte und Themen ansprechen. Hypothese: Je nach Konstellation der 
Entscheidungsalternativen kann beim Individuum ein subjektiver Konflikt zwischen 
(geschützten) Werten entstehen, welcher die Entscheidungsfindung erschwert und eine 
emotionale Belastung bewirkt. Diese Prozesse stehen im Fokus des Experiments. 
Für Fragen und Kommentare können Sie mich gerne kontaktieren. 
 
Martin Hanselmann 
martin.hanselmann@psychologie.unizh.ch 
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Herzlichen Dank! 
 
Als Dankeschön nehmen Sie an einer Verlosung von 3 mal 100 Franken unter allen 
TeilnehmerInnen dieser Studie teil. Bitte geben Sie uns unten Ihre Kontaktangaben an, damit 
wir Sie im Gewinnfall benachrichtigen können. Alle diese Angaben werden vertraulich 
behandelt und getrennt von Ihren Antworten aufbewahrt. 
Wenn Sie an einer Zusammenfassung der Resultate interessiert sind, werden wir diese 
ebenfalls an ihre untenstehende Adresse schicken. 
Dürfen wir Sie wieder mal für eine Teilnahme an einer Untersuchung in unserem Projekt 
anfragen? Darüber würden wir uns sehr freuen! 
 
 Ja, bin interessiert an den Resultaten 
 Ja, Sie können mich für eine weitere Untersuchung anfragen 
 
 
Kontaktangaben (werden vertraulich behandelt) 
 
Name: 
E-Mail: 
Telefon: 
Adresse, Ort (fakultativ): 
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6.1.4 Experiment 2: Decision Scenarios 
Note. Each scenario consisted of three parts, and these parts were provided sequentially: 
(1) Presentation of the first option, (2) presentation of the second option, and (3) 
presentation of the final decision situation.  
 
 
6.1.4.1 Taboo Trade-Off “Flood Protection”  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
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6.1.4.2 Taboo Trade-Off “Safety at Work” 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
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6.1.4.3 Tragic Trade-Off “Flood Protection” 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
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6.1.4.4 Tragic Trade-Off “Safety at Work” 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
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6.1.4.5 Routine Trade-Off “Job Offer” 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
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6.1.5 Experiment 2: E-Mail Invitation 
 
Subject: Deine Teilnahme am Online-Entscheidungsexperiment 
 
 
Studienteilnahmestunden* und Verlosung von 3 mal CHF 50!! 
========================================================== 
 
Hallo! 
 
Du hast dich letzten November in der Vorlesung Sozialpsychologie bei Prof. Hornung in die 
Teilnehmerliste für meine Entscheidungsexperimente eingeschrieben. Das Experiment kann bequem 
online auf jedem Computer durchgeführt werden und dauert nur 20-25 min. Es geht darum, sich in 
zwei verschiedene Problemsituationen hinein zu versetzen, welche einen Bezug zu gesellschaftlichen 
und alltagsrelevanten Themen haben. Vielen Dank für deine Teilnahme! 
 
Deine Vorteile dabei: Du bekommst eine halbe Studienteilnahmestunde* gutgeschrieben, nimmst an 
einer Verlosung von 3 mal CHF 50 teil und bekommst einen interessanten Einblick in 
sozialpsychologische Online-Forschung.  
 
Link zum Online-Experiment: 
http://www.psychologie.unizh.ch/cognisoz/survey/exp2 
 
Nochmals herzlichen Dank und ein erfolgreiches 2007! 
Liebe Grüsse 
 
Martin Hanselmann 
 
 
PS: Dieses Experiment ist unabhängig von der Studie von Dorothea Wiesmann, Patrick Meier und 
Monika Leemann, für welche momentan ebenfalls TeilnehmerInnen gesucht werden. 
 
 
* Bis zum Abschluss des Bachelor-Studiums in Psychologie müssen 10 Studienteilnahmestunden 
nachgewiesen werden. Es wird empfohlen, bereits im Assessmentstudium mit der Teilnahme an 
Studien zu beginnen. Siehe Wegleitung: 
http://www.psychologie.unizh.ch/studium/_pdf/wegleitung_16.10.06.pdf 
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6.1.6 Experiment 2: Online Questionnaire 
Note. The online questionnaire was implemented using Unipark EFS Survey 
(http://www.unipark.info). Below, the general procedure of the questionnaire using one 
selected decision scenario is shown. The second scenario followed the same procedure. 
In some cases, response scales have been recoded for the purpose of the manuscript. 
Items which do not pertain to the research reported here are omitted. 
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6.1.6.2 Scenario: Taboo Trade-Off “Flood Protection” 
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6.2 Appendix to the Manuscript Hanselmann, Tanner, & Duc (2010) 
6.2.1 Experiment 1: Decision Scenarios 
6.2.1.1 Taboo Trade-Off “Counterterrorism” 
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6.2.1.2 Tragic Trade-Off “Kidnapping” 
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6.2.2 Experiment 1: E-Mail Invitation 
 
Subject: Und du, wie entscheidest du dich? Eine Online-Studie 
 
Liebe Studentin, Lieber Student 
 
Deine Meinungen und Einstellungen sind wichtige Bestandteile deiner Persönlichkeit und beeinflussen 
dich in deinem Handeln. Welchen Einfluss haben sie auf deine Entscheidungen, welche du bei 
aktuellen gesellschaftlichen Streitfragen oder in Situationen des Alltags triffst? 
 
Anhand einer kurzen Online-Studie untersuchen wir das Entscheidungsverhalten in verschiedenen 
Situationen. Wir präsentieren dir drei hypothetische, aber dennoch realistische 
Entscheidungssituationen, in welche du dich hineinversetzen sollst.  
 
Deine Teilnahme an dieser Studie ist für uns äusserst wertvoll! Sie dauert nur etwa 15-20 Minuten. 
Alle Angaben werden selbstverständlich vertraulich und anonym behandelt. Am Schluss kannst Du an 
einer Verlosung teilnehmen. 
 
Link zur Online-Studie: 
http://www.psychologie.unizh.ch/cognisoz/survey/stpv2 
 
Wir sind auf deine Unterstützung angewiesen - vielen Dank, dass du dabei bist! 
 
Liebe Grüsse 
Martin Hanselmann 
 
 
 
Martin Hanselmann 
Universität Zürich 
Psychologisches Institut 
Kognitive Sozialpsychologie 
Telefon: 044 634 41 06 
E-Mail: martin.hanselmann@psychologie.unizh.ch 
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6.2.3 Experiment 1: Online Questionnaire 
Note. The online questionnaire was implemented using Unipark EFS Survey 
(http://www.unipark.info). Below, the general procedure of the questionnaire using one 
selected decision scenario is shown. The alternative scenario followed the same 
procedure. In some cases, response scales have been recoded for the purpose of the 
manuscript. Scenarios and items which do not pertain to the research reported here are 
omitted. 
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6.2.3.2 Scenario: Taboo Trade-Off “Counterterrorism” 
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6.2.3.3 Conclusion 
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6.2.4 Experiments 2 and 3: Decision Scenarios 
6.2.4.1 Taboo Trade-Off “Robbery” 
 
 
 
6.2.4.2 Tragic Trade-Off “Time Bomb” 
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6.2.5 Experiments 2 and 3: E-Mail Invitation 
 
Subject: Und du, wie entscheidest du dich? Eine Online-Studie 
 
Liebe Studentin, lieber Student 
 
Deine Überzeugungen und Einstellungen sind wichtige Faktoren, wenn es um  
das tägliche Handeln geht. Welchen Einfluss haben sie auf deine  
Entscheidungen, welche du bei aktuellen gesellschaftlichen Streitfragen  
oder in Situationen des Alltags triffst? 
 
In unserer Forschung untersuchen wir solche Entscheidungen und führen  
nun eine kurze Online-Studie durch. Deine Teilnahme an dieser Studie ist  
für uns äusserst wertvoll und dauert nur 10 - 15 Minuten. Alle Angaben  
werden selbstverständlich vertraulich und anonym behandelt. 
 
Um an der Studie teilzunehmen, klicke bitte auf den folgenden Link: 
http://ww3.unipark.de/uc/entscheidungsstudie4 
 
Wir freuen uns auf deine Teilnahme, herzlichen Dank! 
 
Liebe Grüsse, 
 
Martin Hanselmann 
Andrea Steiger 
Kathrin Derungs 
Prof. Dr. C. Tanner 
 
Universität Zürich 
Psychologisches Institut 
Kognitive Sozialpsychologie 
Telefon: 044 635 71 76 
E-Mail: entscheidungsstudie.unizh@gmail.com 
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6.2.6 Experiment 2: Online Questionnaire 
Note. The online questionnaire was implemented using Unipark EFS Survey 
(http://www.unipark.info). Below, the general procedure of the questionnaire using one 
selected decision scenario is shown. The alternative scenario followed the same 
procedure. In some cases, response scales have been recoded for the purpose of the 
manuscript. Scenarios and items which do not pertain to the research reported here are 
omitted. 
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6.2.6.2 Scenario: Taboo Trade-Off “Robbery” 
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6.2.7 Experiment 3: Online Questionnaire 
Note. The online questionnaire was implemented using Unipark EFS Survey 
(http://www.unipark.info). Below, the general procedure of the questionnaire using one 
selected decision scenario is shown. The alternative scenario followed the same 
procedure. In some cases, response scales have been recoded for the purpose of the 
manuscript. Scenarios and items which do not pertain to the research reported here are 
omitted. 
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6.2.7.2 Scenario: Taboo Trade-Off “Robbery” 
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6.2.7.3 Conclusion  
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